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Abstract
Opioid dependence and opioid related deaths are a public health problem which
the United States Centers of Disease Control have declared an epidemic. While opioid
agonist therapy for opioid addiction has been accepted as the most effective treatment
for opioid dependence among academics, and office based buprenorphine treatment
has been available in the Unites States for over 10 years, OB buprenorphine faces many
barriers to widespread adoption. Empirical data on the geographic distribution of
physicians able to prescribe buprenorphine and the prescribing patterns of those
physicians show considerable unevenness in access and utilization of treatment
services.
Federal-level policies have recently been implemented to expand access to
opioid agonist therapy, but the medium and long term impacts of these policy changes
on individual outcomes, public health, and geographic access equity are not yet clear.
This dissertation compares two recent federal level policies on expanding access
to buprenorphine treatment: raising the regulatory limit on the number of patients a
provider can treat (implemented July, 2016), and extending prescribing privileges to
nurse practitioners and physician assistants (implemented February, 2017), using an
empirically supported Agent Based Simulation model. Policies are assessed by a novel,
at-a-glance, quantitative access equity metric: the Spatial Potential Access Gini Index, in
addition to year-end treatment utilization, opioid overdose deaths, and the amount of
illicit medication diversion.
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In the simulation, expanding access by increasing the patient limit did not result
in more equitable spatial access, while extending prescribing to NPs and PAs increased
both utilization and spatial access equity. This is likely due to empirically supported
model assumptions that NPs and PAs providing primary care often serve in medically
underserved areas including rural and remote regions. Extending prescribing to these
practitioners opens up new treatment locations changing the spatial distribution of
treatment opportunities. Changing patient limits does not change the overall spatial
distribution of services, so spatial access equity does not change even if overall
treatment supply gets better or worse.
The primary contribution of this work is the Spatial Potential Access Lorenz Curve
and the Spatial Potential Access Gini Index, measures that aggregate individual-level
Spatial Potential Access Scores commonly used in health care geography to map and
identify areas of access disparity within a region. The equitability of Spatial Potential
Access is calculated by using the Lorenz Curve, which is commonly used to characterize
the distribution of wealth or income in a society, from which a Gini Index is
calculated. The Spatial Potential Access Gini Index allows for direct comparison of
complex quantitative information about the geographic distribution of supply and
demand in a region with other regions, or in response to policies that impact supply or
demand within the region. The measure has potential applications in simulation studies
on the spatial allocation of services, allowing equity assessment of policy alternatives, as
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well as in empirical work, allowing equity comparisons of different regions, or in hybrid
studies in which policy experiments are conducted on data-rich maps.
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1

Introduction
Opioid dependence and opioid related deaths are a public health problem which

the United States Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have declared an
epidemic. While mediation assisted therapy (OAT) for opioid addiction has been
accepted as the most effective treatment for opioid dependence among academics, and
office based (OB) buprenorphine treatment has been available in the Unites States for
over 15 years, OB buprenorphine faces many barriers to widespread adoption. Policy
makers at agencies and professional societies concerned with substance abuse and
mental health have instituted federal-level policies that could expand access to and
adoption of OB buprenorphine treatment. The CDC, the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA),
the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), and the Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) have not achieved consensus on changes in federal policy.
This is not surprising because the medium and long term impacts of policy changes on
individual outcomes and public health are often difficult to determine soon after
implementation.
An empirically supported system-level model and policy exploration tool could
give stakeholders and policy makers a big picture understanding of the current state of
OB buprenorphine provision, and allow for policy exploration that reveals probable
outcomes of policy changes. Models can leverage the considerable amount of research
on treatment outcomes, barriers and facilitators to treatment access and provision, as
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well as the lived experience of researchers, patients and practitioners and synthesize
this research and experience into a high-level whole.
Empirical data on the geographic distribution of physicians able to prescribe
buprenorphine and the prescribing patterns of those physicians show considerable
unevenness in access and utilization of treatment services. Measuring and comparing
this access inequality in the context of a simulation-based policy exploration requires a
simple at-a-glance, quantitative access equality metric because of the large number of
simulated scenarios that need to be compared. In this dissertation I define a metric and
demonstrate its usefulness by comparing simulation outcomes of an agent-based model
of buprenorphine treatment access.
1.1

Background

1.1.1 Opioid use disorder is a public health problem in the United States
The opioid class of drugs is one of the oldest drugs known to man. People have
been using extracts of the opium poppy to relieve pain for thousands of years
(Brownstein, 1993). Opioids also induce euphoria, and opium abuse has been recorded
as early as the 16th century (Brownstein, 1993). In modern times, opioids are still used
to relieve pain and still used for euphoria. We now understand that sustained abuse can
lead to fundamental and long-lasting changes in brain structure and function (Leshner,
1997). While many believe that drug dependence is the result of bad choices or weak
will, drug dependence is now recognized as a chronic relapsing brain disorder (Baler &
Volkow, 2006; Volkow, Fowler, & Wang, 2004; Volkow & Li, 2004).
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Under the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
version IV (DSM-IV), opioid abuse and opioid dependence were regarded as two
separate disorders (American Psychiatric Association & DSM-IV, 1994). The latest
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) combines opioid abuse and dependence into
opioid use disorder (OUD), which is a spectrum of problematic use from mild to severe
depending on the number of criteria met (American Psychiatric Association & others,
2013). Opioid use disorder, which encompasses both prescription opioid analgesic
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(POA) use disorder and heroin use disorder, is a significant public health problem in the
United States and worldwide. The number of people who have used opioids
nonmedically as well as the number of people with opioid use disorders in the United
States have risen dramatically since the early 1990s (See Figures 1-1 and 1-2, SAMHSA,
2014b), reaching an estimated 2.14 million in 2016 (SAMHSA 2017).

Figure 1-2: Number of people who used POA nonmedically (left plot) and heroin (right plot) in the past
year. Note different scales. As the number of past year users of POA flattened, the number of past year
heroin users began to rise. Source: NSDUH, SAMHSA.
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Figure 1-1: Number of people with POA or heroin use disorder. Note the continued
rise in POA use disorder despite the flattened trend in past year POA use above.
Source: NSDUH, SAMHSA.
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The problem of opioid use disorder is not restricted to cities. According to the
2012 National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH), 50% of people with opioid use
disorder live in large Metropolitan Service Areas (MSAs), 35% live in small MSAs, and
15% live in non-metro areas (SAMHSA, 2013b). Negative health outcomes associated
with opioid use disorder include fatal and non-fatal overdose (Chen, Hedegaard, &
Warner, 2013), higher all-cause mortality (Degenhardt et al., 2009), and HCV and HIV
infection risk if using intravenously (Garfein et al., 1998; Schoenbaum et al., 1989;
Thorpe et al., 2002). The number of deaths involving POAs has also risen dramatically
since the 1990s paralleling the rise in use and use disorder, and deaths attributed to
heroin have nearly tripled since 2010 (see Figure 1-3; Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, 2015).

Figure 1-3: Opioid overdose deaths 1999-2013: Source: CDC Wonder Multiple Cause of Death,
1999-2013 Query, http://wonder.cdc.gov/mcd.html
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1.1.2 Opioid Agonist Therapy is Effective
Pharmacotherapies, or Opioid Agonist Therapy (OAT) are highly effective
treatments for opioid use disorder(i.e. POA use disorder and heroin use disorder;
Mattick, Kimber, Breen, & Davoli, 2002). Pharmacotherapy for OUD has two basic
types, opioid antagonist treatment, and opioid agonist treatment. Opioid antagonists
(including naloxone and naltrexone) bind to opioid receptors in the brain but do not
activate the receptors, effectively blocking the receptor—not allowing the brain to feel
the effects of opioid drugs (Comer et al., 2002; Martin, Jasinski, & Mansky, 1973),
reducing the risk of opioid overdose (Hulse et al., 2005), and reversing opioid overdoses
(Kerr, Kelly, Dietze, Jolley, & Barger, 2009).
Opioid agonists bind to opioid receptors in the brain and also activate the
receptors, which is why agonist treatment was previously referred to as substitution or
maintenance therapy. Opioid agonist treatment reduces cravings for opioids, reduces
use of illicit opioids, and allows for normal functioning (Payte, 1997). Until 2002
methadone was the only drug approved for opioid agonist treatment, and only within
highly regulated Opioid Treatment Programs (OTPs) (Payte, 1997). Methadone was
considered a good choice for MAT because of its high oral availability, slow onset of
action and long-acting duration of action (Payte, 1997). In 2000, the Drug Abuse
Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA 2000) became law, allowing doctors to use schedule III – V
controlled drugs for the treatment of addiction (Carl Levin & Orrin Hatch, 2000).
Methadone is a schedule II drug and cannot be used to treat addiction in private
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doctors’ offices. Buprenorphine, a schedule III drug approved by the FDA in 2002 for the
treatment of opioid dependence, is the only opioid agonist that meets the criteria of
DATA 2000. Like methadone, buprenorphine has a long duration of action which allows
for daily or less than daily dosing, and a strong safety profile due to the ceiling effect on
respiratory depression—the primary cause of opioid overdose deaths (Dahan et al.,
2006). (A ceiling effect on respiratory depression means that higher and higher doses of
buprenorphine do not result in a higher risk of respiratory depression.)
Office-based (OB) OUD treatment has many potential benefits over traditional
treatment in OTPs: greater treatment accessibility especially in areas without OTPs, less
stigma, greater flexibility to tailor treatment to patients’ needs, and less exposure to
drug dealers who may prey on those waiting to get treatment at OTPs (Fiellin &
O’Connor, 2002a)(Fiellin & O’Connor, 2002). However, there are still significant barriers
to the widespread adoption of OB buprenorphine treatment, and many communities
lack adequate access to OB buprenorphine treatment (Rosenblatt, Andrilla, Catlin, &
Larson, 2015a; Stein, Pacula, et al., 2015).
Michael Botticelli, the Director of the ONDCP through 2016; Pam Hyde, the
Administrator of SAMHSA through 2015; Senators Orrin Hatch and Carl Levin, the
sponsors of DATA 2000; Nora Volkow, the Director of the NIDA, and former President
Barack Obama have all made public statements about the need to expand access to OB
buprenorphine (ONDCP 2015; SAMHSA 2014c; Volkow, Frieden, Hyde, & Cha, 2014).
The second point of the 2014 President’s Plan to Reform Drug Policy states that to
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reform drug policy the nation must “expand access to treatment for Americans
struggling with addiction” (ONDCP 2014), and the 2015 National Drug Control Strategy
stresses “integrating treatment for substance use disorders into health care and
supporting recovery” (ONDCP 2015).
There are two policies within the DATA 2000 legislation that limited providers’
capacity to prescribe buprenorphine. Physicians can only prescribe to a maximum of 30
patients in the first year, and 100 or 275 patients thereafter (109th Congress, 2005; Carl
Levin & Orrin Hatch, 2000; SAMHSA 2016a), and up until 2017 only physicians could
prescribe buprenorphine, not other medical care providers who have prescribing
authority including nurse practitioners (NPs) or physician assistants (PAs) (Fornili &
Burda, 2009). Issues around access to buprenorphine including these policies are
examined at length in the literature review section (Chapter 2).
1.2

Research Questions


Question 1: What functional form should an aggregated individual-level access
inequality metric have for it to be sensitive enough to detect differences in access
equity in different regions or due to different policy choices?



Question 2: How equitably distributed is access to OB buprenorphine treatment
spatially in the current OB buprenorphine treatment system given regulatory caps
on patient numbers, physician preferences, and geographic distribution of
treatment seekers and providers?
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Question 3: To what extent would changing the DATA 2000 patient limit per
physician change utilization of buprenorphine, spatial access equity, opioid
overdose deaths and medication diversion?



Question 4: To what extent would various levels of buprenorphine prescribing
adoption by Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants change utilization of
buprenorphine, spatial access equity, opioid overdose deaths, and medication
diversion?

1.3

Motivation and Significance
Treatment capacity, accessibility of OB buprenorphine treatment, and gaps

between treatment need and treatment capacity are complex and current national
survey-based metrics do not capture this complexity. The number of buprenorphine
providers, measured at the county level, serves as a proxy measure for inequality of
access (Rosenblatt, Andrilla, Catlin, & Larson, 2015b; Stein, Gordon, Dick, Burns, Pacula,
Farmer, & Leslie, 2015). One standardized approach for identifying communities with a
shortage of waivered physicians given demand was modeled after the Health Resources
and Services Administration (HRSA) Health Provider Shortage Area (HPSA) metric (Dick
et al., 2015). The authors defined shortage at the county level which may obscure
inaccessibility due to the long travel distances required to access services in sparsely
populated rural counties, and inaccessibility faced by marginalized urban residents who
may not be able to travel even modest distances to access services in the counties they
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live in. An individual level metric may capture this scarcity where there appears to be
abundance by other metrics.
However, individual level metrics cannot be used in data models. The number
and location of people requiring services is not known due to patient privacy and
confidentiality concerns; therefore proxy measures must be used. In a simulation, one
can generate synthetic populations based on these proxy measures and national survey
data, and place synthetic people in a plausible landscape. One can then calculate how
accessible services are to each individual demander based how many providers there
are, the capacity of those providers, the distance to the providers, the number of other
demanders, and the distance the individual is willing to travel. Aggregating all individual
access measures into a single spatial access inequality index can allow for quick,
quantitatively meaningful comparisons of simulated policy experiment outcomes.
1.3.1 Potential Significance
There are two distinct needs that this study addresses. First policy makers and
practitioners know that buprenorphine access is uneven across the country and within
the states, but this unevenness has only been captured at the county level and through
proxy measures. An empirically informed agent based model can visually display the
mismatch between supply of and demand for OB buprenorphine treatment and
describe this mismatch quantitatively. This will give a deeper understanding of
treatment capacity and access through quickly conveyed visual information, and
nuanced quantitative information.

11
Second, a metric that aggregates map-based measures of spatial potential access
could be useful to researchers who study access disparities, such as unequal access to
health providers, food outlets, parks, or affordable quality childcare. Map based metrics
convey detailed information, but can be difficult to use to compare access in different
regions or after policy implementation. A single, aggregated metric could allow
researchers to make quick comparisons. Is spatial potential access better under policy A
or B? Does region C or D locate services more fairly? Spatial potential access will be
defined more fully in Section 2.2.

12
2

Literature Review
This review of literature and data is organized into four main sections:


Buprenorphine treatment capacity



Measuring potential spatial access and studies on regional differences in
buprenorphine access



Two major buprenorphine policies: the patient limit, and the exclusion of
non-physician prescribers in the DATA waiver system


2.1

Simulations for exploring substance abuse policy

Opioid Agonist Therapy treatment capacity
Prior to 2002, OAT was only available in highly regulated Opioid Treatment

Programs (OTPs), or in clinical trials (Fiellin & O’Connor, 2002a). In 2000, the 106th
Congress passed the Drug Addiction Treatment Act of 2000 (DATA 2000) which allowed
qualified physicians to prescribe schedule III – V controlled substances for the treatment
of OUD for up to 30 patients per practice (Carl Levin & Orrin Hatch, 2000). Physicians
could qualify for a DEA waiver under DATA 2000 by taking an 8-hour training course, by
being board certified in addiction medicine or addiction psychiatry, or by having
participated in a buprenorphine clinical trial (Fiellin & O’Connor, 2002a). It took an
additional two years for buprenorphine to be approved by the FDA for the treatment of
opioid dependence as a schedule III drug (Campbell & Lovell, 2012; Jaffe & O’Keeffe,
2003). Office-based OAT with buprenorphine began in 2002. Prior to office-based OUD
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treatment with buprenorphine, only approximately 170,000 of the estimated 810,000
(21%) opioid dependent patients in the US were receiving OAT through OTPs, compared
to approximately 55% opioid dependent patients during the same period in France,
which had implemented a general practitioner focused, office-based buprenorphine
treatment system (Fatseas & Auriacombe, 2007). While more strictly regulated than the
largely unregulated French system, DATA 2000 similarly enabled office-based treatment
with buprenorphine, and was intended to increase treatment capacity (Boone et al.,
2004; Bridge, Fudala, Herbert, & Leiderman, 2003; Thomas et al., 2008), engage new
kinds of patients in OAT (Fiellin, Rosenheck, & Kosten, 2001; Sullivan, Chawarski,
O’Connor, Schottenfeld, & Fiellin, 2005), and reach patients unable to access OTPs (Egan
et al., 2010; Mark, Woody, Juday, & Kleber, 2001; Rounsaville & Kosten, 2000) which
were only operating in 44 out of 50 states (WESTAT & The Avisa Group, 2006) and
tended to be located in urban areas.
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SAMHSA maintains a record of all providers who completed buprenorphine
training and obtained DEA waivers to prescribe each year since 2002. These data are
publicly available and searchable on the SAMHSA website1 (SAMHSA 2016b). The DEA
maintains a list of all providers with waivers. This total number of providers with waivers
has increased steadily since 2002 (see Figure 2-1). The number of providers obtaining
either a new 30 patient waiver or electing to increase to the 100 patient waiver each
year increased from 2002 to 2007, held steady from 2008 to 2012, and again increased
from 2012 to 2016 (see Figure 2-2). The spike in 2007 was likely due to regulation
change that allowed providers to treat up to 100 patients and pent up demand by
providers who would have increased their patient loads in earlier years. In July, 2016,

Total Waivered Providers
45000
40000
35000
30000

30

100

275

25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Figure 2-1: Total number of providers waivered to prescribe buprenorphine at three patient limit levels,
30, 100, and 275.

1

http://www.samhsa.gov/medication-assisted-treatment/physician-program-data/certifiedphysicians?field_bup_us_state_code_value=All
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Figure 2-2: Number of new waivered providers per year. 2016 is and underestimate because it only
counts those providers who obtained waivers through July (Substance Abuse and Mental Health
Services Administration, 2016a).

board certified addiction specialists could apply to further increase their patient limits to
275 patients if they met certain regulatory requirements (Federal Register, 2016). By
January 2018, 4151 practitioners opted to increase their patient limit (SAMHSA 2018).
Multiplying the total number of waivered physicians by their certification level yields the
total potential office-based buprenorphine capacity shown in Figure 2-3. This measure
of total potential office-based buprenorphine capacity was used to define a treatment
gap between the number of people who need opioid agonist treatment and the total
capacity of the treatment system to meet that demand (Jones, Campopiano, Baldwin, &
McCance-Katz, 2015).
However, this definition of potential capacity does not capture the fact that
some providers who complete training and get waivers never prescribe, or are not
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Figure 2-3: Total potential OB buprenorphine treatment capacity assuming every provider treats up
to the maximum allowable limit of his or her DATA waiver.

currently prescribing buprenorphine. Four studies suggest that the number of
physicians who do not prescribe to any patients has fallen since 2002. In a study of a
nationally representative sample of addiction specialists in 2003, only 58% of
respondents with waivers had prescribed buprenorphine to any patients (Kissin,
McLeod, Sonnefeld, & Stanton, 2006). In early 2005, “The SAMHSA Evaluation of the
Impact of the DATA Waiver Program” reported that 67% of physicians with waivers were
prescribing (WESTAT & The Avisa Group, 2006). By 2008, the percentage of providers
who had prescribed to patients in the last 90 day had risen to 75%2, and the percentage
of providers who had never prescribed buprenorphine fell to 17%2 (Arfken, Johanson, di

2

Calculations by the author. Arfken, et al, (2010) separates providers into those on the CSAT locator list
and those not on the list, the 75% is a weighted average of the two provider populations.
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Menza, & Schuster, 2010). In rural areas of Washington state, Quest, et al. (2012) found
that 83% of the 24 surveyed physicians were actively prescribing buprenorphine in 2010
(Quest, Merrill, Roll, Saxon, & Rosenblatt, 2012).
Even when providers do prescribe buprenorphine, many do not prescribe up to
their certification level. There have been few studies on how many patients providers
typically treat, but there appears to have been an upward trend since 2002, particularly
after 2007, when the patient limit was raised from 30 to 100. Gordon, et al. (2007)
found that on average waivered physicians at VA health facilities were prescribing to 4.3
patients in 2005 (Gordon et al., 2007). Reif, et al (2007) found that in 2005, the surveyed
sample of early adopter buprenorphine prescribers wrote an average of 15.6
prescriptions a month. They also found that the mean total number of patients ever
treated was 72, and the median 30, meaning that the distribution of prescribing level
was skewed (Reif, Thomas, & Wallack, 2007a). Arfken, et al. (2010), found that the
average number of patients per provider among providers with at least one patient rose
substantially from 2004 to 2008 in a nationally representative sample of waivered
buprenorphine providers (see Figure 2-4; Arfken et al., 2010). This was true for both
providers who chose to be on SAMHSA’s Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT)
locator list and for those who chose not to be on the list. In 2008, the average number
of patients per provider regardless of list participation was 32.42. This average drops to
23.5 when including non-prescribers2 (Arfken et al., 2010). Quest, et al (2012) found that
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rural providers in Washington
State treating at least one
patient were treating an
average of 23 patients, with
the top one third of providers
treating an average of 51.6
patients, the middle third
Figure 2-4: Mean patients per provider. Filled points represent
providers on the CSAT locator list, hollow points represent
providers not on the list (Arfken et al., 2010).

treating 14.2 patients, and the
lowest third treating an

average of 2 patients (Quest et al., 2012). Stacey Sigmon (2015) analyzed Vermont
Medicaid claims from February through April 2014 and found that providers treated an
average of 14.8 patients with a range of 1 to 76. However, as Reif and colleagues noted
in 2005, she found the distribution of patients per provider was highly skewed, with
29.3% treating only one patient and 48.1% treating under 5 patients.
In the 14 years since office-based buprenorphine prescribing, substantial
increases in OAT capacity have been achieved. Currently there is the potential to treat
over 2.4 million people with buprenorphine under the office-based DATA 2000 waiver
system. This new capacity is in addition to treatment capacity afforded through OTPs.
From 2003 through 2013, though the number of OTPs has remained relatively stable,
the number of patients receiving either methadone or buprenorphine at substance
abuse treatment facilities rose 66% from 227,003 to 378,456 (SAMHSA 2014a). Using
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the definition of “treatment gap” established by Jones, et al (2015) comparing the
prevalence of opioid use disorder to total treatment capacity, the treatment gap
appears to be shrinking. Jones and colleagues found that the difference between the
number of people with opioid abuse or dependence and total treatment capacity was
914,000 people, or 40% of total treatment need in 2012 (Jones et al., 2015). Currently
the “treatment gap” has closed; as 2,140,000 people met criteria for opioid use disorder
in 2016 (most recently available data: SAMHSA 2017) and total buprenorphine
treatment capacity reached 2,416,000 in 2016.
2.2

Spatial potential access: A spatially informed measure of relative shortage or
surplus
Spatial accessibility is defined as the potential for geographically dispersed service

demanders (e.g. people with OUD) to reach geographically dispersed opportunities (e.g.
OAT slots;(Páez, Scott, & Morency, 2012). Potential access, a measure of whether
people have the opportunity to use a service differs from realized access, a measure of
actual service utilization. Spatial potential access measures are used to quantify
regional differences in ability, or opportunity to use services and have been used to
highlight regional differences in access various goods and services including: healthy
food (Charreire et al., 2010; Leslie, Frankenfeld, & Makara, 2012; Ning, 2012; Ver Ploeg,
Dutko, & Breneman, 2014; Walker, Keane, & Burke, 2010), day care providers (Páez et
al., 2012), recreation or park facilities (Nicholls, 2001; Talen & Anselin, 1998), and health
services (see, for example: Delamater, 2013; Guagliardo, 2004; Joseph & Bantock, 1982;
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Khan, 1992; Knox, 1978; Li, Serban, & Swann, 2015; Lowe & Sen, 1996; W. Luo, 2004; W.
Luo & Qi, 2009; McGrail & Humphreys, 2009; Ngui & Apparicio, 2011).
The simplest measure of spatial potential access is the regional availability
method, also called the “container” or ratio method (W. Luo & Qi, 2009). When
measuring regional availability, the region under consideration, such as a county or
census tract, is pre-defined and a supply/demand ratio is calculated by summing up all
supply opportunities and all demanders within that region. In the case of physicians, a
physician/population ratio is generated and compared to a standard established by
professional determination of physician need (Feldstein, 2012). The two measures of
health provider shortage used by the Department of Health and Human Services—
Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs) and Medically Underserved Areas (MUAs)—
are sophisticated container methods that make adjustments for need within the service
regions and for resources in contiguous areas (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, 2016b, 2016a).
There are two critiques of the regional availability method. First, the method
assumes that people within the pre-defined region do not seek services outside the
region. To assure that this assumption is valid, the region under consideration must be
fairly large. Second, one must assume that there is little variation in access across the
region considered—that access is essentially equal at all points within the container.
This assumption requires that the defined regions be fairly small (W. Luo & Qi, 2009).
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Geographers and demographers have been addressing these limitations for
decades. The gravity model of accessibility addresses the second limitation—that access
is not uniform at different distances between demanders and opportunities. In 1948,
John Q. Stewart proposed formal laws of demographic gravitation, the application of the
Newtonian laws of gravity to population groups. He presents the equation for physical
gravitational potential VA which a mass m at point a produces on a second mass M at
point A (with gravitational constant G):

𝑉𝐴 =

𝐺𝑚
𝑑

(1)

and then applies it to population groups. The potentials of population 1 and population
2 become:

𝑉1 =

𝐺𝑁2
𝑑

; 𝑉2 =

𝐺𝑁1
𝑑

(2)

where V is the population potential, N1 and N2 are the number of people considered, d is
the distance between them, and G is a constant “left for future determination”
(Stewart, 1948, p. 34). Population potential is directly proportional to the size of the
population and inversely proportional to the distance from it.
Walter G. Hansen (1959) expanded Stewart’s population-over-distance
population potential concept and defined a measure of population potential as the
“intensity of the possibility of interaction…[or] the spatial distribution of activities about
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a point, adjusted for the ability and desire of people or firms to overcome spatial
separation” (W. G. Hansen, 1959, p. 73). Formally:

1𝑆2

=

𝑂2
𝛽

𝑑1−2

(3)

where 1S2 is the measure of the accessibility in zone 1 of an activity in zone 2. O2 is the
size of the opportunity in zone 2, which could be the number of jobs, parks, people, etc.
d1-2 is either the travel time or distance between zone 1 and 2, and β is an exponent that
determines the effect of distance or travel time between the zones. The total
accessibility in zone 1 to opportunity type O is the sum of the accessibility in each zone:

𝑆𝑖 = ∑
𝑗

𝑂𝑗
𝛽

𝑑𝑖𝑗

(4)

The addition of an exponent β to the distance function was a response to
criticism that the original population potential model adhered too rigidly to the physical
gravity model with an exponent of 1 on the distance term. The author contends that “it
is generally agreed” that an exponential function be used for the distance decay term,
and that the choice of an exponential function is empirically justified (W. G. Hansen,
1959, p. 74). Changing the exponent on the distance decay term alters how restrictive
travel time or distance is for the activity in question. People are willing to travel
different distances for different types of activities. For example, a person might find it
reasonable to travel 40 minutes to work, but unreasonable to travel more than 15
minutes to buy groceries. Different values for the distance decay exponent reflect the
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differences in people’s willingness to travel. Hansen states that the value of the
exponent, β, should be determined from empirical studies of people’s actual travel
behavior. So even though the relative accessibility measure, 1S2, is a potential access
measure, the exponent of the distance decay function is derived empirically from actual
utilization data.
Hansen’s claim that “it is generally agreed” that an exponential function be used
for the distance decay or friction term in a relative accessibility measure may have been
overstated. In D. R. Ingram’s article “The Concept of Accessibility: A Search for an
Operational Form” (1971), a negative exponential distance decay term was one of
several operational forms for accessibility. Ingram’s definition of accessibility, “the
inherent characteristic (or advantage) of a place with respect to overcoming some form
of spatially operating source of friction (for example, time and/or distance)” (Ingram,
1971, p. 73), is consistent with Hansen’s (1959) definition. He defines relative
accessibility as the degree to which two locations are connected based on their
separation, and integral accessibility as the interconnection (at a given location) of all
other points on a surface. Generally:
𝑛

𝑆𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗
𝑗=1

where Ai is the integral accessibility at location i, or the total accessibility of all
opportunities at location i, and aij is the relative accessibility of location j at i. Unlike

(5)
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Hansen, this functional form does not account for the attractiveness or the size of the
activity at location j. Ingram explores various functional forms for relative accessibility,
sij, including average straight line distance (a linear measure):

𝑆𝑖 =

∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑛

(6)

where locations with lower S values have greater accessibility. If we desire, instead, that
larger S values imply greater accessibility, we can calculate the inverse, and the
accessibility function is equivalent to Stewart’s (1948) original gravity potential measure.
Ingram also explores several curvilinear functions for distance decay including the
reciprocal exponential function (with locations at negligible distance having accessibility
scores of 100):
−𝑘
𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 100𝑑𝑖𝑗

(7)

If we substitute Sj, the size of the activity at location j for 100, this is equivalent
to the accessibility measure in Hansen (1959). The reciprocal exponential function
results in rapid decreases in accessibility with increasing distance. The negative
exponential function:
−𝑑
𝑠 = 100𝑒𝑖𝑗

(8)

results in a gentler decline of the effect of distance on accessibility. Both functions (7)
and (8) are limited by the fact that they have rapid declines in accessibility at short
distances, meaning that place 5 minutes away, say, would be substantially less
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accessible than a place 2 minutes away. Ingram argues that the Gaussian function meets
intuitive requirements of a distance decay function: that accessibility be reasonably flat
near the origin, that the decline in accessibility at increasing distance be smooth, and
that accessibility approach zero at large distances. He defines a modified Gaussian
function:

𝑠𝑖𝑗 =

𝑑2
− 𝑖𝑗⁄𝑣
100𝑒

(9)

where v is a constant for the total area under consideration, and determines the width
of the curve. The author offers various, somewhat arbitrary ways of determining v,
including using average squared distance between all points, the radius of the smallest
circle that contains all points, or empirical determination from actual trip frequency
data.
These early gravity models captured an observed phenomenon in service
utilization, the distance decay effect. However, they were limited because they only
considered the supply side of accessibility measurement, not the demand side—
consumers’ competition for the opportunity, service or resource. For example: a
physician in a location closely surrounded by a high number of demanders may seem
highly accessible because the distances are short, but might not really be available
because she has insufficient capacity to meet the demand. Qing Shen (1998) critiques
the supply-side gravity models by stating that at least one of the following must be true:
demand is spread uniformly across the space, or the opportunities have no capacity

26
limitation (Shen, 1998). If demand is spread uniformly across the space, then there will
be no areas where competition or high demand strains the capacity of the resource
more than any other area. If the opportunities or resources considered have no
capacity limitation, such as very large public spaces, or broadcast TV signals, then
competition is not a relevant concern when measuring accessibility. Medical services,
however, do not meet these criteria. Demand is not uniform, and health service
providers have finite capacity.
To address differences in the demand side and competition for supply, Joseph
and Bantock (1982) generated a two-step method that integrates both supply and
demand while considering the friction of distance between the two (Joseph & Bantock,
1982). They, and many of the authors who extended their measure, were concerned
with modeling physician accessibility. So instead of using general language where
suppliers are referred to as opportunities, resources and the like, they use specific
language, referring to physicians and populations. They are concerned with how
accessible spatially dispersed physicians are to the spatially dispersed people they
purportedly serve. Like these authors, I will use the more specific physician/population
language from this point forward. First the supply-side accessibility of physicians is
calculated using the reciprocal exponential form of the gravity model from equation (4):

𝑆𝑖 = ∑
𝑗

𝑂𝑗
𝛽

𝑑𝑖𝑗

(10)
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where Si is the potential spatial accessibility of area i to physicians; Oj is a physician at
location j that is within the range of area i; dij is the distance between them; and β is the
exponent on the distance function. Then the potential demand on a physician at
location j is calculated:

𝐷𝑗 = ∑
𝑖

𝑃𝑖
𝛽

𝑑𝑗𝑖

(11)

where Pi is the size of the population in area i. Therefore, the demand, Dj, is
proportional to the size of the population within the physician’s catchment area, and
inversely proportional to a function of the distance from that population. Combining the
equations (4) and (10) yields a weighted relative accessibility measure:

𝑂𝑗

𝐴𝑖 = ∑

(

(∑𝑖

𝑃𝑖
𝛽)
𝑑𝑖𝑗 )
𝛽

𝑑𝑖𝑗

𝑗

(12)

or:
𝐴𝑖 = ∑𝑗

𝑂𝑗
𝛽

𝐷𝑗 𝑑𝑖𝑗

, 𝐷𝑗 = ∑𝑖

𝑃𝑖
𝛽

𝑑𝑖𝑗

Q Shen (1998) generalized equation (11) further, to allow for alternative
functional forms for the distance decay function (Shen, 1998):

(13)
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𝐴𝑖 = ∑𝑗

𝑂𝑗 𝑓(𝑑𝑖𝑗 )
𝐷𝑗

, 𝐷𝑗 = ∑𝑖 𝑃𝑖 𝑓(𝑑𝑖𝑗 )

(14)

This more general form allows researchers the flexibility to calibrate the distance
decay function to the actual region they are studying. By adding the potential
population demand term to the original gravity model formulation, Joseph and Bantock
(1982) and those that followed addressed one of the fundamental criticisms of gravity
models: that they did not consider competition for available physicians by the
population.
With the advent and maturity of geographic information systems (GIS),
geographers became able to map physician locations precisely, to map population data
at a high level of granularity, and to estimate travel distances or travel times on actual
road networks. Geographers could then map potential access surfaces for areas
studied, and represent differences in spatial potential access in a visually compelling
way. These advances in mapping technology led to the development of the two-step
floating catchment area (2SFCA) and kernel density measures of accessibility.
Luo and Wang (2003) describe the 2SFCA method in this way:
Step 1: For each physician location j, search all population locations (k)
that are within a threshold travel time (d0) from location j (that is, catchment
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area of j), and compute the physician-to-population ratio, Rj, within the
catchment area:

𝑅𝑗 =

𝑆𝑗
∑𝑘 ∈{𝑑𝑗𝑘 ≤𝑑0 } 𝑃𝑘

(15)

where Pk is the population of tract k whose centroid falls within the catchment
(that is, djk ≤ d0), Sj is the number of physicians at location j, and dkj is the travel
time between k and j.
Step 2: For each population location i, search all physician locations (j)
that are within the threshold travel time (d0) from location i (that is, catchment
area i), and sum up the physician-to-population ratios, Rj, at these locations:

𝐴𝐹𝑖 = ∑

𝑗 ∈ {𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑑0 }

𝑅𝑗 = ∑

𝑆𝑗
𝑗 ∈ {𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑑0 } ∑𝑘 ∈{𝑑𝑗𝑘 ≤𝑑0 } 𝑃𝑘

(16)

where 𝐴𝐹𝑖 represents the accessibility at resident location i based on the twostep FCA method, Rj is the physician-to-population ratio at physician location j
whose centroid falls within the catchment centered at i (that is, dij ≤ d0), and dij is
the travel time between i and j (W. Luo & Wang, 2003, p. 872).
Computation of physician to population ratios in step one is an intuitive
extension of container-based methods of calculating regional availability. However, the
2SFCA method addresses the two major criticisms of the container method. First,
calculating each individual physician’s physician-to-population ratio within his or her
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individual catchment area in step 1 addresses the second criticism, that access is
assumed to be equal over the entire region considered. In the 2SFCA, method, each
physician location is considered individually, so there is no need to assume uniformity.
The second step of the 2SFCA method addresses the first criticism of container-based
regional availability methods, that patients are assumed not to seek services outside the
region. Summing the physician-to-population ratios of physicians reachable from each
population location allows that patients may choose to visit any physician that is
reachable. In application, authors tend to use buffer zones around the region under
consideration to allow for “edge correction” of estimation of accessibility at peripheral
regions (see, for example Yang, Goerge, & Mullner, 2006).
Though the steps employed calculating accessibility by the 2SFCA method and
the gravity-based models are different, and may be conceptually dissimilar, it is clear
that the final form of the 2SFCA accessibility equation (14), is a special form of the
general gravity model equation (12) where the distance decay function is a dichotomous
function, where:

𝑓(𝑑𝑖𝑗 ) = {

1, 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑑0 ;
}
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(17)

Over the following decade, several authors modified either the gravity model or
the 2SFCA model to address limitations in each. The dichotomous function in the 2SFCA
was criticized as too rigid in assuming that a person was as willing or able to travel short
distances as long distances (W. Luo & Qi, 2009), so alternatives were proposed. Luo and
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Qi (2009) recognized the criticism of assumed uniformity of access across catchment
areas, but also criticized gravity models as overemphasizing the distance decay term,
resulting in concentric rings of access around physicians and excessive smoothing of the
accessibility surface. To address both limitations, Luo and Qi (2009) created the
enhanced two-step floating catchment area E2SFCA by applying weights to three travel
zones (z) to allow for distance decay effects. The weights are calculated from the
Gaussian function as follows:
2 ⁄𝛽 )

𝑤𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑑𝑖𝑗 ) = 𝑓(𝑧) = 𝑒 (−(𝑧−1)

(18)

Beta must be determined empirically or through calibration or sensitivity testing
methods. Graphically, the difference between the 2SFCA and E2SFCA can be seen in
Figure 2-5.

Figure 2-5: Weights, or values of the distance decay function in the 2SFCA and E2SFCA (Delamater, 2013)

Several modified forms of the 2SFCA method emerged over the years as
researchers found limitations in the E2SFCA when applying the method. In the simplest
modifications, different forms were proposed for the distance decay function
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(Schuurman, BéRubé, & Crooks, 2010), in others, steps were added to allow for variable
sized catchment areas (W. Luo & Whippo, 2012), or to add a selection weighting term to
account for competition among facilities (Wan, Zou, & Sternberg, 2012). Luo (2014)
proposed integrating the Huff model of selection probability for demand into the 2SFCA
method. In this case the physician-to-population ratio would be modified by the
probability that a person at a given location would select a given physician in their
catchment area over another based on the distances to each (J. Luo, 2014). Delamater’s
(2013) modified M2SFCA adjusted the number of beds available (the supply) based on
distance to the population, multiplying the supply term by the distance function twice,
arguing that inaccessible beds do not “count” as much as highly accessible beds
(Delamater, 2013). McGrail and Humphreys (2009) modified the 2SFCA to include a
distance decay term and a capping function that does not allow access at fringe rural
populations to be dominated by demand from outer metropolitan areas (McGrail &
Humphreys, 2009). Ngui and Apparicio (2011) modified the 2SFCA using carried
centrographic analysis and density analysis to adjust the supply side for their
“optimized” 2SFCA (Ngui & Apparicio, 2011).
All of these gravity-based models or 2SFCA methods generate quantitative
measures of relative accessibility for population locations within a given area, which can
be used to generate maps that qualitatively demonstrate disparities in accessibility
using heat mapping. However, additional steps are required to quantify disparities in
accessibility at each location. Wan and colleagues (2012) created the spatial access ratio
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(SPAR), which is a ratio of the accessibility index of each location and the mean
accessibility index of the entire area. A SPAR of greater than 1 indicates greater
accessibility than the overall mean. In defining an optimization problem in which a new
facility would be located to minimize the inequality in potential spatial access, Wang and
Tang (2013) simply define this inequality as:
𝑣𝑖 = (𝐴𝑖 − 𝑎)2

(19)

where vi is the deviation from the average accessibility, and a is a constant equal to the
total supply to total demand ratio for the entire area (Wang & Tang, 2013). In other
words, the constant, a, is equal to the population weighted average accessibility of the
entire region. This property of all (standard, unmodified) gravity models was proven by
Shen in 1998 (Shen, 1998). Simply aggregating the accessibility scores of all locations
yields the regional availability ratio of supply to demand with the entire area under
consideration as the “container.” This does not characterize the access disparity in the
area being studied. To date, there does not appear to be a single metric that quantifies
the disparity in access in a region. A single metric could allow for quick comparisons of
policy implications in what-if exploratory studies of areas that have already been
mapped using a gravity model or 2SFCA method, or for comparisons of access disparity
in different regions that have been mapped using the same methods. In Chapter 3 I
propose a method of aggregating access disparity, and in Chapter 4, I test its usefulness
in a spatial agent based model of OUD treatment accessibility.
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2.2.1 Spatial disparity in access to buprenorphine treatment
Regional disparities in access to buprenorphine treatment exist and have been
measured by several authors. In general, authors assess regional differences in access
either by measuring regional or spatial differences in realized access (utilization) or in
potential access through the regional availability “container” method.
Hansen, et al. (2013, 2016) analyzed differences in buprenorphine and
methadone utilization in New York City residential zip codes and “social areas,”
residential zip codes aggregated into areas based on race/ethnicity and income variables
(H. B. Hansen et al., 2013; H. Hansen, Siegel, Wanderling, & DiRocco, 2016). In both
papers, the authors found that buprenorphine treatment rates, defined as the number
of people receiving buprenorphine per 10,000 residents in the area, was highest (in
2007) and rose most quickly (2004 – 2013) in social areas that were predominantly
white and well off. By aggregating the zip codes into social areas, the authors chose not
to highlight regional differences in buprenorphine utilization, but rather demographic
differences in utilization as extracted from zip-code level data.
Schmitt, Phibbs, and Piette (2003) found that inpatient substance abuse
treatment patients who live farther from their source of mental health care were less
likely to receive aftercare, and that those who did receive aftercare received a lower
volume of care (Schmitt, Phibbs, & Piette, 2003). The authors use their finding of a
distance decay effect on utilization to support the statement that “lack of geographic
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access (distance) is a barrier to outpatient mental health care following inpatient
substance abuse treatment” (Schmitt et al., 2003, p. 1183).
Beardsley, et al., (2002) found a strong distance decay effect on retention in
outpatient drug treatment at very short distances. Clients who traveled one mile or less
to a treatment center in an urban area were 50% more likely to complete treatment
than clients who traveled more than a mile, and clients who traveled over 4 miles were
likely to remain in treatment for a shorter time than those that traveled less than a mile
(Beardsley, Wish, Fitzelle, O’Grady, & Arria, 2003). Similarly, Brian Lockwood (2012)
found that among juveniles attending court mandated treatment programs in
Philadelphia, every increase of 3 miles to treatment nearly doubles odds of dropout
(Lockwood, 2012). These suggests that there is a steep drop in treatment accessibility at
short distances for urban residents. In each case, the authors did not measure
geographic access directly, but this work does provide the type of empirical support on
the effect of distance on utilization to inform the selection of a weighting scheme or
distance decay function.
Several authors noted differences in potential access using the regional
availability container or ratio methods. Kvamme, et al. (2013) compared the
distribution of buprenorphine waivered physicians, and potential buprenorphine
treatment slots (number of physicians x waiver level) to the distribution of population in
Washington State (Kvamme, Catlin, Banta-Green, Roll, & Rosenblatt, 2013a). They found
that the population to provider and population to treatment slot ratios differed based
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on urbanity as measured by RUCA codes, with the lowest ratios in small rural areas, and
the highest ratios in isolated rural areas. While this appears to be a regional availability
analysis, it is not. The authors used RUCA codes associated with the zip codes of
physicians’ practice locations to differentiate practices by urban/rural designation, and
calculated population to physician ratios of each type of region, not the specific regions
themselves. To illustrate, the population to treatment slot ratio in small rural areas of
the state is the lowest, at 279:1, indicating the best access. However, if all 21 of these
rural buprenorphine providers happened to practice in the southeastern corner of the
state, people in the northwestern corner of the state might have no access to providers
despite also living in a small rural area.
Robenblatt, et al. (2015) conducted a similar county-level analysis on the number
and distribution of DATA waivered physicians using the US Department of Agriculture
Urban Influence Codes to differentiate counties by urbanity level (Rosenblatt et al.,
2015a). Like Kvamme, et al. (2013), they aggregated counties by urbanity level, and
presented a high-level analysis of accessibility, for the most part. Counties in
metropolitan areas had the highest physician to 100,000 population ratio, 6.3, while
rural areas had the poorest, 3.1. They note that 82.5% of rural areas counties have no
waivered providers. Also, like Kvamme, et al (2013), their main findings on the
differences in provider ratios by urbanity is not a regional availability analysis. However,
they do map all counties according to whether they have any buprenorphine providers
at all, exposing large disparities in regional access to providers, which is, in effect, a

37
simple regional availability analysis. However, like all container analyses, even this
simple map can be criticized for the assumption that all people within counties with at
least one provider have equal access to that provider, and that people in areas with no
providers will not seek services outside of the county.
Hirchak and Murphy (2016) analyzed differences in the number of opioid agonist
treatment centers and DATA waivered physicians per 10,000 residents aged 16-84 in
Washington State zip codes based on urban-rural classification and whether the land
was designated American Indian reservation/trust land (Hirchak & Murphy, 2016). They
calculated, but did not report, physician to 10,000 resident ratios for every zip code, as
the independent variable of a regression model on the association with rurality and AI
reservation status, and found no relationship.
Stein and colleagues (2015) calculated the number of DATA waivered physicians
per 100,000 residents at the county level from 2008 to 2011 to predict the effects of
state policies and county characteristics on the physician/population ratio (Stein,
Gordon, Dick, Burns, Pacula, Farmer, Leslie, et al., 2015). Like Hirchak and Murphy
(2016), they calculated this provider to population ratio, but did not report it at the
county level because this was an intermediate step in generating the models for their
study. They did report some trends in county level disparities in this availability metric.
In 2008, 51% of counties had no buprenorphine providers, which dropped to 43% in
2011. They reported that the distribution of providers per 100,000 residents was highly
skewed, “with a mean of 3.3 (sd = 6.6) in 2008 and 4.82 (sd = 8.2) in 2011, with only 5%
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of counties having more than 13 waivered physicians per 100,000 residents in 2008 and
17.6 per 100,000 residents in 2011” (Stein, Gordon, Dick, Burns, Pacula, Farmer, Leslie,
et al., 2015, p. 106).
In the only article specifically addressing spatial potential access, Dick and
colleagues (2015) created a methadone, buprenorphine, and overall treatment shortage
area metrics using a methodology similar to that used to calculate HPSAs (Dick et al.,
2015). They defined a treatment shortage county as a county that either had 0
providers, had a provider to population ratio that fell in the lowest 10%, or a provider to
population ratio that fell in the lowest 20% and high need for treatment. High need was
determined by proxies of need: the number of opioid overdose deaths, heroin prices,
and demographic characteristics. They reported that the number of people residing in
treatment shortage counties declined from about 49% to 10%, largely due to the
dramatic increase in buprenorphine waivered physicians over that time period. They go
on to report that the increases in potential access were not uniform across all
metropolitan status types, with small and medium non-metropolitan counties seeing
the smallest increases in potential access, and large non-metropolitan counties seeing
the greatest increases in potential access. Nor were these gains uniformly distributed
across the country. By 2011, large areas in the Midwest remained treatment shortage
areas.
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2.3

Two buprenorphine policies and their impacts on treatment capacity
DATA 2000 established the regulatory framework to allow buprenorphine

prescribing for the treatment of opioid use disorder in office-based settings.
Buprenorphine prescribing for OUD differs from prescription of all other medications in
two respects: prescribers are limited in the number of patients to whom they can
prescribe, and nurse practitioners and physician assistants were not allowed to
prescribe buprenorphine even when they had the prescribing authority for other
controlled substances (until the passage of the Comprehensive Addiction Recovery Act
in 2017).
2.3.1 The history of the patient limit policy
A limit on the number of patients to whom a provider could prescribe was a part
of office-based OAT policy from the outset. The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of
1970 allowed for dispensing, but not prescribing, of narcotic drugs for maintenance
treatment or detoxification treatment and imposed strict regulatory requirements on
dispensing providers (91st United States Congress, 1970). The first draft of legislation to
allow for office-based buprenorphine prescribing, the Drug Maintenance and
Detoxification Act of 1995, sought an exemption to the regulatory requirements of the
CSA when physicians treated 20 or fewer patients with a Schedule V drug
(buprenorphine was in Schedule V at the time due to its safety profile and perceived
limited abuse potential) (Jaffe & O’Keeffe, 2003). When DATA 2000 was signed into law
in 2000, prescribing was limited to 30 patients per practice (Carl Levin & Orrin Hatch,
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2000). In 2005, congress passed a law to allow 30 patients per physician, rather than per
medical practice (109th Congress, 2005).
In studies that surveyed physicians on buprenorphine use, the 30 patient limit
was often cited as a barrier limiting patient access to treatment (Barry et al., 2008; Join
Together, 2003; Kissin et al., 2006; WESTAT & The Avisa Group, 2006). In December of
2006, congress again amended the CSA, this time to allow physicians to treat up to 100
patients at one time (109th Congress, 2006), and in 2007 the DEA finalized the rule
change that allowed waivered physicians to apply for a patient limit increase after one
year (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2008). Finally, in 2016, SAMHSA finalized a
regulatory rule change, without a preceding act of Congress, to allow certain board
certified addiction specialists to increase their patient limit to 275 (SAMHSA 2016a).
2.3.2 The intent of the patient limit policy
No authors explicitly stated the reasoning behind the original 20 or 30 patient
limit, but much can be inferred from OAT policy papers published around the time that
DATA 2000 became law and buprenorphine prescribing began. Two themes for why
policy-makers may have chosen to limit patient numbers emerged from this literature:
integrating addiction treatment into mainstream or primary medical care—as opposed
to higher volume specialty care settings, and reducing the risk of diversion.
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2.3.2.1 Integrating addiction medicine into mainstream or primary medical care
In a primary care addiction treatment model, in which a provider would treat a
patient’s addiction as part of that patient’s routine medical care, many providers would
each treat few patients. This was the case in France around the time that DATA 2000
became law. In 1995, in response to a heroin crisis, France allowed all physicians to
prescribe buprenorphine for the treatment of opioid use disorder without requiring any
special certification or education. Bell, et al. (2002) wrote that 29% of French General
Practitioners (GPs) were prescribing to 1 patient (6% of patients) and that 12% were
prescribing to 12 or more (50% of total patients; Bell, Dru, Fischer, Levit, & Sarfraz,
2002). In 1999, in a study of one French region, 20% of GPs were prescribing
buprenorphine, 0.8% had 50 or more patients, while 84% had fewer than 6 patients
(Auriacombe, Fatséas, Dubernet, Daulouede, & Tignol, 2004). Several studies through
2002 showed that the “large majority of buprenorphine prescribers in France [were]
office-based general practitioners” (Auriacombe et al., 2004, p. S18). This GP focused
system was able to engage 50% of problem heroin users in OAT, and likely contributed
to a dramatic reduction in opioid overdose deaths at the time (79% reduction from 1994
to 1999; Auriacombe et al., 2004).
In the United States, interest in integrating OAT into primary care pre-dated
DATA 2000 and buprenorphine FDA approval. In the 1980s and 90s, there were several
successful studies of “medical maintenance programs,” or office based methadone
treatment for stable methadone patients (Fiellin, O’Connor, et al., 2001; Merrill, 2002;
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Novick et al., 1988; Schwartz, Brooner, Montoya, Currens, & Hayes, 1999; Senay et al.,
1993). Because of these successful studies and the French experience, by the time
DATA 2000 became law, authors were calling for broadening the OAT prescriber base
through primary care methadone or buprenorphine treatment (Rounsaville & Kosten,
2000), for the reintegration of “methadone maintenance and other addiction
pharmacotherapies into [office-based] medical practice” (Merrill, 2002, p. 1), for “the
much needed medicalization or opioid agonist pharmacotherapy” (Kreek & Vocci, 2002,
p. 102) , and for the expanded role of the primary care physician in “optimizing health of
opioid dependent patients” (Krantz & Mehler, 2004, p. 1).
Buprenorphine prescribing under DATA 2000 was originally envisioned as a
system in which opioid agonist treatment was integrated into the normal course of
medical treatment. The manufacturer of buprenorphine, Reckitt Benckiser, needed
buprenorphine “to reach the mainstream practice of medicine” (Jaffe & O’Keeffe, 2003)
in order to make the investment in the FDA approval of buprenorphine worthwhile.
SAMHSA generated a Treatment Improvement Protocol (TIP) to support DATA 2000
prescribers with limited experience with addiction treatment. The TIP authors wrote of
the vision of OB buprenorphine treatment, “Office-based treatment with buprenorphine
promises to bring opioid addiction care into the mainstream of medical practice”, and
“The promise of DATA 2000 is to help destigmatize opioid addiction treatment and to
enable qualified physicians to manage opioid addiction in their own practices”
(emphasis mine; Boone et al., 2004, p. xv and 2-3). Feillin and O’Connor (2002) wrote
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“the current initiatives are designed to meet the dual objectives of treatment expansion
and involvement of physicians in the care of opioid-dependent patients….increasing the
participation of the medical community in the treatment of opioid dependent patients”
(Fiellin & O’Connor, 2002b).
The original vision of DATA 2000 conveyed by researchers at the time was a
primary-care based addiction treatment system as a supplement to OUD treatment in
specialty addiction treatment settings, in which addiction treatment was integrated into
mainstream medical practices (Ling & Smith, 2002). With the example of the French GPbased system and the promise of a similar primary care based system, one could see
how a 30-patient limit might have seemed like a non-issue from an access standpoint.
2.3.2.2 Reducing the risk of diversion
In crafting the law that would create the envisioned diffuse, primary care based
system, the early policy makers had to balance access with against the risk of diversion.
In the French system at the time, access was paramount, and diversion did occur
(Auriacombe et al., 2004). Auriacombe et al. (2004) wrote of the largely unregulated
French system that “a lack of regulation could increase the occurrence of…diversion to
non-registered patients and thus limit the overall benefit of this medication”
(Auriacombe et al., 2004, p. S18). In the United States, the addiction treatment system
in place before DATA 2000 was highly regulated to prevent methadone diversion (Bridge
et al., 2003; Campbell & Lovell, 2012; Jaffe & O’Keeffe, 2003; Merrill, 2002). In the
balancing concerns about access against diversion, diversion concerns appeared to be

44
paramount, as “limiting diversion dominated discussion of methadone within the
domestic drug control apparatus in the early 1970s” (Campbell & Lovell, 2012).
By the late 1990s, treatment access was once again a major concern as opioid
overdose deaths were on the rise. Buprenorphine was seen as a desirable product for
office based treatment because it appeared to have lower potential for diversion and
misuse than methadone (Bridge et al., 2003; Fiellin et al., 2002), especially when
combined with naloxone, an abuse deterrent formulation that discourages medication
injection. Even with a lower potential for diversion and abuse due to its pharmacological
properties, there were continuing concerns about medication diversion. Jaffe and
O’Keefe (2003) that “The FDA was concerned that the system could get out of hand
unless limits were place on the number of doctors and patients who could initially
participate in the system” (Jaffe & O’Keeffe, 2003, p. S8). A congressional aide
interviewed by Fornili and Burda (2009) remembered that there was opposition to DATA
2000 from legislators concerned about “potential diversion of any opioid medication”
(Fornili & Burda, 2009). This concern may have contributed to the inclusion of a patient
limit in the legislation.
2.3.3 The effects of and reaction to the patient limit policy
In the early days after DATA 2000, uptake of office-based treatment was low
(Netherland et al., 2009). As predicted, the early adopters tended to be addiction
specialists (West et al., 2004). According to SAMHSA’s evaluation of the DATA waiver
program, by 2005 44% of waivered providers were addiction specialists (WESTAT & The
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Avisa Group, 2006), and 80% of all waivered physicians were prescribing to zero or very
few patients, leaving 20% of waivered physicians to treat the majority of patients
seeking buprenorphine treatment (Albright, Ciaverelli, Essex, Tkacz, & Ruetsch, 2010).
Similarly, a 2005 national survey of all psychiatrists found that 86% were not
comfortable with prescribing buprenorphine (West et al., 2004). And in a nonrepresentative survey of psychiatrists in 4 cities also conducted in 2005, only 13% of
non-addiction specialist psychiatrists had received waiver training and 9% had
prescribed buprenorphine (Thomas et al., 2008).
In these early days, patient counts tended to be low or even zero, but
distributions of patient counts were skewed, indicating that while most providers were
treating few patients, a few were treating a lot of patients (Albright et al., 2010; Fiellin,
2007; Reif, Thomas, & Wallack, 2007b; WESTAT & The Avisa Group, 2006). These few
were likely the early adopting addiction specialists. Many providers at the time were
frustrated by the patient limit policy and were vocal in opposition to it. Physicians were
frustrated with two aspects of the patient limit—the limit on patients per practice, and
the limit itself. The limit on the number of patients per practice did not differentiate
between large medical practices that could have hundreds or thousands of providers,
and single solo practices (Schackman, Merrill, McCarty, Levi, & Lubinski, 2006; WESTAT
& The Avisa Group, 2006). Providers in large medical groups, or in groups that
specialized in addictions were particularly frustrated by the 30 patient limit for medical
groups (WESTAT & The Avisa Group, 2006). The 30 patient limit was cited as barrier to
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access to buprenorphine in several physician surveys (Barry et al., 2008; Join Together,
2003; Thomas et al., 2008). Addiction specialists who responded to open ended survey
questions in the SAMHSA evaluation report were eager to convey to SAMHSA that the
30-patient limit hampered their ability to provide care to patients who need treatment.
Many stated that they maintained waitlists and turned patients away. Some called for
the limit to be raised, others for it to be abolished for specialists (WESTAT & The Avisa
Group, 2006). The American Society of Addiction Medicine wrote in its public policy
statement that “arbitrary caps on the number of patients who can be treated by a
physician….that are not supported by medical evidence, should not be imposed by law,
regulation or health insurance practices” (American Society of Addiction Medicine,
2006, p. 2).
After changes to the patient limit policy in 2005 and 2007, the patient limit was
still cited as a constraint on physician capacity and a barrier to access (Green et al.,
2014; Molfenter, Sherbeck, Zehner, & Starr, 2015; Stein, Pacula, et al., 2015), and
several providers have reported demand that exceeds their 100-patient limit (ASAM
staff, 2015; Molfenter et al., 2015).
2.3.4 Post-hoc policy analysis of patient limit changes
To date there have been two post-hoc policy analysis studies of lifting the
patient limit from 30 to 100. Stein and colleagues found that the amount of
buprenorphine dispensed and the number of waivered providers increased in general
from 2004 to 2011, but that buprenorphine dispensing increased most from providers
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with 100-patient waivers. They estimated 24 to 45 additional patients received
treatment per 100-patient provider in urban areas and 57 additional patients received
treatment per 100-patient provider in rural areas (Stein, Pacula, et al., 2015). The
authors noted that many of the physicians waivered at the 30-patient level were
prescribing to few or no patients. The same research group published a study on
pharmacy retail transactions and found that among those that prescribed, the majority,
69%, prescribed to 30 or fewer patients (Stein BD et al., 2016). Similarly, Hefei Wen
(2016) found that “the availability of 100-patient waivered physicians was strongly
associated with increase in Medicaid prescriptions for and spending on buprenorphine
MAT,” but did not find a significant association between prescribing and the availability
of 30-patient waivered physicians (Hefei Wen, 2016). These studies suggest that though
most providers are prescribing to a small number of patients and were unaffected by
the cap change policy, increasing capacity did afford greater access to treatment
through the smaller proportion of providers who elected to increase their limits, and
that this increase in access occurred in both rural and urban areas.
2.3.5 Exclusion of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants as eligible DATA 2000
prescribers until 2016
A provision of the Comprehensive Addiction Recovery Act (CARA) passed in 2016
enabled Nurse Practitioners (NPs) and Physician Assistants (PAs) to prescribe
buprenorphine for the treatment of OUD. The original language of DATA 2000 explicitly
stated that “qualified physicians may prescribe” schedule III, IV and V controlled
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substances for the treatment of opioid use disorder. It is not clear whether NPs and PAs
were excluded from the waiver program due to oversight or design (Fornili & Burda,
2009). Senator Levin, one of the original sponsors of DATA 2000 and an advocate for
expansion of buprenorphine treatment expansion was in favor of NP buprenorphine
prescribing in 2014 (“Congress and SAMHSA look at ways to expand buprenorphine,”
2014), so it is unlikely that he had intended that they be excluded when the law was
originally written. Whatever the original intent, up until passage of CARA, NPs and PAs
could not prescribe buprenorphine for the treatment of OUD.
Advocates for extending prescribing authority to NPs and PAs note that NPs and
PAs could expand OAT capacity to vulnerable populations because NPs and PAs working
in primary care often serve in Health Provider Shortage Areas (HPSAs) or Medically
Underserved Areas (MUAs), in safety-net settings, or as front line health care workers in
rural areas (Fornili & Burda-Cohee, 2006; O’Connor, 2011; Strobbe & Hobbins, 2012).
Three studies have been conducted on NP/PA attitudes toward buprenorphine
prescribing. Roose, et al. (2008) found that 48% of PAs and NPs surveyed at HIV
educational conferences expressed interest in prescribing buprenorphine and that PAs
and NPs (pooled) were more likely than infectious disease physicians to be interested in
prescribing (aOR 2.89; Roose, Kunins, Sohler, Elam, & Cunningham, 2008). The authors
note the limitations of their study: small sample size and possibility of selection bias—
NPs and PAs at HIV conferences may be more likely to show interest in buprenorphine
prescribing than those who don’t go to conferences. They should be commended in not

49
making general claims about NP and PA interest from this small sample of NPs and PAs
that work in HIV settings. However, authors of policy and advocacy papers have not
always been so careful. This study is widely cited as proof of a general claim that NPs
and PAs are interested in prescribing buprenorphine. Additionally, the odds ratio in the
study is a little suspect because physicians who were already prescribing buprenorphine
to their patients were excluded from the analysis. PAs and NPs who can’t prescribe
buprenorphine are compared to physicians who have already had the chance to
prescribe buprenorphine and have chosen not to.
In a study of all PAs in Kansas to which only 25% responded, Spiser and Dumolt
(2011) found that 53% of respondents believe legislation should be changed to allow
PAs to prescribe buprenorphine, while 32% are unsure. 29% of primary care PAs were
interested in becoming certified if the legislation would allow, while 15% were unsure.
50% believed there was a need for more certified buprenorphine prescribers in their
communities, while 29% were unsure. 65% of primary care PAs reported having to turn
patient away or recommend another location for opioid addiction treatment. Average
distance from their practice to the nearest certified provider site was 28.87 miles. Of
those who practiced in rural or frontier communities, the average distance was 42.6
miles, with more than one response of 150 miles (Spiser & Dumolt, 2011).
The biggest issue with this study is selection bias: the PAs who are interested in
buprenorphine may also be interested in filling in the survey, and the ones who didn't
respond might not have because they are not interested in buprenorphine. However, it
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does provide another data point (if not a perfect one) on interest in buprenorphine
prescribing by a group of non-physician providers. The average distance metrics also
provide a good picture of how patients are currently being affected by the physicianonly legislation, and how extending prescribing to this group could benefit
geographically isolated patients.
In her dissertation on advanced practice nurses’ perspectives on DATA 2000,
Dorothy Were (2014) reports on a survey of a convenience sample of 96 NPs in 32
states. 64% of those surveyed felt a subspecialty in addiction medicine should be
required for buprenorphine prescribing. 65% believe that NPs should be authorized to
prescribe buprenorphine, and 24% though that maybe they should. 99% said NPs should
go through the same training as physicians for buprenorphine prescribing (Were, 2014).
The use of a convenience sample limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the
study since NPs interested in prescribing buprenorphine may have been more likely to
complete the survey, potentially biasing the results. Also, recruitment via social media
likely resulted in a young sample, while the median age of NPs is fairly high(American
Association of Nurse Practitioners, 2016). Further, the author’s interpretation of survey
results may have been overzealous. She used survey results to support a broad assertion
not gathered from survey. Responding that NPs should be allowed to prescribe
buprenorphine was interpreted as representing the surveyed NPs’ personal interest in
prescribing buprenorphine, while it may instead indicate that NPs believe that they
should have the same prescribing authority as physicians regardless of actual interest.
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These studies, while limited by their use of convenience samples, do show that
some NPs and PAs are interested in buprenorphine prescribing. In fact, some NPs who
work in practices with physicians prescribing buprenorphine have already completed
waiver training (O’Connor, 2011). Because NPs and PAs often work with marginalized
communities or people in rural communities, it may be that extending prescribing
authority to these types of providers will alleviate some of the regional disparities in
access.
With the passage of the Comprehensive Addiction Recovery Act (see McCarty,
Priest, & Korthuis, 2018), nurse practitioners and physician assistants may now prescribe
buprenorphine for the treatment of opioid use disorder after completing 25 hours of
training (compared to 8 hours for physicians) which some providers have identified as a
barrier to adoption by NPs and PAs.
2.4

Simulation for substance abuse policy analysis
Researchers have been generating substance abuse policy simulations since the

1970s. While this is not a comprehensive list of all substance abuse policy simulations,
several examples are shown in Table 2-1, categorized by substance and methodology.

Table 2-1: Dynamic policy models of substance use grouped by substance and modeling methodology.

Modeling Methodologies
System Dynamics/
Differential or
Difference
Equations

Markov/ State
Transition

Alcohol

(H. D. Holder &
Blose, 1987)
(H. Holder, 1998)

(Mortimer &
Segal, 2005)
(Chisholm, Rehm,
Van Ommeren, &
Monteiro, 2004)
(Barbosa et al.,
2010)

Tobacco

(Levy, Chaloupka,
Gitchell, Mendez,
& Warner, 2002)

Heroin/Opioids

(Levin, Roberts, &
Hirsch, 1975)
(White &
Comiskey, 2007)
(Nyabadza &
Hove-Musekwa,
2010)

Topic

Monte Carlo
Simulation/
Discrete Event
Simulation

Microsimulation

Agent Based
Simulation

(Garrison &
Babcock, 2009)
(Giabbanelli &
Crutzen, 2012)

(Levy & Friend,
2001)
(Levy et al., 2002)
(Levy, Friend,
Holder, &
Carmona, 2001)
(Tomintz, 2009)
(Barnett, 2009)
(Schackman, Leff,
Polsky, Moore, &
Fiellin, 2012)

(Zarkin, Dunlap,
Hicks, & Mamo,
2005)
(Zarkin et al.,
2011)

(Perez et al., 2006)
(Hoffer, Bobashev,
& Morris, 2012)
(Heard, Bobashev,
& Morris, 2014)
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Cocaine

Other

(Wakeland et al.,
2013)
(Wakeland,
Nielsen, &
Geissert, 2015)
(Homer, 1993a)
(Homer, 1993b)
(Behrens,
Caulkins, Tragler,
Haunschmied, &
Feichtinger, 1999)

Methamphetamin
es (Nyabadza &
Hove-Musekwa,
2010)

(Sohler
Everingham, Peter
Rydell, & Caulkins,
1995)
(Jonathan P.
Caulkins, Rydell,
Everingham,
Chiesa, &
Bushway, 1999)
(Jonathan P.
Caulkins, Behrens,
Knoll, Tragler, &
Zuba, 2004)
Injection drug
Injection drug
users (Peterson,
users (Peterson et
Willard, Altmann, al., 1990)
Gatewood, &
Davidson, 1990)
Drug use
trajectories (J. P.
Caulkins, Dietze, &
Ritter, 2007)
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Drug use in
general (Galea,
Hall, & Kaplan,
2009)
Injection drug
users (Gutfraind et
al., 2015)
Recreational poly
drug use (Lamy,
Bossomaier, &
Perez, 2015)
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2.4.1 Model typologies for policy analysis
As simulation is increasingly used for policy analysis, methodologists have
developed simulation classification schemes and recommendations for best practices.
Boero and Squazzoni (2005) defined three basic agent based simulation (ABS) model
typologies and prescribe appropriate levels of empirical embeddedness for each (Boero
& Squazzoni, 2005). Simulations may be theoretical abstractions, typifications, or casebased models. Theoretical abstraction models aim to explain or explore a “wide range of
general phenomena with no direct reference to reality” (Boero & Squazzoni, 2005, p. 4),
such as the SugarScape models which explore economic concepts including wealth
disparity and trade in a simple stylized artificial world (Epstein & Axtell, 1997). Casebased models simulate a specific event or phenomenon such as the rapid disappearance
of the Anisazi people in around 1300 modeled in the Artificial Anisazi Project (Dean et
al., 2000). Typificiation models target a class of empirical phenomena that share certain
properties, but not a single, specific case. Theoretical abstractions require no empirical
data, and case-based modes aim to replicate a phenomenon as faithfully as possible and
require as much empirical support as is available. Typification models make use of
empirical data to specify, calibrate and validate models, but aim at a more generalizable
understanding of studied phenomena. The buprenorphine treatment capacity model in
this research is a typification model. The purpose of the model is not to explain or
understand access to buprenorphine in a given region at a specific time, but rather how
policy could impact treatment access for people who live in different kinds of
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communities based on typical provider and patient preferences. The choice of a
typification model rather than a case-based model for policy analysis may allow for
more generalizable policy recommendations, as outlined in Yücel and van Daalen
(2009).
Yücel and van Daalen (2009) propose a conceptual framework for policy analysis
simulations, specifically, based on the objective of the simulation (Yücel & van Daalen,
2009). They delineate six general model objectives:
1. To research and analyze
2. To design and recommend
3. To advise strategically
4. To mediate
5. To democratize
6. To clarify values and arguments
The buprenorphine policy model in this research is type 2, intended to design
and recommend policies that increase buprenorphine access and reduce geographic
access inequality. As an “advisory model” the buprenorphine policy simulation
“focus[es] on a particular problem context, rather than representing [the] dynamic
phenomenon in general” (Yücel & van Daalen, 2009, p. 5). They go on to recommend
best practices for advisory models beyond standard modeling practices, including
boundary assessment, basis assessment, and representation assessment. I will include
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specifics on how these assessments will be used here as the concepts are defined,
rather than in chapter 4, where I propose the actual tests.
Boundary assessment is the evaluation of the selection of what is left out of the
model, or what can be modeled as an exogenous input. In advisory models decisions on
boundary selection, these decisions must be defensible in reference to the particular
problem context of the policy. In the case of the buprenorphine policy model, the policy
problem is one of provider capacity and access, not treatment adequacy, quality, or
patient quality of life. As such, the model excludes rich modeling of relationships among
potential patients, motivations to seek treatment, or medical decisions by providers.
Further, the incidence of OUD and treatment seeking are exogenous constants because
they change slowly compared to the time horizon in the model.
Basis assessment is the extent to which a model should be based on empirical
data, theory or the knowledge of experts. The buprenorphine policy model is a
typification model that makes heavy use of empirical data. Because the model is a
typification, broad, survey-based empirical data is sufficient, where a case-based model
might require specific, high fidelity geographic data (such as tract-level census data, or
geo-coded provider locations). Also, because the model is a typification, the fact that
the model is ad hoc rather than strictly theory-based is not problematic (Boero &
Squazzoni, 2005). The highest quality, most generalizable data was sought to empirically
support model parameters, and the opinion of a wide array of expert stakeholders with
different policy perspectives was sought to guide the specification of model structure.
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Experts included addiction specialist physicians, a primary care physician, a nurse
practitioner, a physician assistant, a patient advocate in OUD recovery. Providers serve
a variety of patient populations including rural residents, urban residents, pregnant
women with OUD, and veterans; practice in a variety of settings including primary care
clinics, OB clinics, university hospitals, addiction treatment centers, VHA clinics; and live
and practice in different regions of the country including the Northeast, the Northwest,
Appalachia, and the Mid-Atlantic.
Representation assessment includes standard assessments of validity as well as
whether the model represents the behaviors and structures of the modeled system
sufficiently to build confidence in policy recommendations. A model should replicate
both the underlying agent level processes (structures) the overall behavior of the
system for advising on policies to be meaningful. Though “models heavily dependent on
the participators’ depiction of the system are naturally validated and already approved
by the participants/problem owners,” as the buprenorphine policy model will be,
standard validation tests should also be used (Yücel & van Daalen, 2009, p. 13). To
develop appropriate model structures while simultaneously replicating the overall
behavior of the buprenorphine treatment system, I will use Grimm and Railsback’s
(2012) “pattern oriented modeling” approach (Grimm & Railsback, 2012), in which I will
attempt to fit multiple quantitative and qualitative patterns at both the agent and
system levels.
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The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 reviewed the limited access to opioid
agonist therapy in the US, outlined historical approaches to assessing variation in spatial
access, described the unique limits imposed on buprenorphine prescribing, and
discussed prior simulation models used to assess policies related to treatment for
substance use disorders. The stage is now set to address the methods used in the
analysis of potential changes in policies controlling buprenorphine prescribing.
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3

Methods
This research uses Agent-Based Simulation (ABS), a modeling methodology in

which heterogeneous agents act and interact in a dynamic environment according to
individual rules of behavior. Population level outcomes of interest are generated by
local interactions of agents acting in their own interest—in this case: providers
interacting with people with OUD seeking treatment, and people with OUD interacting
with providers and peers.
Empirically-based simulation models have been used to model state alcohol and
traffic policies, social influence on BMI, drinking behavior, and health behavior and drug
use (see Table 2-1). There are many advantages of using Agent-Based Models (ABMs) as
policy analysis tools. ABMs allow for the exploration of policy options in silico, without
putting people at risk, at lower cost, and often in less time than empirical studies. ABMs
are not aggregate population-based models, but rather individual-based models which
allow for exploration of the effects of individual heterogeneity including spatial
heterogeneity. As in real target systems, population level dynamics arise from the
interactions of these heterogeneous agents within the modeled environment. In this
study, issues of buprenorphine treatment capacity arise due to the interactions
between people with OUD entering treatment and their prescribers, and due to the
simulated geography which these actors inhabit. This simulation method was selected
specifically because of an apparent mismatch between simply-calculated buprenorphine
treatment capacity numbers (the sum of waivered doctors times the three patient limit
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levels) and the actual experience of providers: some of whom treat very few patients,
and others who maintain waitlists and routinely turn patients away.
It should be noted that in some research studies an ABM is the result of
research, and in others, an ABM is a research method. The latter is the case in this
research. The ABM developed is used to research policy options in the context of future
uncertainty, and to assess the usefulness and functional form of the proposed aggregate
geographic accessibility metric. As such, the model is described in this methods chapter,
while the results of metric exploration and policy analysis experiments are described in
Chapter 4.
The model was implemented in NetLogo 6.0.2 (Wilenski & others, 1999).
3.1

Model development
Simulation modeling is often a participatory and iterative process. Subject

matter experts are involved throughout the model development process, from
conceptualization of the system to validating that the model represents the actual
system. As initial, simple models expand to include more detail in order to explore more
outcomes or to assess a new set of policy questions, the modeling process is repeated.
This iterative process is outlined in Figure 3-1, below.
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Figure 3-1: The model development process is iterative, and a single model may require many cycles
through the process.

The model used to assess the research questions in this thesis is the fourth
iteration of a modeling process focused on addressing the question of buprenorphine
capacity. Early model iterations included simple simulated geographies and were
presented at SAMSHA’s 2014 Buprenorphine Summit (iteration 1: SAMHSA 2014c), at
the American Association for the Treatment of Opioid Dependence (AATOD) annual
conference in 2015 (iteration 2: Alexandra Nielsen, 2015), and submitted to an
academic journal (iteration 3). In the third iteration, model geography was based on a
real map, and the scope of the model expanded to include: 1) a greater number of
relevant outcomes, 2) more detail on patients seeking treatment, 3) people not seeking
treatment as agents, 4) methadone treatment offered at Opioid Treatment Programs
(OTPs), 5) children and pregnant women, and 6) more policy options. Model revision
followed each dissemination activity in response to reviewer comments and critique. In
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the fourth modeling iteration, the model was streamlined and several outcomes and
populations were removed. For example, because child buprenorphine poisonings are a
significant public health concern, children and this outcome were included in iteration 3,
to increase applicability, but removed in iteration 4, to address more targeted
dissertation research questions.
Each step of the modeling process detailed in Figure 3-1 is detailed below:
3.1.1 Conceptualize the system
I sought understanding of the target system to be modeled through extensive
literature search and through interviews with experts in OB buprenorphine treatment.
Prior to initial modeling, I interviewed two addiction medicine specialists who had
experience developing the eight-hour training course for DATA 2000 waiver
certification, Dr. Margaret Kotz, and Dr. Stephen Wyatt (Kraus et al., 2011). In order to
involve a broader base of stakeholders, I empaneled a diverse group of experts to guide
model conceptualization and specification. Expert panel members consulted during
model development for iterations 2 through 4 are listed below. I interviewed each
panel member at least twice using an unstructured format, and asked specific questions
via email as they arose in the modeling process. Dr. Alane O’Connor and Dr. Andrew
Saxon were also consulted to assess iteration 4 face validity.
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3.1.1.1 Expert Panel Members
•

Dr. Todd Korthuis—Oregon Health and Science University, General internal
medicine, HIV research program director—Primary Care Provider in Oregon

•

Timothy Lepak—president National Alliance of Advocates for Buprenorphine
Treatment—Patient Advocate

•

Melvania Briggs, PA-C—Academic coordinator for the Duke University
Physician Assistant Program. Co-Principal Investigator of a NIDA funded
Buprenorphine Clinical Trial for a community based mental health
organization and Duke University Medical Center—Physician Assistant in
North Carolina

•

Dr. Kelly Clark—Chief Medical Officer of CleanSlate Addiction Treatment
Centers, president of the American Society of Addiction Medicine (ASAM)—
Addiction Medicine specialty provider in Kentucky and Pennsylvania

•

Dr. Andrew Saxon—Center of Excellence in Substance Abuse Treatment and
Education, VA Puget Sound Health Care System, Director Addiction Psychiatry
Residency Program, University of Washington, associated with the American
Association of Addiction Psychiatrists (AAAP)—Addiction Psychiatry provider
in Washington

•

Dr. Alane B. O’Connor, DNP, FNP—Maine Dartmouth family Medicine
Residency Faculty Adjunct Instructor, author of NP buprenorphine health
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policy article, investigator of clinical trials of buprenorphine use in
pregnancy—Family Practice Nurse Practitioner in Maine
3.1.2 Build a model
The operational model was developed in NetLogo 6.0.2, an ABS tool. I used the
pattern oriented modeling technique (Grimm & Railsback, 2012), in which a model is
developed to fit several quantitative and qualitative patterns. The Overview, Design
concepts, and Details (ODD) protocol (Grimm et al., 2010) was employed to convert the
understanding of the system into an operational model. The model is documented in
Section 3.2 using the ODD protocol, which is the gold standard for model reporting and
replicability.
3.1.3 Add data to the model
Modeling best practice requires that all aspects of the system that are
considered important in model conceptualization be included in an operational model
whether or not high quality data are available to support them (Caro, Briggs, Siebert, &
Kuntz, 2012). When possible, I obtained empirical support for model parameters from
peer-reviewed published literature through both comprehensive and targeted literature
searches. I obtained empirical support for model parameters for which high quality data
were not available from smaller studies that are not necessarily generalizable, “grey”
literature, expert opinion, and through the process of model calibration.

65
3.1.4 Test the Model
For models to serve as credible proxies for the target system, models should be
calibrated, verified, and validated to the degree possible. The model should also be
tested for sensitivity to specific parameter values and critical assumptions about model
structure. I calibrated the iteration 4 model manually to reproduce historical trends in
opioid overdose deaths and the number of unique buprenorphine recipients for a given
year. I conducted model verification—testing that the model performs as expected—
throughout the iterative modeling process, as model code was developed and as new
data added to the model. The model was assessed for face validity by two panel experts,
Dr. O’Connor and Dr. Saxon, and externally validated by comparing model-generated
annual opioid overdose deaths and number of unique buprenorphine recipients against
data that was not used in model calibration. I conducted one-way sensitivity testing by
varying each model parameter by 30%. I tested the model’s sensitivity to the geography
selected by conducting baseline model runs with 10 different maps. I tested sensitivity
to assumptions about provider preferences for patient loads by running the model
under several alternative assumptions about providers’ patient load preferences.
In general, model testing built confidence that the model is a sufficiently faithful
representation of the world to be able to consider the results of policy experiments to
be meaningful. Calibration can show that a model is capable of generating known
behavior, verification shows that the operational model matches the conceptual model
developed with subject matter experts, and validation can show that the model is
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capable of generating real world behavior in a way that conforms to experts’
understanding of the target system. Sensitivity testing builds confidence by showing the
degree to which model performance is dependent on assumptions and on parameter
values which may or may not have strong theoretical or empirical support. While none
of these tests can prove that a model is “right,” they do build confidence that a model
may be useful for its intended purpose.
Model testing specifics and results are reported in Section 3.4.
3.1.5 Run Experiments
I conducted policy experiments by systematically changing the values of policy
variables and observing model outcome values after a year of modeled time. Because
the model contains several random variables, each experiment was repeated 35 times
to establish the possible range of outcomes. One-way ANOVA power analysis indicated
that with 35 replications, one could detect medium to large effects (f = 0.30), with an
alpha of 0.05, beta of 0.1, and 5 variable levels. Fewer replications would risk low
power, or inability to detect differences in outcome variables that are present in
simulation data. Policy experiments and results are detailed further in Section 3.7 and
Section 5.
I also conducted spatial potential access metric exploration experiments using
alternative formulations of the aggregated spatial disparity metric to assess the relative
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sensitivity and usefulness of each formulation. The process is further detailed in Section
3.6, results detailed in Section 4.
3.2

Model specification
Model specification is detailed below using the ODD (Overview, Design concepts,

and Details) protocol for ABS models (Grimm et al., 2010). The ODD protocol is a
standardized description protocol that facilitates rigorous formulation of ABS models,
and allows for reproducibility of such models. Model overview is outlined in three
sections: purpose; entities, state variables and scales; and process overview and
scheduling. Major ABS design concepts are described in the design concepts section,
and details are provided in the initialization, and input data sections. Full model code is
attached as an appendix to support model replicability. Embedding a full model
description using the ODD protocol in a dissertation results in some redundancy, but I
include all sections for rigorous adherence to the reporting standard.
3.2.1 Purpose
The purpose of this model is to represent OB buprenorphine treatment capacity
in the United States, and to assess policy options that impact treatment capacity.
Specifically: Is OUD agonist treatment capacity sufficient to meet patient
pharmacotherapy treatment demand, given: regulatory limits on patient numbers,
barriers to provision of treatment, geographic dispersion of people with opioid use
disorder, and geographic concentration of providers? Is treatment capacity equitably
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distributed spatially? The simulation explores two policy areas to increase OB
buprenorphine access:


How does changing the patient limits affect treatment access, access equity, and
medication diversion?



How does extending buprenorphine prescribing authority to NPs and PAs affect
treatment access, access equity, and diversion?
My research also explores the usefulness of the proposed aggregate spatial

accessibility metric.
3.2.2 Entities, state variables, scales, and environment
There are four types of entities in the model: people with opioid dependence,
OAT treatment providers, OTPs, and spatial units.
Agents with OUD, “agents” are characterized by the following state variables, or
attributes:
Table 3-1: Attributes of agents with OUD

Attribute
Is the agent seeking OAT?
Is the agent receiving
methadone?
Number of weeks receiving OB
BUP
Has the agent relapsed?
(defined as no longer seeking
treatment, not engaged in

Range
True/False
True/False

Units
Boolean (yes, no)
Boolean

[0, length of simulation)

weeks

True/False

Boolean
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treatment, or not completed
treatment)
Is the agent stably abstinent
from non-medical opioids,
(including reduced use)?
Chance that agent will never
achieve stable abstinence (or
reduced use)
Length of time in treatment
required to attain stable
abstinence (or reduced use)
Distance willing to travel for
treatment
Length of time will wait for
treatment before relapsing
Length of time currently
waiting for treatment
Is the agent currently on a
waitlist?
Is the agent too far from a
provider?
Provider the agent would like
to establish with
Group of referred or nearby
providers
Sorted list of referred or
nearby providers
Has the agent purchased
buprenorphine from an illicit
source?
Source of illicit buprenorphine
Has the agent sold/given away
treatment buprenorphine
Reason for diverting

True/False

Boolean

50%

--

[10, ~400)

weeks

(0, ~150)

miles

[1, ~10)

weeks

[0, ~10)

weeks

True/False

Boolean

True/False

Boolean

provider agent

provider agent

unsorted list of provider
agents
list of provider agents
sorted by distance from
agent
True/False

list

“friend” or “street”
True/False

list
Boolean

“can’t afford treatment”,
“wanted money”,
“friend asked”

list

list

Boolean

70
Dose of buprenorphine
needed
Weeks of buprenorphine
medication in the agent’s
possession
Insurance held by agent
Coinsurance—percentage paid
for treatment
Poverty level of agent

Income
Monthly treatment out-ofpocket payment
Monthly medication cost
Can the agent afford his/her
treatment?
Sex
At the end of the current year,
did the agent receive any OAT
treatment?
At the end of the current year,
did the agent receive OB BUP?
At the end of the current year,
did the agent never receive OB
BUP?
At the end of the current year,
did the agent attempt to get
OB BUP even once?
weighted sum of provider to
agent ratios

[8, 32]

mg per day

[0, 4]

weeks

“public”, “private”,
“none”
[0, 100%]

--

[1,3]

(0, ~$3000)
[0, ~$1300)

Indicator of income
relative to the poverty
level. 1 is below 100% of
poverty level, 2 is below
200% of poverty level,
etc.
$ per month
$ per month

[0, $480)
True/False

$ per month
Boolean

Male/Female
True/False

-Boolean

True/False

Boolean

True/False

Boolean

True/False

Boolean

[0, upper patient limit *
number providers]

dimensionless

percentage

For model simplicity, some of these states are mutually exclusive. For example:
an agent cannot be receiving OB BUP and also seeking OAT treatment.
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Provider agents, “providers” are characterized by the following attributes:
Table 3-2: Attributes of provider agents

Attribute
Number of years the provider
has had a waiver
Other waivered providers that
a provider might refer a
patient to
Population density of the
provider’s practice location
(depending on provider type)
Provider type

Does the provider work at an
OTP?
Does the provider have an
addiction medicine specialty?
Does the provider have a high
waiver (100 patients at
baseline, in 2013)?
Is the provider on the
SAMHSA searchable list?
Is the provider currently
prescribing?
If the provider has a low
waiver, will he or she then get
a high waiver?
Number of patients the
provider is willing to treat
under ideal circumstances
Number of patients the
provider is able to treat with
patient limits
Number of patients a
methadone prescriber can
treat with methadone

Range
[0, 15]

Units
years

list of provider agents

list

(0, ~15,000)

people/mi2

“doctor,” “NP,” “PA,”
“methadone only
doctor”
True/False

--

True/False

Boolean

True/False

Boolean

True/False

Boolean

True/False

Boolean

True/False

Boolean

[0, ~2500)

people

[0, upper patient limit
levels] determined by
policy experiment
[0, ~650)

people

Boolean

people
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Number of patients a
methadone prescriber is
currently treating with
methadone
Total capacity for all OAT
treatment types by OTP
doctors
Does a methadone provider
have a no-pay option?
Does the provider offer
telemedicine BUP treatment?
Types of insurance the
provider accepts
Cost of a typical BUP office
visit before insurance
Physician to agent ratio in
physician’s catchment area

[0, ~650)

people

[0, ~650 + upper patient
limit levels)

people

True/False

Boolean

True/False

Boolean

“Public,” “Private,”
“None”
(60, ~$800)

Combinations are
allowed
$/month

(0, upper patient limit
level]

dimensionless
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Opioid Treatment Programs, OTPs are characterized by the following attributes
Table 3-3: Attributes of OTPs

Attribute
OTP type

Types of insurance the OTP
accepts

Range
Private for profit, Private
non-profit, Government,
Veteran’s Health
Administration
“Public,” “Private,”
“None”

Units
--

Does the OTP have a no-pay
option?
Does the OTP provide
buprenorphine?
Providers that work at the OTP

True/False

based on OTP type, one
OTP may accept some,
one or all types
Boolean

True/False

Boolean

List of providers

list

Methadone spots at the OTP
Methadone recipients at the
OTP

(~5, ~1300)
(~5, ~1300) depending on
the number of spots at
the OTP

people
people

Spatial Units: The spatial units are 1 square mile grid cells that are characterized
by population density, the amount of “street” buprenorphine available for purchase in
that square mile, and whether the 1 square mile cell is in a “medically underserved area
(MUA).”
Scales: Time is measured in weeks; 52 weeks constitutes a year, and the model
was run for one year. Each spatial unit represents one square mile, and the total
modeled environment is 150 units by 150 units, representing 22,500 square miles.
Environment: The modeled environment contains a gradient of population
densities, with more dense clusters representing cities and less dense areas
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representing rural regions. The population density of the modeled environment was
derived from actual population density maps of 150 x 150 mile regions of the United
States.
Policy: Policy variables are as follows: the patient limit for providers waivered for
greater than one year (patients), and the percentage of NPs and PAs who obtain DATA
2000 waivers (percentage).
3.2.3 Process overview and scheduling
The process overview and scheduling section outlines which entities do what,
and in what order things happen. In general, this describes what happens when we “run
the model.”
In one time step, first, the environment does its process, then agents not in
treatment or seeking treatment do their processes. Next the agents seeking treatment
or in treatment do their processes, and finally, providers do their processes. These four
sets of processes are outlined in pseudo-code below:
Environment process:
Environment patches (1 mile grid cells) with diverted
buprenorphine diffuse a fraction of the street buprenorphine
to neighboring patches
Out of treatment or not seeking treatment Agent processes:
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A number of people develop opioid use disorder, and initialize
state variables as non-treatment-seeking agents
A fraction of people not in treatment die of overdose and are
removed from the model
Treatment seeking or in-treatment agent processes:
A fraction of patients in treatment die and free up a treatment
spot
Agents who have been waiting for treatment longer than their wait
threshold relapse, become non-treatment-seeking agents,
update state variables
Patients in methadone treatment either:
Quit treatment: relapse, become non-treatment-seeking
agents, update state variables
Continue treatment: update state variables
Patients in buprenorphine treatment either:
Quit treatment: relapse, become non-treatment-seeking
agents, possibly die due to post-treatment relapse,
update state variables
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Complete treatment: free up treatment spot, update state
variables
Continue treatment:
Get medication:
If it has been 4 weeks since the last office
visit or this is the first office visit,
get 4 weeks of buprenorphine medication
Set monthly out-of-pocket treatment and
medication costs based on: insurance,
whether it is an initial or follow up
visit, and provider charges
Set affordability variable based on out-ofpocket costs and income
Divert medication:
A fraction of patients who need money or can’t
afford treatment divert a fraction of
their medication to the “street”:
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Subtract medication from myself, add medication
to the environment
Set diversion flag variable to true
Use medication: decrement the amount of medication by
1 weeks’ worth
Update state variables
Patients on waitlists start treatment if possible:
If the closest provider IS NOT within the distance the
patient is willing to travel try to get diverted
buprenorphine:
Ask nearby people, “friends” in treatment for
medication directly. If obtained: update
diversion variables of self and friend, DO NOT
increment time waiting variable
If not obtained from friends, look for “street”
buprenorphine in the environment patches in the
neighborhood. If obtained: update diversion
variable of self, update amount of buprenorphine
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in the local environment, DO NOT increment time
waiting variable
If couldn’t get diverted buprenorphine, increment
time waiting variable, update state variables
If the closest provider IS within the distance the patient
is willing to travel, check capacity of provider
If the provider does not have a spot, get a list of
other providers who may have spots
If either a buprenorphine or methadone provider on the
referral list has a spot, start treatment, take
treatment spot, update state variables
If no providers have spots, try to get diverted
buprenorphine (as above)
If can’t get diverted buprenorphine, increment weeks
waiting, update state variables
Patients NOT on waitlists start treatment if possible (same as
waitlisted patient code), except that if no providers have
capacity, become waitlisted
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A number of non-treatment-seeking agents become treatment-seeking
agents and start seeking treatment, update state variables
There are a few scheduling issues that merit mention: a patient could quit
treatment and begin seeking treatment again in the same time step. This represents
leaving treatment for a period of time shorter than a week. Patients cannot start
seeking treatment and get treatment in the same time period with this schedule. And
finally, patients seeking treatment will attempt to enter treatment before using diverted
buprenorphine to avoid relapse.
Provider Processes:
Age all providers by one week:
If a provider’s time providing buprenorphine is now > 1 year
and the provider wants to have a higher patient limit,
change to higher patient limit, update state variables
Add more providers and initialize new providers
It should be noted that providers update their patient limit levels and that new
providers are added after the patient processes in a given week. So, a provider will get
more patients due to a limit change in the time step after the limit level variable
changes.
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3.2.4 Design concepts
ABS models tend to incorporate the design concepts below to some degree. This
model is a more top down, probabilistic ABS model than many ABS models and as such
does not fully employ some of the design concepts. Learning and prediction (by agents
within the model) are not employed.
3.2.4.1 Emergence
The model is a top down, probabilistic model, so much of the dynamics are “built
in” rather than emergent. However, the heterogeneous geography, placement of
waivered providers, and patients’ willingness to travel do result in the emergence of
groups of unserved individuals even in more urban locations with many providers. These
emergent groups do not arise out of the actions and interaction of agents, but more due
to a confluence of many random properties of geography, treatment seekers and
physician siting.
3.2.4.2 Adaptation
Again, as a top-down, probabilistic model the proposed model treats adaptation
only lightly. Patients seek to establish treatment with the closest provider, and if this
fails, seek to establish with referred providers, failing that, they will use diverted
buprenorphine or wait. This could be construed as adaptive behavior in treatment
seeking. Use of diverted buprenorphine could be construed as an adaptive behavior in
prolonging treatment seeking through self-medication. Patients in treatment may be in
treatment long enough to reach stable abstinence or reduced opioid use. Once this
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threshold is reached, a patient no longer uses a provider’s OAT treatment spot. This
could be construed as an adaptive behavior in recovery. Patients who cannot afford
their treatment or who need money will divert some of their medicine to the street
(presumably for money). This is an adaptive behavior in treatment retention.
3.2.4.3 Objectives
Treatment-seeking agents in the model want to get into treatment. Most people
with opioid dependence do not want to enter treatment, their implied objective is to
use opioids. As in actual treatment, attrition out of treatment is high, but retention in
treatment and possibly reaching stable abstinence or reduced opioid use is also an
objective of agents. While “success” per se is not modeled from the agent perspective,
from the model observer perspective, an agent in treatment or stably abstinent is
considered “successful.”
Providers in the model want to provide treatment but only up to patient limit
levels or to the level that they are comfortable.
3.2.4.4 Sensing
Treatment-seeking agents do not have complete information on all providers
within the radius they are willing to travel, but they are assumed to know the closest
provider. They are able to query whether a provider has an open treatment spot and
act according to this information. Agents are also aware of their own internal states,
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such as how long they have been waiting for treatment, or how long they have been in
treatment.
Providers know how many patients they have, what the patient limits are, and
how many patients they are willing to treat. They also know how long they have been
waivered. Providers know that patients have left treatment. If a provider is in a densely
populated area, a provider has complete information on all providers within a given
radius. If a provider is in a rural area, the provider may only know the closest provider.
For this model purpose—determining capacity and access, it is not necessary for
providers to know patient details.
3.2.4.5 Interaction
Interaction between agents is simple, and much of it is indirect. Treatmentseeking agents and providers interact when patients take up provider treatment spots.
This results in indirect interaction among treatment-seeking agents. Indirect interaction
occurs when a treatment spot is occupied and a potential patient is denied treatment,
or when a treatment spot opens up and another patient can receive treatment.
3.2.4.6 Stochasticity
Stochasticity is the driving force behind this model. Providers and OTPs are
placed on the map using a random process. A statistical distribution is fit to the actual
population densities of the zip codes of waivered physicians and OTPs. Modeled
providers select the density of their own practice location by drawing from this
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probability distribution and matching their practice location population density to a
close population density on the map. The location of agents with OUD is also randomly
selected based on the percentage of NSDUH respondents with dependence in different
metro area types. The proportion of large MSA, small MSA, and non-MSA are fixed at
initialization, but the actual location of agents with OUD on the map is random. This is
because the actual locations of people with dependence is protected information, and
not known to modelers. The distance a patient is willing to travel for treatment is
determined by 10 empirical probability distributions based on population density of
patient zip code obtained from the NAABT patient locator data file (www.naabt.org),
with a greater proportion of rural residents willing to travel large distances to receive
treatment. Treatment retention is treated probabilistically based on retention in
treatment studies.
To model capacity and access, I have chosen to fit certain variables to empirically
observed distributions to be both general and empirically grounded, specifically
willingness to travel based on urban/rural designation. I have also chosen to simulate
decisions as probabilities based on aggregate survey and study data because it is simple
and more nuanced decision making logic is likely not necessary to address the research
aims.
3.2.4.7 Collectives
While different agent types are aggregated into collectives for observation (see
below), agents act as individuals and do not interact with groups of agents. For
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example: there are no professional societies of providers that share a common desired
cap level.
3.2.4.8 Observation
Observation refers to what data are collected from the model. The following
metrics are recorded at the end of a model year:


Total population in the modeled environment



Number of people who received BUP treatment in the past year per 100,000
population



Number of people who received ANY OAT treatment in the past year per 100,000
population



Milligrams of diverted buprenorphine in the region



The number of opioid overdose deaths in the past year per 100,000 population



Spatial Potential Access Gini Indices (see Section 3.5 for derivation of these
measures)

3.3

Data

3.3.1 Initialization
Initialization varies from one simulation run to the next as described above in
Section 3.3.1. Initialization consists of 4 steps: geography, OTPs, providers, and agents
with OUD are each initialized in turn.
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Geography is initialized by importing population density maps into the
simulation environment and by assigning densities to 1 square mile “patches”
accordingly. Similarly, a map of medically underserved areas (MUAs) is imported and
overlaid on the population map to determine for which patches the “medically
underserved area” variable is “true.” MUAs maps are generated by the HRSA to identify
regions which have a shortage of primary care health services and are publicly available
for GIS analysis (Health Resources and Services Administration, 2018). Figure 3-2 shows
the initial population density and MUA maps. The model is initialized with nine other
sets of maps to explore the effect of geographic variation on outcomes and measures.
This is described in Section 3.4.4.3.
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Figure 3-2: Population density (left) and Medically Underserved Area (right) maps. Blue-grey regions
represent MUAs.
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OTPs are initialized with the following random and calculated parameters:
Table 3-4: OTP initial parameter values and empirical support

Parameter
Number of OTPs

Value
1368 * total model
population / US
population

Location of OTPs

Random:
Lognormal
distribution (mean
9050 sd 32900) for
density of OTP
location

VA
accepts cash
accepts private
insurance
accepts public
insurance
have a no-pay
option
offer
buprenorphine
methadone spots
number of
physicians
Government OTP
accepts cash
accepts private
insurance

64%

Support
SAMHSA Opioid
Treatment Program
Directory (Division
of Pharmacologic
Therapies, 2015)
SAMHSA Opioid
Treatment Program
Directory

91%

2011 OTP Survey
(SAMHSA 2013a)
2011 OTP Survey

35%

2011 OTP Survey

94%

2011 OTP Survey

94%

2011 OTP Survey

Mean 103 sd 89
Random: 1 or 2

2011 OTP Survey
2011 OTP Survey

92%
49%

2011 OTP Survey
2011 OTP Survey

Comment
The number of
OTPs is scaled to
the size of the
model geography
The lognormal
distribution is the
best fit to the
actual densities of
OTP locations on
the OTP directory.
Model OTPs select
a population
density from the
distribution and
then are sited on a
patch with a similar
population density.
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accepts public
insurance
have a no-pay
option
offer
buprenorphine
methadone spots
number of
physicians
Private Non-profit
accepts cash
accepts private
insurance
accepts public
insurance
have a no-pay
option
offer
buprenorphine
methadone spots
number of
physicians
Private For-Profit
accepts cash
accepts private
insurance
accepts public
insurance
have a no-pay
option
offer
buprenorphine
methadone spots
number of
physicians

71%

2011 OTP Survey

70%

2011 OTP Survey

35%

2011 OTP Survey

Mean 362 sd 469
2

2011 OTP Survey
2011 OTP Survey

96%
58%

2011 OTP Survey
2011 OTP Survey

92%

2011 OTP Survey

44%

2011 OTP Survey

44%

2011 OTP Survey

Mean 235 sd 213
Random: 1 or 2

2011 OTP Survey
2011 OTP Survey

100%
33%

2011 OTP Survey
2011 OTP Survey

46%

2011 OTP Survey

8%

2011 OTP Survey

48%

2011 OTP Survey

Mean 255 sd 204
Random: 1 or 2

2011 OTP Survey
2011 OTP Survey
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Providers are initialized with the following random and calculated parameters:
Table 3-5: Provider initial parameter values and empirical support

Parameter
Number of years
the physician
provider has had a
waiver
Population density
of physician
practice location
(for geographic
placement)

Location and
population density
of NP or PA
practice

Theoretical patient
capacity

Value
Random: Uniform
distribution [0, 15]

Random:
Lognormal mean
9460 sd 46300 for
physicians with
high waiver;
lognormal mean
5570 sd 19600 for
physicians with low
waiver
30% in Medically
Underserved Areas
(MUAs), 25% of
those in “isolated
small rural” areas
with density < 20.
Otherwise with a
BUP physician.

Random: 30 +
random
exponential mean
220 for providers
who are

Support
SAMHSA list of all
waivered
physicians,
obtained 20143
SAMHSA list of all
waivered
physicians,
obtained 2014

Comment
Uniform
distribution best fits
data

Cross sectional
analysis of
administrative and
survey of primary
care providers
(Grumbach, Hart,
Mertz, Coffman, &
Palazzo, 2003), 13
state survey of a
random sample of
rural physicians,
NPs and PAs
(Doescher, Andrilla,
Skillman, Morgan,
& Kaplan, 2014)
Calibrated to:
Healthcare
Analytics Retail
Data4 and (Stein BD
et al., 2016).

Between 26% and
42% NPs and PAs in
Washington and
California practice
in HPSAs. HPSAs
may be rural or
urban in the model
and in the US.
Co-locating NPs and
PAs not in
HPSA/MUAs with
other BUP
providers was
suggested by the PA
expert.
See Section 3.4.5:
Recalibration.
Calibrated to fit
total number of
unique

Lognormal is best
fit to actual
population density
of waivered
physicians’ zip
codes.

3

A full de-identified list of providers with a DATA 2000 waivers was provided directly by SAMHSA

4

Data obtained from a representative of Reckitt Benckiser in personal communication.

in 2014.
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prescribing, nonspecialists, have or
will get a high
waiver; Normal(20,
7) for providers
who are
prescribing, nonspecialists, don’t
have or want a high
waiver, 30 +
random
exponential mean
250 for providers
who are addiction
specialists.

Patient capacity
with current
patient limits

Range[0, high
patient limit],
theoretical capacity
truncated at
patient limit

Percentage of
physicians that do
not prescribe

7%

Supported by
expert opinion.

Upper limit
established from a
national survey of
buprenorphine
providers 2004 2008 (Arfken et al.,
2010), calibrated to
fit (Stein BD et al.,
2016)

buprenorphine
recipients per year,
and so that
physicians’ actual
patient census
numbers
approximate mean,
median, IQR of
Stein, et al (2016).
With some
specialists willing to
treat very large
numbers, and other
willing to treat
fewer than 100.
Experts supported
that specialists with
good infrastructure
could treat a very
large number of
patients, and that
primary care
providers are
unlikely to treat
very many.
Providers willing to
treat more than the
high patient limit,
are forced to treat a
maximum of 100 or
275, depending on
model year
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Number of
physicians

Number of NPs

Calculated: 22631 /
model population
in 2013;
22218 in 2014;
25504 in 2015;
29961 in 2016
71% * 220,000 *
model
population/US
population

Number of PAs

26.5% * 101318 *
model
population/US
population

Insurance types
accepted by all
providers

90% cash
77% private
60% public
21% cash only

Cost of physician
office visit

Random normal
(mean $150 sd
$150), redrawn for
visit costs less than
$60.

SAMHSA list of all
Converted to
waivered physicians doctors/person and
multiplied by the
model population

2013 NP survey:
71% of 220000 NPs
are in adult primary
care or psychiatric
fields (American
Association of
Nurse Practitioners,
2013).
2013 PA survey:
26.5% of 101318
PAs are in adult
primary care or
psychiatric fields
(American
Academy of
Physician
Assistants, 2014).
Small survey of
physicians
(Wisniewski,
Dlugosz, & Blondell,
2013)

192000 NPs in
2013, with
approximately
14,000 graduates
per year gives
220,000.

Model parameters
are set so that the
resulting
distribution of
insurance accepted
fits the empirical
data. NP and PAs
are assumed to
take the same
insurance as
physicians.
Expert opinion of
Initial visit is double
buprenorphine
the maintenance
treatment patient
office visit. Costs
advocate, and
vary considerably
patient advocate
from provider to
website (Timothy P. provider and region
Lepak, 2014)
to region. The
random function
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allows for a large
range of visit costs.
Cost of NP or PA
office visit

70% * cost of
Assumed. Primary
physician office visit care NPs are often
reimbursed at a
lower rate than
primary care
physicians by
managed care
payers (HansenTurton, Ware,
Bond, Doria, &
Cunningham,
2013).
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Agents with OUD are initialized with the following random and calculated
parameters:
Table 3-6: Agent initial parameters and empirical support

Parameter
Number of people
with opioid use
disorder

Value
3556000 * model
population / US
population in
2013; 3400000 in
2014; 3418000 in
2015; 3538000 in
2016

Percentage of
30%
patients that are
female
Distance willing to
drawn from
travel for treatment empirical
distributions of
patient willingness
to travel based on
zip code
(presented in
Appendix B)
Number of patients 35% of total OUD
at baseline (seeking population
treatment or in
treatment)

Support
2013, 2014, 2015,
and 2016 NSDUH
(SAMHSA 2014b)
and ONDCP “What
Americans Spend
on Drugs” (ONDCP
2012)

2013 NSDUH

National Alliance of
Advocates for
Buprenorphine
Treatment (NAABT)
treatment locator
data

2013 NSDUH,
Calibrated to:
Healthcare

Comment
Opioid use disorder
is defined as opioid
abuse or
dependence per
the NSDUH
definitions. The
number of people
who primarily use
opioid analgesics is
estimated from the
NSDUH, while
heroin use is
estimated from the
ONDCP document
since many heroin
users are hidden
from the NSDUH
survey.
Assumed to be the
same proportion as
people with OUD.
Dataset is not
publicly available.

Using the highest
estimate of
receiving treatment
in the NSDUH,
“received
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Analytics Retail
Data5
Calibrated to:
Healthcare
Analytics Retail
Data5

Percentage of
patients in
treatment at
baseline

60% in 2013
70% in 2014
80% in 2015

Number of weeks
in treatment for
those initialized in
treatment
Stable abstinence
threshold (time to
achieve abstinence
or reduced opioid
use after opioid
agonist therapy)
Geographic
distribution of
patients

Random:
exponential mean
10

Assumed

Random: normal
distribution (200,
200), redrawn for
weeks < 10.

Assumed

Random: 49.9%
areas with
population density
> 1000, 35.5% in
areas with
population density
between 35 and
1000, 14.5% areas
with population
density less than
35 with 48% of
rural residents in
areas with
population density
> 35

SAMHSA, 2012
NSDUH, (Kvamme,
Catlin, BantaGreen, Roll, &
Rosenblatt, 2013b)

Willing to wait
threshold

randomexponential mean
4 weeks

Harm reduction
expert opinion

5

treatment in past
year.”
Calibrated to
reproduce
estimated number
of unique
recipients of BUP.

To protect privacy,
NSDUH only
reports if a
respondent lives in
a large MSA, small
MSA, or non-MSA.
We assume that
this roughly maps
onto population
density. Kvamme
reported that in
Washington, 52%
of rural residents
live in small towns
while 48% live in
remote areas.
A randomexponential
distribution with a
mean of 4 results in
a median
willingness to wait
of about 2.5 weeks.

Data obtained from a representative of Reckitt Benckiser in personal communication.
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Agents with waiting
times less than 1
week will seek
treatment in the
given week, but will
relapse if they
cannot
immediately access
treatment.
Number of weeks
waiting

0

All initialized to 0
weeks waiting for
simplicity

Percentage of
patients who divert
because they need
or want money

14 % of people
below 200% of the
poverty line per
year

Percentage of
patients who can’t
afford treatment
who divert
medication

54% of people who
can’t afford
treatment per year

Calibrated to fit
buprenorphine
patient survey
(Genie L. Bailey,
Monique Ziebro,
Timothy P. Lepak,
Richard G. Soper, &
Michael M. Miller,
2015).
Calibrated to fit
buprenorphine
patient survey
(Genie L. Bailey et
al., 2015).

Percentage of
patients who say
yes when a friend
requests diverted
buprenorphine

35% per year

Calibrated to fit
buprenorphine
patient survey
(Genie L. Bailey et
al., 2015).

Setting the
parameter to 14%
results in
approximately 29%
of patients listing
“needed money” as
a reason for
diversion
Setting the
parameter to 54%
results in
approximately 47%
of patients listing “I
needed it to afford
my treatment” as a
reason for
diversion
Setting the
parameter to 35%
resulted in
approximately 38%
of patients listing “I
was pressured to
divert by a friend or
because someone
else needed it
more than I did” as
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a reason for
diversion
Amount of
medication
diverted to the
“street”
Poverty level of
people with OUD

1, 2, or 3 days’
worth out of a
week selected at
random
30% are below the
poverty level, 26%
are below 200% of
the poverty level,
44% are above
200% of the
poverty level
Insurance of people 47% have public
in poverty
insurance,
20% have private
insurance,
33% have no
insurance
Insurance of people 30% have public
to 200% of poverty insurance,
level
34% have private
insurance,
36% have no
insurance
Insurance of people 11% have public
above 200% of
insurance,
poverty level
72% have private
insurance,
17% have no
insurance
Coinsurance
0 for public
insurance,
50 – 70% for
private insurance,
100% for no
insurance
Buprenorphine
18% 8 mg,
dose
63% 16 mg,
15% 24 mg,
4% 32 mg

Assumed

2011-2013 NSDUH
analysis of full data
set

2011-2013 NSDUH
analysis of full data
set

Insurance types for
people with opioid
abuse or
dependence
calculated based on
poverty level.

2011-2013 NSDUH
analysis of full data
set

2011-2013 NSDUH
analysis of full data
set

Assumed

2011 OTP survey

Medication
coinsurance and
office visit
coinsurance were
assumed equal for
simplicity
The SAMHSA OTP
survey gives ranges
of doses. For
simplicity, doses
were rounded up
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to the highest dose
in the range

Figure 3-3: Graphical display of the simulation after model initialization. Maroon squares represent OTPs;
large red triangles are OB BUP providers; small triangles represent people seeking OAT.
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3.3.2 Input data
Input data are those empirical data that are used when the model is running to
update the state of the model. The geography, population density and OTP values are
static. Provider and agent variables are updated with the following input data:
Table 3-7: Input data for updating provider and patient variables

Parameter
Number of new
providers obtaining
waivers

value
2500* (total model
population / total
US population) per
year
Buprenorphine
76% week 1, 64%
treatment retention week 2, 50% in
week 6, mean days
in treatment 214

support
SAMHSA list of
number of
waivered physicians
by state 2007-2015
Randomized
controlled trial of
buprenorphine
retention (Bell,
Trinh, Butler,
Randall, & Rubin,
2009)

Methadone
74% retained at 6
treatment retention months,
50% at a year

Multisite
randomized
controlled trial
(Hser et al., 2014)

Crude mortality
rate: in treatment

3/1000 patient
years

Crude mortality
rate: stable
abstinence

3/1000 patient
years

Randomized
controlled trial,
cohort study, of
buprenorphine
retention and
mortality (Bell et
al., 2009)
Assumed

comment
Data show near
linear growth in
providers since
2007
The model was
configured to
simulate a closed
cohort to
reproduce the
retention in
treatment from this
closed cohort study
as a verification
test

assumed equal to
in-treatment
mortality
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Crude mortality
rate: people taking
diverted BUP
Crude mortality
rate: not in
treatment

Crude mortality
rate: relapsing out
of treatment

Rate of growth of
people with opioid
use disorder
Incidence of
treatment seeking

3/1000 patient
years
8/1000 patient
years in 2013,
10.5/1000 patient
years in 2014,
12/1000 patient
years in 2015

Assumed

Assumed equal to
in-treatment
mortality
See Section 3.4.5:
Recalibration

Calibrated to fit
national opioid
related deaths data:
CDC Wonder
Multiple Cause of
Death Database for
opioid and heroin
deaths (NIDA, 2017)
8/1000 patient
Randomized
years
controlled trial,
cohort study, of
buprenorphine
retention and
mortality (Bell et
al., 2009)
10%
2002-2012 NSDUH
Fit to rate of
Surveys
increase of
prevalence of
opioid use disorder
40% of people with 2013 NSDUH
Calibrated to fit the
OUD including
unique recipients
multiple attempts
of BUP per year.
by one person

3.3.3 Outcome variables
Policies were assessed by their impact on the following outcome variables at
year end: Population adjusted unique recipients of buprenorphine, opioid overdose
deaths, and milligrams of diverted buprenorphine. Population adjusted unique
recipients of buprenorphine was normalized to the model population: total
buprenorphine recipients/model population * 100,000. This outcome variable will be
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referred to as Unique BUP recipients, for short. Access equity was assessed using the
Spatial Potential Access Gini Indices.
3.4

Model Testing

3.4.1 Calibration
To establish the baseline model scenario, I initialized the model the model with
2013 data and calibrated to fit two outcome variables: unique buprenorphine recipients
and opioid overdose deaths; a pattern of buprenorphine diversion assessed by patient
survey; and a pattern of buprenorphine prescribing based on pharmacy survey. Values
and data sources for these calibration targets are detailed in Table 3-8.
Prior to final model calibration, I conducted sensitivity analysis to highlight
tunable parameters. I didn’t calibrate or validate against the medication diversion
outcome directly because the quantity of diverted buprenorphine in the US is not
known. While there are several surveillance systems that can estimate trends in
diversion including NFLIS (US Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Diversion
Control, 2013), or the RADARS system (see, for example: Dart et al., 2015), these rely on
proxy measures such as calls to poison centers or seizures by law enforcement, and
don’t generate estimates of total quantity diverted.
I chose to calibrate the model against the provider patient census pattern
reported by Stein, et al (2016) because provider preferences for patient loads are not
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Table 3-8: Calibration targets and data sources

Parameter

National value

Support

2013 unique
buprenorphine recipients
2013 opioid overdose
deaths

1,300,824

Diversion by patients to
non-patients

9% of patients
(47% to afford treatment)
(29% needed money)
(38% friend wanted or
needed)
27% have used nonprescribed BUP
Median 13, IQR 5-36;
22% had 1-3 patients
49% had 4-30 patients
20% had 31-75 patients
9% had more than 75

Healthcare Analytics Retail
Data6
CDC Wonder Multiple
Cause of Death Database
for opioid and heroin
deaths (NIDA, 2017)
Buprenorphine patient
survey (Genie L. Bailey et
al., 2015)

Use of non-prescribed BUP
Provider patient census

24,492

Buprenorphine patient
survey
Analysis of Symphony
Health Solutions’
Integrated Dataverse retail
pharmacy transactions
(Stein BD et al., 2016)

known empirically, and these preferences play an important role in model dynamics. It
was difficult for the model to generate a large enough number of unique buprenorphine
recipients while tuning provider preferences for patient loads to fit the provider census
pattern. Even when attempting to fit the prescribing pattern loosely, allowing a greater
percentage of providers to have higher patient census levels than recorded in Stein’s
group’s analysis, the number of unique buprenorphine recipients was 7-10% low. It is
worth noting that Stein reported that regression analysis showed an increase in
prescribing levels in later years, though they did not report specifics on the census in

6

Data obtained from a representative of Reckitt Benckiser in personal communication.
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later years. As discussed in Section 3.4.5, I found it necessary to calibrate the model
further after validation tests.
3.4.2 Face Validation
I reached out to all expert panel members via email for face validation
interviews, received four responses, and conducted interviews with two panel
members: Dr. Alane O’Connor, and Dr. Andrew Saxon. Interviews were two hours long,
and covered boundary, basis, and representation assessment (see Section 2.4.1), as well
as critical model assumptions, policies, and future conditions that should be considered
in policy analysis.
At the outset of the interview, I introduced Drs. O’Connor and Saxon to the
research questions, to the basic structure of the spatial ABS capacity model, and
explained that the purpose of the interview was to check assumptions about model
scope (boundary assessment), assumptions that informed the use of data (basis
assessment), and model logic that drives key dynamics (representation assessment), and
to share early findings prior to final external validation.
In general, the experts were comfortable with the boundary of the model,
agreeing that a model that is narrowly investigating questions of capacity might not
need rich details on patient experience, for example. They were both interested in the
spatial dimension of the model since they both had experience working with rural
communities. As to basis assessment, they seemed comfortable with populating a real
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map with people with OUD and providers placed plausibly according to population
density and the NSDUH survey. However, this may have stemmed more from a lack of
familiarity with ABS methods and a reluctance to “red flag” something unfamiliar. They
agreed that there was a large variance in the patient loads of providers, which was
reported by Stein, et al (2016) and suggested several reasons that some providers
choose to serve different numbers of patients. Dr. O’Connor’s practice experience did
not conform to the data used for patient retention, which was several years old. In her
experience, by the time patients are admitted to her program, they are heavily invested
in treatment and are better retained, and suggested that retention in the model may be
overly conservative.
Regarding key model logic, both agreed that diversion was likely primarily not for
recreational purposes but for self-treatment, or to maintain active opioid use when
preferred drugs might not be available. This supports model assumptions about reasons
for diversion, which has implications for diversion outcomes of policies that expand
access. They also agreed that many people self-treat with buprenorphine while waiting
to start formal treatment, sometimes for years. On the other hand, both also
questioned the validity of the assumption that people with OUD select providers on the
SAMSHA searchable list. Dr. O’Connor asserted that word of mouth was a much more
likely source of information on potential providers, especially in rural areas.
Interviews concluded with open questions about the impact of policies
implemented since modeling began in 2014, including the patient limit expansion policy
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and NP/PA prescribing policy, and what unforeseen circumstances may have had
outsized impact on their practices and patients. Dr. O’Connor had already obtained her
DATA 2000 waiver by the time the interview took place. The model was originally
intended to test very modest penetration of NP and PA prescribing, at the 3-5% level,
mirroring the uptake among primary care physicians. Dr. O’Connor expects much higher
uptake by NPs, and suggested testing the impact of uptake among 50-70% of primary
care NPs in states with high NP autonomy. She also expects that initially patients will be
shifted from overloaded specialty providers to less distant NPs resulting in a reallocation
of treatment without apparent expansion until those specialist spots are backfilled and
word of mouth brings new patients to NP prescribers.
Both providers were not surprised that early model experiments with the patient
limit policy didn’t produce large gains in the number of people who receive
buprenorphine in a given year, though Dr. Saxon was dismayed by it. In Dr. O’Connor’s
experience, while some providers, such as those who run intensive outpatient recovery
programs, may have expanded their practices dramatically after increasing their patient
limit, many may have elected to expand to 275 patients as a safety valve just in case
they approach the 100 patient limit. Dr. Saxon also explained that even addiction
medicine specialists may be reluctant to build their practices around buprenorphine
prescribing, preferring a more diverse patient mix in part because practice barriers such
as high paperwork burden and low reimbursement remain.
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I closed by asking what surprised them in 2014-2017 and what to look out for
when modeling future policy. The emergence of synthetic fentanyl as a street drug was
completely unanticipated and resulted in increased opioid deaths. State policies
squeezing down on prescription opioid diversion and the resultant uptick in heroin use
wasn’t totally unanticipated, but it did drive up overdoses and would not have been
captured in a policy model that doesn’t differentiate between opioids, including this
one. I was made aware of a major change in insurance that could have a large impact on
access to treatment. A person with an extremely high deductible insurance plan may be
insured on paper, but that insurance wouldn’t pay for treatment, leaving that person
effectively uninsured and paying out of pocket, making treatment unaffordable.
3.4.3 External Validation
I performed external validation by initializing the model in week 1 of 2013, 2014,
2015, and 2016, and running the model for 52 weeks thirty times for each model year. I
also initialized the model in 2013 and 2014 and ran for 104 weeks (two years) thirty
times for each model year. I scaled up the model-generated number of unique
buprenorphine recipients and opioid overdose deaths to the total national population,
by dividing by model population and multiplying by the national population for that
year. I generated 95% confidence intervals around the simulation means and compared
these model ranges to the real world target values. The number of opioid overdose
deaths in 2016 was not available at the time of writing. Results are shown in Table 3-9.
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Table 3-9: External validation results, simulation compared with data for 2013, 2014, and 2015.

One year
runs
Model year
2013

2014

2015

2016

Two year
runs
Model year
2013-2014

2014-2015

Simulation
Unique BUP
Opioid
recipients: mean
overdose
[95% CI]
deaths: mean
[95% CI]
1178147
[1155141,
1201152]
1065499
[1045661,
1085337]
1166551
[1147081,
1186021]
1242834
[1220505,
1265164]

23819
[23050,
24589]
20574
[20006,
21143]
20931
[20452,
21411]
21375
[20802,
21948]

1132527
[1103229,
1161825]
1087457
[1062895,
1112020]

25257
[24562,
26153]
21736
[21080,
22392]

Data
Unique BUP
Opioid OD
recipients
deaths
(% deviation
(% deviation
from mean)
from mean)
1300824
24492
(9.43%)
(2.74%)
1294715
(17.7%)

28647
(28.18%)

1387815
(15.9%)

33091
(36.75%)

1380616
(9.9%)

Not reported

1294715
(12.5%)

28547
(11.5%)

1387815
(21.6%)

33091
(34.3%)

The 7-10% under-calculation of total unique buprenorphine recipients at the end
of calibration resulted in a systematic low estimate of total unique buprenorphine
recipients in each modeled year. This was compounded by a change in the estimation
method for the starting number of people with OUD in each modeled year. The model
was calibrated to an initial population with OUD of 3,895,621 in 2013, rather than an
estimate of 3,556,000 using the estimation method for 2014 forward. The fit to 2014
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year end data when starting the model in 2013 and running for two years was likely
better than when the model was initialized in 2014 and run for one year because of the
higher starting population with OUD in 2013.
Opioid overdose deaths in 2013 were calibrated to fall within the 95%
confidence interval of simulated overdose deaths. However, the fit 2014 onward was
poor. This is unsurprising given that the opioid overdose death rate was held fixed in the
model. The introduction of synthetic fentanyl and the shift in use of diverted
prescription opioids to counterfeit prescription pills and heroin reported by Dr.
O’Connor likely increased the risk of opioid overdose despite an apparent level trend in
people with prescription OUD recorded in the NSDUH at that time.
3.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis consisted of three processes: one-way sensitivity analysis,
structural sensitivity analysis to the provider patient load preference assumption, and
structural sensitivity analysis to the map selected for simulation.
3.4.4.1 One-way sensitivity analysis
Holding all other parameter values fixed, I systematically increased and
decreased each parameter value by 30% and recorded the impact on model outcome
variables: unique BUP recipients, opioid overdose deaths, and diverted buprenorphine. I
report the percentage difference of the means of 30 replications of these outcome
variables from baseline level means and present results as tornado diagrams on each
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outcome variable to highlight the sensitivity of model outcomes to changes in particular
parameters (Eschenbach, 1992). If confidence intervals on the mean for outcome levels
of tested parameters overlapped with the baseline mean, the difference in the mean is
not detectable due to random variation in the model. These parameters are in not
included in the diagrams.
The number of buprenorphine recipients was sensitive to three treatment
seeking parameters, and three provider specific parameters, as shown in Table 3-10.
The number of buprenorphine recipients was sensitive to the incidence of treatment
seeking—the percentage of people with OUD who would seek treatment in the model
year starting the year uninterested in treatment, and the initial percentage of people
with OUD who start the year in treatment or seeking treatment, but only when these
parameters were reduced. Increasing these parameter values did not significantly
increase the number of buprenorphine recipients at year end. The relative percentage
of people with OUD who start the model year in or seeking treatment who
Table 3-10: Tornado diagram of sensitivity analysis on the number of unique buprenorphine recipients. In
general, an increase (or decrease) in the parameter value resulted in an increase (or decrease) in the number
of buprenorphine recipients, with the exception of the number of OTPs (*), for which a 30% increase in the
number of OTPs resulted in a 5% decrease in unique recipients of BUP
Unique BUP recipients: percentage difference from baseline

+/-30% change in paramter value
incidence of treatment seeking
initial % people with OUD in/seeking tx
% providers = specialist high-cap
initial % seeking vs in tx
number of OTPs *
% providers accept private insurance

25- 20- 15- 10- 5030% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-5%

0- 5- 10- 15- 20- 255% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

4%
-5%
-4%
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.

are assigned into treatment increases buprenorphine recipients when increased, and
decreases it when decreased.
Decreasing the percentage of providers who are addiction medicine specialists
with high waivers and replacing those providers with an equal number of non-specialists
who have low waivers resulted in a 6% decrease in buprenorphine recipients. Even
though the percentage of specialist providers was only reduced from 12% to 9% of all
providers, providers of this type were initialized with preferences for the highest
number of patients (often over 100) and were replaced by providers with the lowest
preference levels (around 10).
Increasing the number of OTPs in the model decreased the number of
buprenorphine recipients significantly, but did not affect the number of people who
received any OAT. Conversely, decreasing the number of OTPs by 30% did result in a 7%
decrease in OAT treatment overall, while having no detectable effect on the number of
people receiving buprenorphine. This suggests that increasing OTPs results in a
treatment substitution effect in the model.
The amount of diversion in the model was sensitive to three types of parameters
(see Table 3-11): diversion-specific parameters, poverty and affordability parameters,
treatment seeking parameters, and two parameters that didn’t fall into those
categories: number OTPs, and % patients with 16 mg BUP daily dose.
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Table 3-11: Tornado diagram of sensitivity analysis on the amount of buprenorphine diverted to nonpatients. An increase (or decrease) in the parameter value resulted in an increase (or decrease) in the
amount of diversion, with the exception of parameters marked with an (*).

Not surprisingly, increasing the percentage of patients who divert medication for
various reasons resulted in large increases in diversion. This is due to model logic that
does not require that an increase in one reason for diversion be offset by a decrease in
another reason. A person may divert medication both because she can’t afford
treatment and because she wants money. Increasing the weeks a person is willing to
wait to begin treatment before relapsing increases diversion because of the way the
demand for diverted buprenorphine is coded. People who are waiting for treatment will
ask friends in treatment to divert, and will stop asking for diverted medication when
they stop self-treatment and treatment seeking and resume regular opioid use. So in the
model, relatively quick abandonment of treatment seeking results in less diversion
demand.
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Incidence of treatment seeking increases demand for diverted buprenorphine as
people self-treat with diverted buprenorphine while waiting for formal treatment spots
to open. Decreasing incidence of treatment seeking also likely reduces the supply of
diverted buprenorphine since it also decreases the unique number of buprenorphine
recipients.
Changes to poverty parameters affect diversion because most of the reasons for
diversion are due to poverty. People with incomes below two times the poverty level
might divert because they can’t afford treatment or need money. In the model, people
whose incomes are above those levels will not divert due to affordability or money
issues. The cost of treatment and medication did affect diversion because they impact
affordability logic. A patient who pays less for treatment is less likely to find treatment
unaffordable, and hedge the cost of treatment by selling medication.
Changes in the number of OTPs affects diversion from the supply side, by
changing the relative proportion of people receiving methadone versus BUP for OAT.
Finally, the amount of diverted buprenorphine decreases when the percentage
of people who require 16 mg per day of buprenorphine increases because of how
required dosages are set. Increasing the number of people who require 16 mg doses
squeezes down on the number of people getting 32 mg per day, followed by 24 mg per
day, while decreasing the number of people who need 16 mg per day increases the
number of people who need 8 mg per day. When diverting medication in the model,
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people give up a fraction of what they receive. So if most people get less medication,
less is diverted per diversion occasion.
The number of opioid overdose deaths was only affected by changes in the crude
mortality rate for people not in treatment, and the change was approximately 1:1. A
30% increase in the mortality rate resulted in 27% more overdose deaths overall, and a
30% decrease resulted in a 28% decrease. That no other parameter impacted opioid
overdoses is likely due to the fact in the model, the vast majority of people with OUD
are not in treatment.
3.4.4.2 Structural sensitivity analysis: provider preferences
The baseline model was run with provider preferences tuned to roughly match
the provider census reported in Stein, et al (2016) and the number of unique
buprenorphine recipients (Stein BD et al., 2016). I assumed that providers have a
maximum patient number above which they would not accept new patients, no matter
the patient limit. For some providers this maximum lay above the patient limit level, for
other, it lay below the limit. In baseline runs, an individual provider’s maximum was
drawn from a random distribution based on provider type. These baseline distributions
are reported in Table 3-5 as “Theoretical Patient Capacity.”
I conducted one-way sensitivity analysis by provider type with three different
sets of parameters for determining the patient maximum for each provider: a low
uniform random distribution, a high uniform random distribution, and a fixed constant
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at the patient limit for the waiver type held (30 or 100, in 2013). I conducted a five-way
analysis by setting patient preferences to the maximum waiver level (30 or 100) for all
provider types. Sensitivity analysis parameter values are shown in Table 3-12.
Table 3-12: Distributions for provider preference sensitivity analysis

Baseline
distribution

Specialist, low
waiver
Specialist, high
waiver
Non-specialist,
high waiver,
on SAMSHA
list
Non-specialist,
low waiver, on
SAMHSA list,
will get high
waiver
Non-specialist,
low waiver, on
SAMHSA list,
will NOT get
high waiver
Non-specialist,
low waiver,
not on
SAMHSA list

Alternative
random
distribution
(low)
Uniform[0,
150]

Alternative
random
distribution
(high)
Uniform[0,
1000]

Fixed constant

Uniform[0,
150]

Uniform[0,
1000]

100

Uniform[0,
100]

Uniform[0,
1000]

100

Uniform[0,
100]

Uniform[0,
200]

100

Normal (3.5, 7), Uniform[0, 10]
redraw for
values below 0

Uniform[0, 30]

30

Normal (3.5, 7), Uniform[0, 10]
redraw for
values below 0

Uniform[0, 30]

30

30 +
exponential
(250)
30 +
exponential
(250)
30 +
exponential
(120)
20 +
exponential
(40)

100

114
Changing provider preference did not result in significant differences from
baseline in medication diversion or opioid overdose deaths. However, there were
significant changes in the number of buprenorphine recipients, as shown in Table 3-13.
Only parameter settings with detectable differences are shown, and differences are
expressed as percentage difference in means.
Table 3-13: Impact of changing assumptions about provider preferences on total number of buprenorphine
recipients after a year.

Parameter setting

All parameters to maximum level for waiver type
Fixed Constant (100) Non-specialist, high waiver, on list
Fixed Constant (30) Non-specialist, low waiver, not on list
Random, Low (uniform[0, 100]) Non-specialist, high
wavier, on list
Random, High (uniform[0, 1000]) Non-specialist, high
waiver, on list
Random, Low (uniform[0, 150]) Specialist, high wavier
Random, High (uniform[0, 30]) Non-specialist, low waiver,
not on list

Percentage difference
between mean and
baseline
+21%
+11%
+10.9%
-10%
+9.8%
-5.1%
+4.3%

In the model, if all providers are willing to treat up to the regulatory limit
depending on demand, the number of people who receive buprenorphine at year end
increases by around 21%. The greatest impact comes from changes in preferences of
non-specialists, each of which increase utilization by around 10% alone. This is likely
because these two groups represent 20% and 48% of buprenorphine providers
respectively, and because the maximum number of patients treated by non-specialists
with low waivers was held very low at baseline.

115
3.4.4.3 Structural sensitivity analysis: model map
To test the model’s sensitivity to the selected geography, I generated 9
additional population density maps based on the 2010 United States Census merged
with HRSA Medically Underserved Area maps using the QGIS GIS mapping software
(QGIS, 2017). The population density maps are shown in Figure 3-4 and the underlying
MUA maps are shown in Figure 3-5. I selected the maps from a wide array of regions in
the US including the North East, South East, Midwest, Mountain West and California,
and include highly urbanized regions (such as Figure 3-4, bottom middle), and rural
regions (such as Figure 3-4, bottom left). Models were run 30 times each for one year,
initialized at the start of 2013, and buprenorphine recipients, opioid overdose deaths
and diversion outcome variables were compared against baseline model runs. I
normalized diversion and opioid overdose death outcome variables to the population
size to allow for direct comparison. The buprenorphine recipients outcome variables for
each set of runs was also compared against 2013 unique buprenorphine recipient data.
There were no significant differences in opioid overdose deaths when using
different starting maps. Regions 1, 3 and 6 had significantly fewer buprenorphine
recipients than the baseline Region 0 (Figure 3-4 top left, top right and middle right,
respectively), with mean values 12%, 6% and 7% lower than the mean number of
recipients per 100,000 population. Regions 1, 3, 5, and 7 (Figure 3-4 top left, top right,
middle middle, bottom left) had significantly lower diversion (mg per 100,000
population) than the baseline region, with mean values 14%, 10%, 7% and 15% lower.
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Regions 4 and 8 (Figure 3-4 middle left, bottom middle) had significantly higher
diversion (mg per 100,000 population) than the baseline region, with mean values 7%
and 6% higher. In general, more densely populated regions had higher diversion than
less densely populated regions despite normalization, and may signal a systematic bias
in how demand for diverted buprenorphine is modeled in remote and urban areas.
The number of unique buprenorphine recipients at year end was low for all
regions. Model confidence intervals did not cover the actual year-end value adjusted
for model population in any region. Inadequate calibration to the year-end target in the
baseline region reported in Section 3.4.3 resulted in the use of poorly calibrated
parameter values in all regional model runs.
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Figure 3-4: Alternative population density maps for geographic sensitivity testing. Population density is
measured in people per square mile. Maps are numbered sequentially left to right, top to bottom.
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Figure 3-5: Additional Medically Underserved Areas (MUA) maps for geographic sensitivity analysis. Darker
regions are MUAs. Maps correspond to population density maps in Figure 3-4.
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3.4.5 Recalibration
The original research plan called for calibration on 2013 data, external validation
on 2014-2015 data, and sensitivity analysis followed immediately by policy
experimentation. Rather than perform policy experiments on a model that failed tests of
external validity, I chose to iterate and use all available data for model calibration and to
perform policy experiments on a better calibrated, though non-validated model. Failure
to validate large simulation models or poor results on tests of model fit tend to be a
challenge when striving to simulate complex social systems.
To recalibrate the model, I made three choices—
1. to initialize the model in 2013 with the number of people with opioid
dependence calculated the same way as the 2014 and 2015 populations,
2. to tune provider preference parameters to privilege fit to total unique
buprenorphine recipients over fit to provider patient census in Stein, et al (2016),
3. to use a non-stationary opioid overdose death rate (the death rate changes
over time).
I chose to recalculate the initial population with OUD in 2013 because calculating
the population in a different way resulted in an apparent decrease in people with OUD
from 2013 to 2014 due to a modeling artifact. I removed this spurious effect by
calculating the population the same way for all model years. The modeling artifact was
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introduced in the first place because of the considerable lag between early modeling
efforts in iterations 1-3 of the model and validation efforts on model iteration 4.
I chose to recalibrate the model by tuning provider preference variables because
these variables have considerable leverage over the unique buprenorphine recipients
outcome measure as shown in structural sensitivity analysis (see Section 3.4.4.2).
Further, Stein’s regression model on 2009-2011 patient census data showed that patient
census levels were rising even in 2011 (Stein BD et al., 2016).
Lastly, to fit trends in opioid overdose deaths in 2013-2015, I chose to
parameterize the model with a non-stationary opioid overdose mortality rate. It may
have been possible for a non-stationary opioid overdose mortality rate to have arisen
endogenously by introducing considerable model complexity. I could have chosen to
model people’s shift from prescription opioids to heroin, from oral to injection drug use,
and other transitions from lower risk to higher risk behaviors, but I would likely still have
had to introduce exogenous factors that drove up overdose mortality, such as changes
to price and purity of heroin and the introduction of synthetic fentanyl (see Section
3.4.2, Face Validation). Rather than introduce this complexity, which I felt would have
little relevance to capacity and access equity research questions, I chose the simpler
option of a time-varying opioid overdose mortality rate.
The following parameters were tuned to fit the number of unique
buprenorphine recipients in 2013, 2014 and 2015: theoretical patient capacity for non-
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specialists with a high waiver and for non-specialists with a low waver not on the
SAMHSA searchable list, and percentage of patients in treatment at baseline each year.
Table 3-14 shows all post-recalibration parameter values including crude mortality rates.
The initialization data and input data parameterizations reported in Sections 3.3.1 and
3.3.2 record parameter settings after calibration and recalibration was complete.
Table 3-14: Parameter values changed during recalibration and the final values of these parameters.

Theoretical patient capacity
Non-specialist, high waiver, on
SAMSHA list
Non-specialist, low waiver, not on
SAMHSA list
Percentage of patients in treatment at
baseline
2013
2014
2015
Opioid overdose crude mortality rate (not
in treatment)
2013
2014
2015

3.5

30 + random exponential(220) patients
random normal(20, 7) patients

60%
70%
80%

8/1000 patient years
10.5/1000 patient years
12/1000 patients years

Spatial Potential Access Aggregate Measure
To generate an aggregate access equity metric for OAT in the simulation model, I

took advantage of the following simulation properties:
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the simulation generates plausibly sited synthetic individual demanders
with opioid use disorder along with plausibly sited sources of OAT supply—
providers with limited treatment capacity



each demander has an empirically informed distance he or she is willing
to travel to get OAT based on the population density of his or her location.

Using these model properties, I modified the two-step floating catchment area
(2SFCA) method (see Equations 13 and 14) in the following manner. Substantive
differences from Luo and Wang (2003) are italicized.
Step 1: For each provider j, search all individuals (i) that are within i’s
willingness to travel distance (di0) from the location j (that is, the individualized
catchment area of j), and compute the weighted provider capacity-to-population,
Rj, within the catchment area:

𝑅𝑗 =

𝑆𝑗
∑𝑖 ∈{𝑑𝑗𝑖 ≤𝑑𝑖0 } 𝑤𝑗𝑖 𝑖

(20)

where Sj is the capacity of provider j (the number of patients that j is willing to
treat given patient limits and preference), dji is the Euclidean distance between i
and j. The weight, wji, is calculated by various distance decay functions described
in Section 3.5.1, below.
Step 2: For each individual, i, search all provider locations (j) that are
within the threshold willingness to travel distance (di0) of i (that is, the reachable
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provider region of i), and sum up the weighted provider-capacity-to-population
ratios, Rj, at these locations:

𝐴𝐹𝑖 = ∑

𝑗 ∈ {𝑑𝑗𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑖0 }

𝑤𝑗𝑖 𝑅𝑗 = ∑

𝑤𝑗𝑖 𝑆𝑗
𝑗 ∈ {𝑑𝑗𝑖 ≤ 𝑑𝑖0 } ∑𝑘 ∈{𝑑𝑗𝑖 ≤𝑑𝑖0 } 𝑤𝑗𝑖 𝑖

(21)

where 𝐴𝐹𝑖 represents the potential access of individual i, Rj is the OAT treatment
capacity of provider j, who is within the reachable provider region of i (that is djk
< di0). The weight, wjk is the same distance weight as used in step 1. (Modified
from W. Luo & Qi, 2009, p. 1102; W. Luo & Wang, 2003, p. 872)
Changing the numerator of the first step to total provider capacity, and the
demand from populations at census tract centroids to individuals preserves an
important property of the 2SFCA method. The population weighted average of the
accessibility values of a system will equal the provider-population ratio of that system
(Shen, 1998). Put another way, if you multiply the accessibility values of the population
units by their population and sum, you get the total supply in the system (Delamater,
2013). In the individualized version, each population unit is one person, so the sum of
the individuals’ potential accessibility scores equals the total capacity in the considered
region:

∑ 𝐴𝐹𝑖 = ∑ 𝑆𝑗
𝑖

𝑗

(22)
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This property allows us to consider one individual agent’s potential accessibility
score as its fraction of the total supply. As such, we can quantify the equitability of the
distribution of accessibility using the Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient (Gini, 1912;
Lorenz, 1905).
The Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient (or Gini Index) are usually used to quantify
unequal distributions of wealth or income in an economy. A Lorenz curve is constructed
with the x axis representing the cumulative proportion of the population, and the y axis
representing cumulative proportion of wealth or income. The population is indexed in
increasing order of wealth or income. The x value of the function is equal to the
cumulative fraction of the population, and the y value of the function is equal to the
cumulative fraction of total wealth or income. If wealth is distributed perfectly, with
each person having a proportional share, the function becomes the straight line y = x. If
one person has all the wealth or income and everyone else has none, the function is a
stepwise curve with y = 0 for x < 1 and y = 1 for x = 1. In all other cases, the curve is
Index is 0, because the area A is 0. In the case in which one person has all the wealth,
the Gini Index is 1 because A+B = A. The US Central Intelligence Agency publishes Gini
Indices for household income in The World Fact Book (Central Intelligence Agency,
2018). Lethoso and South Africa have the most unequal distribution of income at Gini
Index = 63.2 and 62.5 respectively, and Slovakia and Finland have among the most equal
distribution of income at Gini Index = 23.7 and 21.5, respectively. The United States’ Gini
Index is ranked 41st highest out of 156 nations at 45.0. The Gini Index of income
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A
B

Figure 3-6: Typical Lorenz curve with the line of perfect equality in black. The Gini coefficient summarizes
the unequal distribution represented by the curve in an index given by the ratio A/(A+B).

distribution does not give any information on individuals’ actual income, or the total
income in the system. Income in the United States is distributed about as equally as
income in Cameroon (ranked 42nd out of 156, Gini Index = 44.6), but per capita income
differs by an order of magnitude ($58,030 in the US, and $3,250 in Cameroon, 2018).
I use the same general method to generate a Lorenz Curve and Gini Index for
spatial potential access—the Spatial Potential Access Lorenz Curve (SPALC) and the
Spatial Potential Access Gini Index (SPAGI). The x axis represents the cumulative
fraction of the total population of demanders, and the y-axis the fraction of the total
OAT supply in the system. Agents are indexed in increasing order of spatial potential
accessibility scores, 𝐴𝐹𝑖 , and the y value is calculated by dividing the spatial potential
accessibility score by the sum of all spatial potential accessibility score, which is
𝐴𝐹
𝑖

equivalent to the total amount of supply in the system: ∑

𝑗 𝑆𝑗

. The area of region
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between the resultant Spatial Potential Access Lorenz Curve (SPALC), and the line of
perfect equality of access is the Spatial Potential Accessibility Gini Index, or SPAGI for
short.
Like the Lorenz Curve and Gini Index for income does not give information of the
adequacy of income to meet peoples’ needs, neither does the SPAGI give information
on the adequacy of OAT supply to meet treatment demand, only the equitability of the
distribution of that supply based on location and travel preferences. Adding treatment
supply to the system could cause the SPAGI to increase, decrease, or stay about the
same depending on the location of that supply.

Figure 3-7: Eight demanders equidistant to one provider. In the left figure, the provider has excess capacity,
and in the right figure, the provider has inadequate supply.

Figure 3-7 shows an idealized case. In both the left and right figure, using a
dichotomous weighting scheme with dij < di0, SPAGI = 0. In the Capacity = 16 case,
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𝑅𝑗 =

16
=2
8

𝐴𝐹𝑖 = 2 ∀𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑖
2
=
∀𝑖
∑𝑗 𝑆𝑗 16
Each demander has a 1/8 proportional share of the 16 units of supply, and
therefore the area of the region between the curve and the line of perfect equality is 0.
In the Capacity = 4 case,

𝑅𝑗 =

4
= 0.5
8

𝐴𝐹𝑖 = 0.5 ∀𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑖
0.5
=
∀𝑖
∑𝑗 𝑆𝑗
4
And again, each demander has a proportional share of the 4 units of supply, and
again SPAGI is 0.
3.5.1 Weighting schemes for the Spatial Potential Access Gini Index (SPAGI)
As emphasized in Section 2.2, the distance decay weights 2SFCA models can take
on various forms. I tested the range, sensitivity, and differences among five different
weighting schemes: dichotomous 2SFCA at an individual’s stated willingness to travel
distance, inverse logistic distance decay, Gaussian distance decay, exponential distance
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decay, and at three cut off distances (10, 30 and 60 miles) per the E2SFCA method in
equation (18). All weights are calculated based on Euclidean distances because the
simulation model maps do not include road systems, or actual geo-located individuals,
and because travel times and straight line distances are highly correlated (Phibbs &
Luft, 1995).
3.5.1.1 Dichotomous weighting
When using the dichotomous weighting scheme, (hereafter designated
“2SFCA”), an individual regards all providers within his or her willingness to travel
distance as equally reachable and all those outside that distance as unreachable.
Provider catchment areas are determined by whether that provider is reachable by the
patient. Individuals in the model have heterogeneous distances they are willing to
travel, so one demander at a given location may be inside a provider’s catchment area,
while another demander at the same location may be outside that provider’s catchment
area. The individualized dichotomous measure becomes:

𝑓(𝑑𝑖𝑗 ) = {

1, 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≤ 𝑑𝑖0 ;
}
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(23)

where dij is the distance between the provider j and individual i, and d0, the populationwide catchment cutoff distance is replaced by di0, an individualized cutoff value.

129
3.5.1.2 Continuous distance decay functions: Inverse Logistic, Gaussian, and
Exponential decay
The three continuous distance decay functions are also based on individuals’
willingness to travel distances. In these weighting schemes providers within the
willingness to travel radii of demanders are reachable, but not equally desirable. Those
that are near are assigned high weights, and those that are further, but still within the
willing-to-travel radius are assigned low weights. Providers outside the willing-to-travel
radius are unreachable and are assigned a weight of 0. The inverse logistic weight
(designated “Logistic” hereafter) is calculated as follows:

1−
𝑓(𝑑𝑖𝑗 ) = {

1

1+

, 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑑
−10
(𝑑𝑖𝑗 − 𝑖0 )
1.5
𝑒 𝑑𝑖0

≤ 𝑑𝑖0 ;
}

0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

(24)

where, dij is the distance between the provider j and individual i, and di0 is individual i’s
willing-to-travel distance, and the constants -10 and 1.5 tune the shape of the curve.
The Gaussian weight function (designated “Gaussian”) is calculated as follows:

𝑓(𝑑𝑖𝑗 ) = {𝑒

−

𝑑𝑖𝑗 2
0.3𝑑𝑖0 2 , 𝑖𝑓𝑑

≤ 𝑑𝑖0 ;}
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑖𝑗

where dij and di0 are defined as previously, and the constant, 0.3, is used to tune the
shape of the curve.

(25)
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The exponential weight function (designated “exponential”) is calculated as
follows:

𝑓(𝑑𝑖𝑗 ) = {𝑒

−

𝑑𝑖𝑗
0.3𝑑𝑖0 , 𝑖𝑓𝑑

≤ 𝑑𝑖0 ;}
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝑖𝑗

(26)

where dij and di0 are defined as previously, and the constant,0.3, is used to tune the
shape of the curve.
The tuning parameters were selected so that each curve would have a weight of
.0357 at the maximum travel distance, and a weight of 1 if the provider and demander
were within a mile. The four curves are shown below for an individual with a maximum
travel distance of 60 miles.

Figure 3-8: The dichotomous and continuous distance decay functions for 60 mile travel willingness. The
orange curve is inverse logistic, which penalizes small deviations from collocation less than the other
continuous measures: blue for Gaussian and green for exponential. The red region is reachable under the
dichotomous scheme, and the region to the right of 60 miles is unreachable under all weighting functions.
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3.5.1.3 Enhanced Two-Step Floating Catchment Area (E2SFCA) weighting zones
For the final measure, I chose the three weighting zones proposed by Luo and Qi
(2009). Any distance less than 10 miles is assigned weight 1, 10 to 30 miles 0.6, and 30
to 60 miles 0.123 per the Gaussian function in equation (18). Any provider outside of 60
miles is unreachable.
This weighting function differs from the others because it is not based on
individuals’ stated willingness to travel or their geographic placement. City dwellers are
assumed equally willing to travel 50 miles as country residents.
3.6

Exploratory Analysis Experiments
Because the Spatial Access Gini Index (SPAGI) is a novel metric, I needed to

understand more about its applicable range in idealized as well as plausible scenarios
before using the measure to compare research scenarios. To answer Research Question
1—What functional form should an aggregated individual-level access inequality metric
have for it to be sensitive enough to detect differences in access equity in different
regions and/or due to different policy choices?—I performed simple scenario
exploration exercises and tests, as detailed in Section 3.6.1.
3.6.1 Exploring the Spatial Potential Access Gini Index (SPAGI) with six test scenarios
To explore the range and applicability of SPAGI with the five different weighting
functions, I generated six test cases. In five of the six cases, I explored the effect of
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different geographies, using the ten maps generated for spatial sensitivity analysis (see
Section 3.4.4.3). The six cases are as follows:


“Baseline”—Placement of people with OUD and providers according to model
assumptions (see Section 3.3.2).



“Random”—Initial placement as “Baseline” (to generate willingness to travel
distances in people with OUD and patient capacity for providers),
reassignment to random locations.



“Baseline Double”—Placement as “Baseline,” but all providers at double
baseline capacity.



“Hotspots”—Placement as “Baseline” with the addition of small regions of
high demand with the following characteristics:
o “Rural hotspot”—an additional 20% of the population in a 625 square
mile rural region have OUD.
o “Rural hotspot, low transport”—as “Rural hotspot,” but with
willingness to travel restricted to 10+uniform(20) miles.
o “Urban hotspot”—an additional 10% of the population in a 225 square
mile urban region have OUD.



“High capacity provider closure”—Placement as “Baseline” with 1-5 of the
highest capacity providers removed from the model, simulating the sudden
closure of one or more high capacity providers.
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“Rural provider closure”—Placement as “Baseline” with 1-5 of the most
remote providers removed from the model, simulating the sudden closure of
one or more rural/remote providers.

The “Hotspot” scenarios were only explored on the baseline map, all others were
repeated on all 10 simulation maps.
I conducted the following analyses on the six scenarios:
3.6.1.1 Full Range of SPAGI
For each weighting scheme (2SFCA, E2SFCA, Logistic, Gaussian, Exponential—
referred to as “weight” for short), I combined the datasets for each map and graphed
the full range of the Spatial Potential Access Gini Index (SPAGI) for plausible allocation
geographies.
3.6.1.2 Allocation Exploration
For each region and weight, I tested the difference in the SPAGI with respect to
two population allocation scenarios, “Random,” and “Baseline.” This tested the ability
of the SPAGI to detect large differences in the spatial allocation of populations of the
same size. This tests the basic question: Does spatial allocation matter when calculating
SPAGI, or just population sizes?
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3.6.1.3 Exploration of Regional Differences
For each region, I plotted all five SPAGI measures and tested the differences
among the measures to see if the measures are different for each other, and if they are
systematically different from each other across all ten regions.
Additionally, for each measure, I also plotted and tested the difference in the
SPAGI dependent variable with the region as the dependent variable. This tests
whether SPAGI can detect differences between regions with different spatial features
and plausible population allocations.
3.6.1.4 Double Capacity Exploration
For each map and each weight, I tested the difference in the SPAGI between the
“Baseline” scenario and “Baseline Double” scenario. This tests whether the SPAGI
necessarily tracks with supply expansions. Colloquially: is more always more equal, as
measured by SPAGI?
3.6.1.5 Hotspot Exploration
For each weight, I tested the difference in the SPAGI for each hotspot scenario.
This tests whether SPAGI can detect unusual concentrated demand within a broader
region.
3.6.1.6 Supply Shock Exploration
For each map and each weight, I tested the difference in the SPAGI for one to
five high-capacity provider closures, and for up to five of the remotest providers. This
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tests whether SPAGI can detect the effect on access equity of the loss of individual
providers.
To test the response of the five parameterizations of the SPAGI in these
scenarios, I had intended to perform one-way ANOVA tests (or t-tests in the Allocation
and Double Capacity analyses). However, when checking that the analyses met criteria
for ANOVA, I found that the SPAGI often fails the Shapiro-Wilk normality test of
residuals, and one-way linear models of the SPAGI often fail the Bartlett test of
homoscedasticity. Because I could not assume homogeneity of variance or normality of
residuals, I opted to use the Kruskal-Wallis test as a non-parametric alternative to
ANOVA, Dunn tests for post-hoc pairwise comparisons. For the Allocation Exploration
and Double Capacity Exploration experiments I used the modified two-sample-t
confidence interval procedure, also called the Welch confidence interval approach, set
out in Simulation Modeling and Analysis (2005), a gold standard text on the construction
and analysis of simulation models with random inputs and outputs (Law, 2013).
3.7

Policy Analysis Experiments
Because the model is complex and SPAGI is a novel measure, I kept policy

research experiments simple.
3.7.1 Model Baseline including Spatial Potential Access Gini Indices
Research Question 2—How equitably distributed is access to OB buprenorphine
treatment in the current OB buprenorphine treatment system given: regulatory caps on
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patient numbers, physician preferences, and geographic distribution of treatment
seekers and providers?—was answered simply by calculating SPAGI measures on the
fully calibrated and tested baseline scenario in addition to generating other baseline
outcome measures. No tests were performed to answer this question; the outcome
variables including SPAGI measures serve as a baseline foundation for comparing
changes in outcomes including spatial potential access in the policy analysis. Because
outcome measures are the results of a random process, I report 95% confidence
intervals on all model outcomes.
3.7.2 Patient Limit Change Experiments
To answer Research Question 3—To what extent would changing the current
DATA 2000 patient limit per physician change utilization of buprenorphine, equality of
access, opioid overdose deaths and medication diversion?—I set patient limit levels to
100, 275 (baseline), 500 and 4000, initialized the model in 2016, and ran it 35 times at
each patient limit level. The SPAGI measures were calculated at the end of the year.
Because the patient limit has already been expanded to 275, this is the baseline
scenario, and a patient limit of 100 represents a policy roll-back to the previous patient
limit prior to 2016. I chose to use patient limit level of 4000 as a proxy for the complete
removal of the patient limit because this exceeded the maximum unlimited patient
capacity of modeled providers.
To test the impact of different patient limits on outcome variables including
SPAGI measures, I used ANOVA tests where heteroscedasticity was absent and residuals
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were normally distributed, Welch one-way tests with Games-Howell post hoc tests
where heteroscedasticity was present and residuals were normally distributed, and
Kruskall-Wallis non-parametric tests with Dunn post hoc tests where both assumptions
were not valid.
3.7.3 NP and PA Buprenorphine Adoption Experiments
To answer Research Question 4—To what extent would various levels of
buprenorphine prescribing adoption by Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants
change utilization of buprenorphine, equality of access, opioid overdose deaths, and
medication diversion?—I set the percentage of NPs and PAs who prescribe
buprenorphine to 0, 5, 10, 20 and 30 percent, initialized the model in 2016, and ran it 35
times at each patient limit level. The SPAGI measures were calculated at the end of the
year. Because patient limit regulations were changed in July 2016, the patient limit for
physicians was held to 100 for the first 26 week of the modeled year, and expanded to
275 in week 27.
To test the impact of different levels of NP PA buprenorphine adoption on
outcome variables including SPAGI measures, I conducted ANOVA tests when
assumptions were met, and Welch one-way test or Kruskall Wallis rank sum tests when
assumptions were not valid, along with post hoc tests as described in Section 3.7.2.
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4

Exploratory Analysis Results
In Chapter Four I report the results of exploratory analyses of the Spatial

Potential Access Gini Indices and the Spatial Potential Access Lorenz Curves. Because
this section reports on my efforts to understand what these novel measures mean when
used in practice, the tone in Chapter 4 is more conjectural and inquisitive than in
Chapter 5, when the measures are used to make inferences on the spatial equity
impacts of policy. Also, rather than wait to discuss the implications of the SPAGI
exploration experiments in the discussion section after they are used for policy analysis,
I have chosen to dig deeper into the exploratory analysis of the measures in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 5, I return to the more traditional format, in which I present results with little
commentary in Chapter 5, followed by discussion in Chapter 6
In this Chapter, some of the SPAGI exploration exercises required testing of five
measures on ten maps, generating fifty separate analyses. In these cases, I present a
single case which shows a typical result, and any non-typical cases.
4.1

Descriptive Statistics of 10 Regions
Table 4-1 includes a brief list of descriptive statistics about the regions and the

accompanying map. Mean and standard deviation of 35 replications are reported for
random inputs.
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Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics of 10 regions used for exploratory analysis.

Total population (people)
Proportion of population
living in a MUA (dml)
Proportion of population
living in an urban area with
population density > 1000
people /mi2 (dml)
Average population density
(people/mi2)
Total number of providers at
initialization (people)
Proportion of providers with
high waiver (dml)
Total number of people with
OUD at initialization (people)
People with OUD per 100,000
population (1/100000)
Total number OTPs (number)
Total population (people)
Proportion of population
living in a MUA (dml)
Proportion of population
living in an urban area with
population density > 1000
people /mi2 (dml)
Average population density
(people/mi2)
Total number of providers at
initialization (people)
Proportion of providers with
high waiver (dml)
Total number of people with
OUD at initialization (people)
People with OUD per 100,000
population (1/100000)
Total number OTPs (number)
*value fixed prior to simulation

Region 0
2,666,164(19520)
0.157 (0.002)
0.638 (0.0028)

124.32 (0.91)
255.5 (3.02)
0.316(0.022)*
29,194 (213.7)
1095*
11
Region 1
1,088,659 (4162)
0.33 (0.0015)
0.041 (0.0023)

54.9 (0.21)
103.5 (2.03)
0.315 (0.05)*
11,920 (45.6)
1095*
4
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Total population (people)
Proportion of population living
in a MUA (dml)
Proportion of population living
in an urban area with
population density > 1000
people /mi2 (dml)
Average population density
(people/mi2)
Total number of providers at
initialization (people)
Proportion of providers with
high waiver (dml)
Total number of people with
OUD at initialization (people)
People with OUD per 100,000
population (1/100000)
Total number OTPs (number)
Total population (people)
Proportion of population living
in a MUA (dml)
Proportion of population living
in an urban area with
population density > 1000
people /mi2 (dml)
Average population density
(people/mi2)
Total number of providers at
initialization (people)
Proportion of providers with
high waiver (dml)
Total number of people with
OUD at initialization (people)
People with OUD per 100,000
population (1/100000)
Total number OTPs (number)
*value fixed prior to simulation

Region 2
3,435,904 (10160)
0.22 (0.0011)
0.30 (0.0024)

152.7 (0.45)
328.6 (3.49)
0.303 (0.02)*
37,623 (111.2)
1095*
14
Region 3
1,185,966 (5912)
0.749 (0.0026)
0.179 (0.004)

52.7 (0.26)
113.6 (2.03)
0.303 (0.035)
12,986 (64.7)*
1095*
4.8 (0.4)
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Total population (people)
Proportion of population living
in a MUA (dml)
Proportion of population living
in an urban area with
population density > 1000
people /mi2 (dml)
Average population density
(people/mi2)
Total number of providers at
initialization (people)
Proportion of providers with
high waiver (dml)
Total number of people with
OUD at initialization (people)
People with OUD per 100,000
population (1/100000)
Total number OTPs (number)
Total population (people)
Proportion of population living
in a MUA (dml)
Proportion of population living
in an urban area with
population density > 1000
people /mi2 (dml)
Average population density
(people/mi2)
Total number of providers at
initialization (people)
Proportion of providers with
high waiver (dml)
Total number of people with
OUD at initialization (people)
People with OUD per 100,000
population (1/100000)
Total number OTPs (number)
*value fixed prior to simulation

Region 4
5,319,913 (23025)
0.25 (0.0013)
0.69 (0.0018)

237.1 (1.03)
509.3 (3.5)
0.31 (0.017)*
58,253 (252.1)
1095*
22
Region 5
1,062,685 (7522)
0.22 (0.0024)
0.469 (0.003)

47.69 (0.33)
100.9 (1.8)
0.32 (0.035)*
11,636 (82.3)
1095*
4
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Total population (people)
Proportion of population living
in a MUA (dml)
Proportion of population living
in an urban area with
population density > 1000
people /mi2 (dml)
Average population density
(people/mi2)
Total number of providers at
initialization (people)
Proportion of providers with
high waiver (dml)
Total number of people with
OUD at initialization (people)
People with OUD per 100,000
population (1/100000)
Total number OTPs (number)
Total population (people)
Proportion of population living
in a MUA (dml)
Proportion of population living
in an urban area with
population density > 1000
people /mi2 (dml)
Average population density
(people/mi2)
Total number of providers at
initialization (people)
Proportion of providers with
high waiver (dml)
Total number of people with
OUD at initialization (people)
People with OUD per 100,000
population (1/100000)
Total number OTPs (number)
*value fixed prior to simulation

Region 6
732,390 (4303)
0.24 (0.0018)
0.15 (0.004)

32.6 (0.19)
69.8 (1.52)
0.30 (0.05)*
8,019 (47.2)
1095*
3
Region 7
248,524 (2681)
0.92 (.001)
0.209 (0.008)

11.1 (0.11)
23.6 (1.04)
0.319 (0.102)*
2720 (29.3)
1095*
1
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Total population (people)
Proportion of population living
in a MUA (dml)
Proportion of population living
in an urban area with
population density > 1000
people /mi2 (dml)
Average population density
(people/mi2)
Total number of providers at
initialization (people)
Proportion of providers with
high waiver (dml)
Total number of people with
OUD at initialization (people)
People with OUD per 100,000
population (1/100000)
Total number OTPs (number)
Total population (people)
Proportion of population living
in a MUA (dml)
Proportion of population living
in an urban area with
population density > 1000
people /mi2 (dml)
Average population density
(people/mi2)
Total number of providers at
initialization (people)
Proportion of providers with
high waiver (dml)
Total number of people with
OUD at initialization (people)
People with OUD per 100,000
population (1/100000)
Total number OTPs (number)
*value fixed prior to simulation

Region 8
6,920,384 (22035)
0.14 (.001)
0.71 (.001)

315.5 (1.0)
663.8 (5.3)
0.31 (0.20)*
75,778 (241.2)
1095*
29
Region 9
2,524,241 (12268)
0.23 (0.0017)
0.702 (0.002)

114.4 (0.54)
242.5 (3.3)
0.31 (0.027)*
27,640 (134.2)
1095*
10
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4.2

Full Range of Five Weighted SPAGI
The full range of each of the five is shown in Figure 4-1. The three SPAGI with

continuous weighting have similar medians and ranges as shown in Table 4-2. E2SFCA
weighting has consistently lower SPAGI values, and 2SFCA has the largest potential

E2SFCA

Gaussian

Figure 4-1: Box plots of the full range of each SPAGI measure over all regions. Plots left to
right: 2SFCA, E2SFCA, Exponential, Gaussian, Logistic.

range of values. E2SFCA SPAGI is much lower than the other measures because access is
not discounted by individuals’ ability to travel. Providers that are up to 60 miles away
are considered reachable but distant for urban residents by E2SFCA, are unreachable by
most urban residents by the other measures since many urban residents are willing to
travel only 5 or 10 miles. 2SFCA SPAGI tends to be lower than the other willingnessweighted measures because all reachable providers are assigned a weight of 1, while
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the other willingness-weighted measures discount more distant providers that are still
reachable.
Because E2SFCA is different from the other measures, in experiments that
follow, I will discuss E2SFCA results first followed by willingness-weighted SPAGI results,
noting any substantive differences among the willingness weighted measures.
Table 4-2: Median, IQR and full range of each SPAGI measure.

Measure
2SFCA
E2SFCA
Exponential
Gaussian
Logistic
4.3

Median
0.447
0.29
0.503
0.495
0.512

IQR
0.102
0.079
0.101
0.118
0.124

Range
[0.137, 0.563]
[0.180, 0.459]
[0.328, 0.603]
[0.278, 0.602]
[0.269, 0.621]

Allocation Exploration
Does spatial allocation matter when calculating SPAGI in a region? For each

SPAGI measure and each region, can SPAGI detect a difference between the random
allocation of the region-appropriate number of people with OUD and treatment
providers, “Random,” and a plausible allocation of the same number of people and
treatment providers, “Baseline?” The null hypothesis is that the simulation mean for 35
replications at “Random” and “Baseline” are equal, and was tested using the Welch
Confidence Interval Approach (see Section 3.6.1 for specifics on how the populations
were allocated randomly). I ran 50 tests: the 5 SPAGI measures for 10 regions. Mean
differences in confidence intervals did differ significantly from zero in 48 out of 50 tests
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at p < 0.001. Differences between E2SFCA SPAGI for “Radom” and “Baseline” allocation
could not be detected in region 5 or 6.
4.3.1 E2SFCA Typical Results
Region 4 results are typical, and are featured in Figure 4-2. Typically, where a
significant difference was detected in E2SFCA SPAGI, “Random” allocation resulted in
substantially better E2SFCA SPAGI scores than “Baseline” allocation, as shown for region
4 in Figure 4-2a. In region 4, under the “Random” allocation rule almost all people are
within 10 miles of a provider. For the remaining tiny fraction of the population the
closest provider is between 10 and 30 miles. Further, “Random” allocation means the
catchment areas of each provider has about the same number of individuals, so the
population denominator of the treatment supply to population ratio is about the same
for all providers. Further, when populations are large, each person can reach a large
number of providers, diluting the impact of high treatment capacity of individual
providers. Deviation from perfect equality is due to chance placing slightly more
providers near some demanders, to the variation in provider capacity, or due to edge
effects. These effects combined result in near perfect spatial access equity when
populations are large. When populations are smaller, each person can reach fewer
providers variation in the capacity of individual providers becomes more important,
resulting in more heterogeneity in access. However, when population density is greater
than 50 people/mi2, E2SFCA SPAGI scores are still higher than “Baseline” allocation.
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4.3.2 Willingness-weighted Typical Results
“Baseline” allocation resulted in substantially better willingness-weighted SPAGI
than “Random” allocation in all region. The box plots for 2SFCA, Logistic, Gaussian and
Exponential SPAGI for region 4 shown in Figure 4-2(b-e) are typical. By random
allocation, people with large willingness to travel radii aren’t relegated to providerscarce regions rural regions, so they have a disproportionately large share of the spatial
potential access pie. Further, people who are willing to travel very short distances are
not concentrated in regions of denser provider locations, so providers are more likely to
be unreachable. Slow growth at the low access end of the Spatial Potential Access
Lorenz Curve coupled with as steep rise at the high access end of the curve results in
high inequality as measured by SPAGI.
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b. 2SFCA

c. Logistic

a. E2SFCA

d. Gaussian

e. Exponential
Figure 4-2: Region 4 boxplots comparing SPAGI of the two population allocation scenarios using 5
different weights. The willingness-weighted measures show the same trend, and are grouped to the
right in plots (b-e), while E2SFCA shows the opposite trend and is high
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4.3.3 E2SFCA Atypical Results
Region 5, 6, and 7 results for E2SFCA are not typical. These regions have small
populations (47 people/mi2, 32 people/mi2, and 11 people/mi2, respectively). In region 5
and 6, no difference could be detected between “Random” and “Baseline” allocation. In
region 7, the most sparely populated region, “Random” allocation resulted in worse
E2SFCA SPAGI, as shown in the boxplot in Figure 4-3. At low population levels, each
individual may only be able to reach one or two providers, making the effect of the
treatment capacity much more important when calculating equity. If one person can
reach a provider with 20 treatment spots, and another person can reach an OTP which
has 2 providers who can treat 150 people each, their access is not equal, despite the
fact that the providers have about the same number of people in their catchment areas.

Figure 4-3: Region 7 E2SFCA does not have the characteristic pattern of lower E2SFCA SPAGI for
“Random” allocation.

4.3.4 Implications of Allocation Exploration
This set of simple, stylized tests show that the Spatial Potential Allocation Gini
Indices can detect differences from random spatial allocation. It is encouraging that the
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differences between “Baseline” population allocation and “Random” allocation are
much larger than the random run to run variation inherent in spatial agent based
models. As a first test of a spatial potential access equity measures, this is encouraging.
Failure to detect a difference between totally random allocation of supply and demand
and geographically plausible allocation of supply and demand would mean that the
measures are aspatial. Rejecting the null hypotheses in most cases means that, yes,
spatial allocation does matter when calculating SPAGI.
The analysis also highlights that SPAGI results that appear to be typical may not
generalize to regions with particularly low population density.
The attempt to understand the regional differences between regions where
“Random” allocation resulted in higher E2SFCA SPAGI than “Baseline” allocation
highlighted the importance of considering the capacity of reachable providers, distance
from those providers, and the number of reachable providers. With “Random”
allocation, provider catchment areas contained about the same number of people, so
differences in competition for supply did not need to be considered. Even without
competition and willingness to travel, understanding the source of a regional difference
in the metric required careful consideration of three pieces of information. SPAGI
compresses a lot of information about individual differences in spatial potential access
into a single measure. Understanding SPAGI results requires the unpacking of that
compressed information.
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4.4

Exploration of Differences among SPAGI Measures in a Given Region
Are the five SPAGI measures different, and are they different from each other in

the same way in all regions? For each region, are there detectable differences in
medians of the 5 SPAGI measures as measured by Kruskall-Wallis rank sum tests? The
null hypothesis is that all medians are equal, and rejection of the null hypothesis implies
that at least one of the SPAGI measures gives different information about the region.
Figures 4-4 through 4-8 show maps of each region, the allocation of people with OUD
and providers in that region, and a boxplot of SPAGI by weighting scheme. In all regions
differences in medians were detected at p < 0.0001. Post hoc tests showed that in all
cases E2SFCA is different from all other measures. Typically, 2SFCA is different from the
other willingness-weighted SPAGI measures, and typically differences could not be
detected among the Logistic, Gaussian and Exponential SPAGI measures.
4.4.1 Typical Results
All regions but region 7 show the same general trend: E2SFCA SPAGI is far lower
than the other measures, and 2SFCA SPAGI is lower than the other willingness weighted
measures. The reasons for this were discussed in Section 4.2. Regions with lower
population density have larger run-to-run SPAGI variation, so in some cases differences
between 2SFCA SPAGI and the other willingness measures could not be detected, as in
regions 1, 3 and 6.

Population density map

Typical provider, population allocation

SPAGI plots

Region 0

Region 1
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Figure 4-4: Regions 0 and 1. Left, regional map; center, providers (red), OTPs (maroon), and people with OUD (black); right, Box plots of SPAGI by weight

Region 2

Region 3

153

Figure 4-5: Regions 2 and 3. Left, regional map; center, providers (red), OTPs (maroon), and people with OUD (black); right, Box plots of SPAGI by weight

Region 4

Region 5

154

Figure 4-6: Regions 4 and 5. Left, regional map; center, providers (red), OTPs (maroon), and people with OUD (black); right, Box plots of SPAGI by weight

Region 6

Region 7
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Figure 4-7: Regions 6 and 7. Left, regional map; center, providers (red), OTPs (maroon), and people with OUD (black); right, Box plots of SPAGI by weight

Region 8

Region 9
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Figure 4-8: Regions 8 and 9. Left, regional map; center, providers (red), OTPs (maroon), and people with OUD (black); right, Box plots of SPAGI by weight
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4.4.2 Atypical Results
In region 7, 2SFCA has the lowest SPAGI. To understand why the trend is
different in region 7, I inspected the map shown in Figure 4-7(bottom), and the Spatial
Potential Access Curves (SPALCs) shown in Figure 4-9.

Figure 4-9:Spatial Potential Access Lorenz Curves for region 7. The 2SFCA weighting scheme results in the
lowest SPAGI in this region only.

Lower SPAGI means supply is more equitably allocated among demanders. In
region 7, the majority of people live in one small urban center or in rural areas. The
small number of suppliers are also located in the urban centers where people are not
willing to travel far. Virtually everyone else is willing to travel large distances to the two
more densely populated zones. The few people in small towns can’t access any provider,
so the SPAGI curves are horizontal near the origin. Then, by 2SFCA, providers are far, but
reachable for almost everyone else, hence the steep, linear curve. With the E2SFCA
providers who are between 30 and 60 miles away are less preferable, so the curve is
more bowed out.
However, at this very low population level, the SPAGI are sensitive to the actual
allocation of the small number of providers, which is why several simulations resulted in
outlier SPAGI values. Counterintuitively, when a provider is allocated to a small town in
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the west, as in Figure 4-10, the SPAGI values go down. Inspection of the curves gives a
clue as to why. It is easiest seen in the 2SFCA curve. The curve is still flat near the origin,
rises linearly until about the 80% mark, and then rises dramatically. So the increase in
inequality is not to more people having worse access, which would be indicated by a
longer flat region near the origin, but instead by some people having much better
access, indicated by the steep rise near the right axis.

Figure 4-10: Region 7 map and Spatial Potential Access Lorenz Curves (SPALCs) with random allocation of
a provider to the small town in the west.
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4.4.3 Implications of Exploring Differences among SPAGI measures in a Given Region
The SPAGI measures are different. E2SFCA SPAGI is consistently much lower
than the other measures because it does not include ability to travel in its calculation of
individual spatial potential access. 2SFCA is typically slightly lower than the other
willingness-weighted measures because there is no distance decay discounting of
reachable providers. The Logistic, Gaussian and Exponential willingness-weighted SPAGI
are the most complex measures because they include both ability to travel and a
distance decay weighting within the willingness to travel radius. The subtle differences
in the weighting curves typically do not result in detectable differences in SPAGI.
The fact that results were again atypical in the lowest density region 7 highlights
the need for special consideration in measuring Spatial Potential Access in low density
regions. Analysis of an outlier simulation run in region 7 highlighted an important aspect
of SPAGI—Spatial Potential Access Equity can get worse because a small, select group of
individuals gets particularly good access. If we say that supply within a region is a pie,
SPAGI calculates whether everybody is getting a fair and proportional piece of the pie. If
a lucky few get large slices, there is less to go around for everyone else. Changes in
equity are zero sum.
4.5

Exploration of Regional Differences: Comparing the Ten Regions for Each SPAGI
Measure
Can SPAGI detect differences between regions with different spatial features and

plausible population allocations? For each SPAGI measure, I tested for differences in
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SPAGI medians using Kruskall-Wallis rank sum tests. The hull hypothesis is that medians
are indistinguishable, and rejection of the null hypothesis would mean that SPAGI can
detect differences in Spatial Potential Access equity based on regional differences.
Figure 4-11 shows a plot of population density and boxplots of each of the 5
SPAGI measures. The population density plot is included for comparison. Kruskall-Wallis
rank sum tests for each measure were significant at p <0.001, and the results of Dunn
post-hoc pairwise comparison test are shown in Table 4-3. In general, as was found
when comparing the five SPAGI measures within each region, the trends across regions
for the four measures based on willingness to travel were very similar. Figure 4-11
shows similar trends in the box plots, though note the slightly different y-axis scaling.
Table 4-3 shows that most differences detected by one continuous measure were
detected by all of the continuous measures. When detecting differences among these
particular simulations, the Gaussian weighed SPAGI was the most discriminating of the
continuous measures, but all measures performed about the same. All differences
detected by the willingness-to-travel based measures were in the same direction: no
region appeared less equitable than another by one measure, and more equitable than
another by another, as indicated by the (+) and (-) notation in Table 4-3. 2SFCA detected
differences in spatial potential access between some regions not detected by the
continuous measures in some pairwise comparisons.
E2SFCA SPAGI is different from the other measures both in magnitude, as shown
in Section 4.2 but also in whether it detects differences between regions, and the
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direction of the differences. Even when E2SFCA and another measure both detect
differences in spatial potential access between two regions, the direction of the
difference may not be the same, as indicated by opposite signs (+/-) in Table 4-3. For
example, SPAGI is higher for region 8 than 1 by all willingness-weighted measures (here
8 appears to have less equitable allocation than region 1), but lower by E2SFCA. This
same reverse trend was seen in the simple allocation exploration in Section 4.3.
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a.

Average population density by region

b.

2SFCA SPAGI by region

c.

E2SFAC SPAGI by region

d.

Logistic SPAGI by region

e.

Gaussian SPAGI by region

f.

Exponential SPAGI by region

Figure 4-11: SPAGI measures by region (right column), and population density by region (left). Differences
among all plots but E2SFCA are small. E2SFCA has a substantially different trend
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Table 4-3: Results of Dunn post-hoc pairwise comparison tests for each SPAGI, comparing the 10 regions.
Kruskall-Wallis rank sum tests were significant, p <0.001. (+/-) indicate that SPAGI was higher (+) or lower
(-) in the second region than the first.
Regions
1 vs 0
2 vs 0
3 vs 0
4 vs 0
5 vs 0
6 vs 0
7 vs 0
8 vs 0
9 vs 0
2 vs 1
3 vs 1
4 vs 1
5 vs 1
6 vs 1
7 vs 1
8 vs 1
9 vs 1
3 vs 2
4 vs 2
5 vs 2
6 vs 2
7 vs 2
8 vs 2
9 vs 2
4 vs 3
5 vs 3
6 vs 3
7 vs 3
8 vs 3
9 vs 3
5 vs 4
6 vs 4
7 vs 4
8 vs 4
9 vs 4
6 vs 5
7 vs 5
8 vs 5
9 vs 5

2SFCA
p-value; +/n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
<0.01; +
n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; +
n.s.
n.s.
<0.01; n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; <0.001; <0.01; +
n.s.
<0.001; n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; <0.001; n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; +
n.s.
n.s.
<0.01; <0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; <0.001; n.s.
<0.05; n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; +
<0.05; +

Logistic
p-value; +/n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001; +
<0.05; n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
<0.01 +
<0.01; <0.01; <0.001; <0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001; n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; <0.001; n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; +
<0.01; +
<0.001; <0.001; <0.001; n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; +
<0.001; +

Gaussian
p-value; +/n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
<0.01 +
<0.01; <0.05; <0.001; <0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001; n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; <0.001; n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
n.s.
<0.05; <0.001; +
<0.01; +
<0.001; <0.001; <0.001; n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; +
<0.001; +

Exponential
p-value; +/n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001 +
n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; +
n.s.
<0.001; n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; <0.001; n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; +
n.s.
n.s.
<0.05; <0.001; +
<0.01; +
<0.001; <0.001; <0.001; n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; +
<0.001; +

E2SFCA
p-value; +/<0.001; +
<0.001; +
<0.001; +
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; <0.01; n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; <0.001; n.s.
<0.001; n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; <0.01; n.s.
n.s.
<0.001; <0.001; n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

7 vs 6
8 vs 6

n.s.
<0.001; +

n.s.
<0.001; +

n.s.
<0.001; +

n.s.
<0.001; +

<0.001; <0.001; -
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9 vs 6
8 vs 7
9 vs 7
9 vs 8

n.s.
<0.001; +
<0.001; +
<0.001; -

<0.001; +
<0.001; +
<0.001; +
n.s.

<0.001; +
<0.001; +
<0.001; +
<0.05; -

<0.001; +
<0.001; +
<0.001; +
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.
<0.01, +
n.s.

E2SFCA SPAGI Results
Because E2SFCA SPAGI is not based on individuals’ willingness to travel, two
people in the same location will always have the same Spatial Potential Accessibility
Score, entirely determined by distance to providers, the treatment capacity of those
providers, and the overall demand on those providers. To explore the differences
between regions using E2SFCA, I first used the Dunn pairwise comparisons from the
Kruskall-Wallis rank sum test post hoc procedure to identify differences in Spatial
Potential Access equity as measured by SPAGI, compared Spatial Potential Access Lorenz
Curves (SPALC) and summaries of the information conveyed by the curves, which I call
SPALC decile summaries, and finally, generated and compared heat maps of individual
Spatial Potential Accessibility Scores.
Among other significant differences detected reported in Table 4-3, regions 1, 2
and 3 have higher spatial inequity than most other regions (0, 5, 7, 8, and 9), though
they cannot be distinguished from each other or regions 4 and 6. For illustration, I am
analyzing region 3.
I found that region 3 SPAGI was significantly higher than regions 0, 5, 7, 8 and 9.
E2SFCA SPALCs and decile summaries for the curves are presented in Figures 4-12 and 413. Often Lorenz curves are interpreted by stating what fraction of the population owns
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a given percentage of the total, for example: 80% of the population owns 20% of a
nation’s wealth. In this case, I report which fraction of the population lays claim to a
given percentage of total potential access in the system, subtracting out all groups who
have lower access. Each SPALC and SPAGI in Figures 4-12 and 4-13 are generated by a
single model run. I am comparing them to better understand why significant differences
were detected over multiple runs, though different runs do produce different curves
and accompanying indices.
In all cases, a disproportionately large percentage of the population are in the
bottom decile of access. In this particular model run of region 3, 27% of the population
shares 10% of the capacity, weighted by distance, and each of the top 4 deciles have
about 4% to 5% of the population in each. This near-linear increase indicates that there
is relative access equity among the 20% of people with the best access, but that this
20% of the population have the highest 10% of Spatial Potential Access Scores. In the
case of E2SFCA weighting this means they either fall within the 10 mile catchment area
of high capacity providers, that they live where many catchment areas overlap, or that
their reachable providers have low demand from others or combinations of these
factors.
When compared to region 3, region 0 has about same fraction of the population
in the lowest access decile, but a more even distribution of access in the remainder of
the population. Regions 9 shows the same trend: a disproportionate fraction of the
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population has very poor access, but there is near equality in all deciles above the first,
indicating near equal access for all but the worst off. Regions 5 and 7 show the same
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Region 0
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Population at decile

st

28.5%
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Region 5
SPALC decile

Population at decile

1st decile

22.2%

2nd decile

12.8%

rd

11.6%
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9.7%

th

8.8%

th

8.3%

th

7.8%

th

7.6%

th

6.7%

3 decile
4 decile
5 decile
6 decile
7 decile
8 decile
9 decile
th

10 decile

4.0%

Figure 4-12: Along with following Figure (4-13), SPALC and SPALC decile summary for region 3 and the 5
regions with significantly different SPAGI—regions 0, 5, 7, 8, and 9. SPALC and summaries are from 1
model run.
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SPALC decile
st
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1 decile

24.3%

2nd decile

11.3%
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9.1%
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8.6%
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8.6%

th
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8.6%

7th decile
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3 decile
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5 decile
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8.4%
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8 decile
9 decile
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10 decile
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Region 8
SPALC decile
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st

19.9%

nd

2 decile

12.6%

3rd decile

10.5%

1 decile
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9.4%

th

8.9%
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8.4%
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8.02%

th

7.6%
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4 decile
5 decile
6 decile
7 decile
8 decile
9 decile
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10 decile
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Region 9
SPALC decile

Population at decile

st

26.9%

nd

10.6%

rd

9.1%

th

4 decile

8.3%

5th decile

7.9%

1 decile
2 decile
3 decile

th

7.7%

th

7.5%

th

7.3%

th

9 decile

7.2%

10th decile

7.0%

6 decile
7 decile
8 decile

Figure 4-13: Along with previous Figure (4-12), SPALC and SPALC decile summary for region 3 and the 5
regions with significantly different SPAGI—regions 0, 5, 7, 8, and 9. SPALC and summaries are from 1
model run.
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basic trend with a difference in the top decile. A disproportionate fraction of the
population has very poor access (at or near zero in the case of region 7). The access
curve is then nearly linear from the 3rd through 9th deciles indicating near equal access
for that segment of the population, a small fraction of the population have the very best
access, as indicated by the sharp uptick at the right-most side of the curve.
Region 8, on the other hand, has a smaller portion of the population with the worst
access a gentle concavity to the Spatial Potential Access curve. Relative to region 3,
access is more equally distributed across all populations.
Figure 4-14 shows a heat map for each region by individual E2SFCA Spatial
Potential Access Scores. The color coding represents deviation from equal proportional
share. The warm, red end of the spectrum represents having less than one’s
proportional share, and the cool, blue end of the spectrum represents having more than
one’s proportional share. If every person were allocated his or her proportional share of
the total supply in the system, there would be no deviation from equal proportional
share, and all individuals would be green. In an extremely unequal allocation, most
people would be orange and red and a small number of people blue.
Examination of the heat maps gives some insight into the sharp uptick at the
highest access decile in regions 5 and 7. There is a deep blue area in the Southwest
quadrant of region 5 and a small deep blue area in the Southeast quadrant of region 7.
In these areas there is less competition for the treatment spots and those spots are
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a. Region 0

b. Region 1

c. Region 2

d. Region 3
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e. Region 4

f. Region 5

g. Region 6

h. Region 7
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i.

Region 8

j.

Region 9

Figure 4-14: Heat maps generated by individual deviation from equal proportional share of the total capacity
in the system as measured by E2SFCA weighted Spatial Potential Access Scores

within ten miles of where those relatively privileged people live. However, like SPAGI
and SPALC, the heat maps of Spatial Potential Access Scores do not give information
about the adequacy of supply to meet demand.
In general, the heat maps show that when ability to travel or preference for
travel is not considered, assumptions about provider and demander locations generally
result in city center residents having access to more than their proportional share of the
limited supply of treatment capacity, rural residents having less than their proportional
share, and residents of the suburbs having about their proportional share. This is not
always the case, as when a provider happens to practice in a small community with less
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demand pressure for her limited capacity, as in regions 5 and 7. The assumptions that
result in these trends are that high waiver, high capacity providers tend to practice in
the most densely populated regions; that OTPs are also located in dense population
centers; and that rural and remote areas have more people with OUD than might be
expected by population density alone.
4.5.1 Willingness-weighted SPAGI Results
Box plots of willingness-weighted SPAGI in Figure 4-11(a, c-e) show similar trends
for each measure. Clearly, region 7 is different from the other regions, with the lowest
population density and the lowest SPAGI, and region 8 has the highest population
density and SPAGI. These apparent differences in SPAGI are significant by Dunn
pairwise comparison tests after a significant Kruskall-Wallis rank sum test of difference
in medians for region 7, but not necessarily so for region 8. In region 8 no significant
differences can be detected between region 8 and regions 2 and 4, which have the
second and third highest populations and a large, dense urban region, nor between
region 8 and 9 by 2SFCA and Exponential SPAGI.
Visual inspection of SPAGI box plots and the population density bar chart show
apparent correlation between population density and SPAGI. Pearson correlation tests
between total population and SPAGI are significant and high, at 0.68, 0.74, 0.75, and
0.76 for 2SFCA, Logistic, Gaussian and Exponential weighted SPAGI respectively. This
begs the question, do SPAGI measures tell us anything about the allocation of the
population inside the regional container that is not summarized by the population
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density? The Allocation exploration in 4.1.2 suggests they do, but can they detect equity
differences in plausible allocations?
Comparison of actual geographies suggests that SPAGI can, in fact, detect
differences between regions with similar population levels, but different population
allocations. To analyze differences detected by willingness-weighted SPAGI post hoc
pairwise comparison tests, I compared SPALCs, and SPALC decile summaries. For
illustration, I present two analyses of regions with similar population levels, but
differences in SPAGI scores.
Regions 3 and 1 have similar population densities, but different 2SFCA SPAGI
scores, as do regions 5 and 1. Both region 5 and 3 have more equitable spatial allocation
of supply than region 1. Comparison of SPALCs and SPALC decile summaries suggest that
SPAGI is different for different reasons, and are shown in Figure 4-15. Region 3 has a
much smaller fraction of the population in the lowest access decile than region 1. The
region 3 curve is nearly parallel to the line of prefect equality for the middle 50% of the
population, and bowed out for region 1. This suggests that the proportion of access
apportioned to the 50% of the population with neither the best nor the worst spatial
potential access scores is shared approximately equally within that group. Whereas in
region 1, there are substantial differences in access equity within this subpopulation.
This may be because providers are spread fairly evenly across the population in small
urban pockets, rather than in a concentrated zone as in region 1.
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SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile
a.

Region 1 2SFCA SPALC
SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

b.

Population at
decile
42.0%
16.5%
10%
6.8%
5.8%
4.4%
4.2%
3.7%
3.4%
3.1%

Population at
decile
34.0%
11.2%
10.8%
8.8%
7.9%
7.7%
7.1%
5.3%
4.1%
3.1%

Region 3 2SFCA SPALC
SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

Population at
decile
40.0%
10.7%
7.8%
7.2%
6.9%
6.8%
6.0%
5.5%
5.0%
3.9%

c. Region 5 2SFCA SPALC
Figure 4-15: SPALCs (left) and SPALC decile summaries (right). Region 1 (a) is different from region 3 (b) and
region 5 (c), but regions 3 and 5 are not different from each other.
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Region 5 has fewer people in the lowest access decile, but the difference is not
large (comparing Figure 4-15a and 4-15c). The SPALC curves are similar for the lowest
40% of the population, after which the curve for region 5 becomes nearly linear. Access
is nearly equally distributed among this subpopulation.
The willingness-weighted measures can also detect a difference in spatial access
equity between region 0 and region 2, which have similar population densities. SPALCs
and SPALC decile summaries for both regions are shown in Figure 4-16. There are no
linear regions in the curves, so Spatial Potential Access inequity is present across all
populations.
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SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

a.

Population at
decile
38.5%
14.3%
11.3%
9.2%
7.2%
5.6%
4.6%
3.8%
3.1%
2.3%

Region 0 Logistic SPALC

SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

Population at
decile
49.1%
14.5%
9.3%
6.9%
5.5%
4.4%
3.5%
2.8%
2.3%
1.7%

b. Region 2 Logistic SPALC

Figure 4-16: Region 0 and region 2 Logistic SPALCs and SPALC summaries

Heat maps of deviation from proportional access are difficult to interpret for
willingness-weighted Spatial Potential Access because people with high and low ability
to travel are randomly mixed. However, mapping the people with the lowest access is
instructive. About the same fraction of people in both regions have no reachable
providers. Region 2 has many more people who have access to a tiny fraction (~0.01%)
of total supply as shown in Figure 4-17. (Recall that individuals are indexed on the
Spatial Potential Accessibility Lorenz curve by their Spatial Potential Accessibility Score
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divided by the total supply in the system, detailed in Section 3.5.) Region 2 has two
corridors of low access, in the South-west and the North-central regions. Those regions
have a few low capacity providers, but a large number of fellow demanders, taxing that
supply. The people with the lowest access in those regions are likely penalized for being
near their willingness-to-travel limit, unlike other people needing services in the same
region.

a.

Region 0

b.

Region 2

Figure 4-17: Maps of region 0 and region 2, with low access agents highlighted. Agents represented by
white triangles have no access, while those represented by black triangles have access to ~.01% of the
total provider capacity.

4.5.2 Implications of Exploration of Detecting Regional Differences in Equity using
SPAGI
SPAGI measures can detect differences in Spatial Potential Access equity among
regions. SPAGI measures are highly correlated with population density, especially the
willingness weighted measures. This means that SPAGI will tend to find that regions
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with high populations have more disparity is Spatial Potential Access than regions with
low populations. However, SPAGI does not always detect differences where regions
have dramatically different population densities (as with regions 8 and 9), and can
sometimes detect differences in regions where overall population density is about the
same, but the geography is different in character. So, I argue, even though SPAGI tends
to track with population density, it does give additional spatial information, and can be a
useful addition to a spatial analysis of a region.
E2SFCA and willingness weighted SPAGI measures do not necessarily give the
same information about potential access equity. E2SFCA clearly gives information on
equity based on location. By adding heterogeneity in ability to travel that is random but
partially determined by location type (e.g. remote, rural, high density urban) into the
calculation of Spatial Potential Access, access equity comparisons based on the
willingness weighted SPAGI point to disparities in access that are not entirely based on
location, but on the many factors considered when people state how far they can travel
for treatment.
Because of this, heat maps of deviation from proportional access are useful visual aids
when analyzing differences in E2SFCA SPAGI, but not necessarily useful when analyzing
differences in willingness weighted SPAGI measures. When individuals’ Spatial Potential
Access scores are weighted by their stated willingness to travel, heat maps do not show
a smooth rural to urban equity gradient. Heat maps by Logistic weighted Spatial
Potential Access Scores are shown in Figure 4-18. People who are willing and able to
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travel long distances live side by side with people who are unable or unwilling to reach
many (or any) providers. This is due to a critical assumption, the validity of which I
discuss at length in Section 6.4.2. At high population density, people overlap and the
visual information conveyed by the heat map becomes muddied.
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a. Region 0

b. Region 1

c. Region 2

d. Region 3
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e. Region 4

f. Region 5

g. Region 6

h. Region 7
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i.

Region 8

j.

Region 9

Figure 4-18: Heat maps generated by individual deviation from equal proportional share of the total capacity
in the system as measured by Logistic weighted Spatial Potential Access Scores

4.6

Exploration of Doubling Capacity
Does expanding capacity without adding new supply locations result in changes

in Spatial Potential Access Equity? Do SPAGI measures detect differences in Spatial
Potential Access equity when the treatment capacity of each provider is doubled? The
null hypothesis is that the simulation mean for 35 replications at baseline capacity and
double capacity are equal, and was tested using the Welch Confidence Interval
Approach.
Results of whether each of the SPAGI measures can detect differences in access
equity when doubling the capacity of each provider are presented in Table 4-4. In most
cases, no significant difference between baseline and doubled capacity was detected.
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4.6.1 Typical Results
It is not surprising that most regions showed no difference in SPAGI measures
when doubling capacity. Recall from Figure 3-7, that SPAGI of a system with one
provider with capacity 4 and 8 equidistant demanders was equal to the same system
when the capacity of the provider was increased four-fold.
Table 4-4: Results modified two-sample-t confidence interval Welch procedure on the difference in mean
SPAGI when doubling capacity. Confidence intervals greater than 0 indicate that doubling capacity resulted
in lower (more equal) SPAGI. Confidence intervals that span 0 indicate that a difference could not be
detected between SPAGI at α = 0.05. Significant differences noted in grey.
95% Confidence Interval of difference in SPAGI when doubling supply (p-value)
Logistic
Gaussian
Exponential

E2SFCA
region 2SFCA
0
[-0.001, 0.014] (p [0.0009, 0.041]

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

[-0.001, 0.020]
(p = 0.085)

[-0.001, 0.019]
(p = 0.087)

[-0.0018, 0.017]
(p = 0.109)

[-0.058, -0.003]
(p = 0.026)
[-0.01, 0.023]
(p = 0.44)

[-0.364, 0.005]
(p = 0.148)
[-0.0057,
0.009]
(p = 0.589)

[-0.036, 0.0047]
(p = 0.126)
[-0.005, 0.009]
(p = 0.60)

[-0.039, 0.001]
(p = 0.064)
[-0.005, 0.009]
(p = 0.54)

[0.0026, 0.034]
(p = 0.023)

[-0.014, 0.045]
(p = 0.318)

[0.0039, 0.041]
(p = 0.019)

[0.0024, 0.039]
(p = 0.027)

[0.0003, 0.035]
(p = 0.046)

[-0.003, 0.007]
(p = 0.48)

[-0.008, 0.02]
(p = 0.41)

[-0.004, 0.009]
(p = 0.51)

[-0.004, 0.009]
(p = 0.509)

[-0.004, 0.009]
(p = 0.49)

[-0.006, 0.015]
(p = 0.42)

[-0.024, 0.024]
(p = 0.995)

[-0.008, 0.024]
(p = 0.423)

[-0.009, 0.019]
(p = 0.47)

[-0.01, 0.017]
(p = 0.637)

[-0.014, 0.02]
(p = 0.605)

[-0.040, 0.010]
(p = 0.232)

[-0.016, 0.025]
(p = 0.676)

[-0.017, 0.022]
(p = 0.810)

[-0.018, 0.021]
(p = 0.88)

[-0.048, 0.026]
(p = 0.558)

[-0.037, 0.022]
(p = 0.61)

[-0.042, 0.030]
(p = 0.72)

[-0.040, 0.026]
(p = 0.68)

[-0.039, 0.019]
(p = 0.511)

[-0.002, 0.0039]
(p = 0.73)

[-0.012, 0.016]
(p = 0.812)

[-0.004, 0.005]
(p = 0.80)

[-0.004, 0.005]
(p = 0.78)

[-0.004, 0.005]
(p = 0.81)

[-0.004, 0.006]
(p = 0.663)

[-0.010, 0.016]
(p = 0.702)

[-0.006, 0.010]
(p = 0.651)

[-0.006, 0.0092]
(p = 0.677)

[-0.006, 0.008]
(p = 0.723)

= 0.104)

(p = 0.040)

[-0.026, 0.005]
(p = 0.179)
[-0.004, 0.007]
(p = 0.64)
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4.6.2 Atypical Results
The particular distribution of supply and demand in regions 0, 1 and 3 resulted in
discernable, though small, differences in SPAGI when doubling the treatment supply of
all providers. To unpack these differences, I inspected the SPALCs, considered the
SPALC deciles, and the relative Spatial Potential Access heat maps for one run at
baseline capacity and one run at double capacity, shown in Figure 4-19. In region 0,
random allocation of more providers to the small city in the Southeast and doubling the
capacity of all providers resulted in a smaller fraction of people in the lowest SPALC
decile, more people with near proportional share of the treatment supply over all
(broader swath of yellow and green in the urban corridor), and a new region of near
proportional access in the Southeast.
On the other hand, in region 1, doubling provider capacity resulted in an increase
in E2SFCA SPAGI, meaning less equitable distribution. Inspection of SPALCs, SPALC
deciles, and heat maps for one run at baseline capacity and one run at double capacity
show subtle differences. About the same proportion of the population is in the lowest
SPALC decile. In the double capacity scenario, a higher proportion of the population is in
the second and third access deciles. In both cases SPALCs are near linear thereafter.
The heat map shows a much larger yellow region of less than proportional access and a
contraction of the green proportional access band to the north of the city center.
In region 3, doubling provider capacity resulted in detectable decreases in all
willingness-weighted SPAGI—indicating greater equity. Inspection of SPALCs and SPALC
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deciles for a single run at baseline capacity and a single run at double capacity show that
the bottom three deciles are essentially unchanged, but that access is more equally
distributed among the higher deciles in the double capacity case as shown in Figure 420.

SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

a.

Region 0 baseline capacity
SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

b.

Population at
decile
30.2%
12.2%
10.2%
8.5%
7.3%
6.8%
6.5%
6.3%
6.1%
5.9%

Population at
decile
22.4%
12.2%
10.3%
9.5%
8.7%
8.2%
7.8%
7.4%
7.1%
6.7%

Region 0 double capacity
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SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

c.

Population at
decile
32.6%
12.7%
9.8%
7.8%
7.1%
6.8%
6.2%
5.6%
5.6%
5.6%

Region 1 baseline capacity
SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile
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d. Region 1 double capacity
Figure 4-19: Heat maps, SPALCs and SPALC decile summaries. Region 0 and 1 showed a significant difference by E2SFCA SPAGI.

Population at
decile
32.2%
14.0%
12.0%
6.5%
6.0%
6.0%
5.9%
5.9%
5.8%
5.8%
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SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile
a.

Population at
decile
41.0%
12.8%
8.8%
7.5%
6.9%
6.3%
5.2%
4.3%
3.8%
3.3%

Region 3 baseline capacity
SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

Population at
decile
41.7%
12.2%
8.7%
7.0%
5.9%
5.4%
5.2%
5.0%
4.8%
4.1%

b. Region 3 double capacity
Figure 4-20: SPALCs and SPALC decile summaries for region 3 for one run at
baseline capacity and double capacity.

4.7

Exploration of High Demand Hotspots
Can SPAGI detect hotspots, small concentrated regions of high demand? I

conducted Kruskall-Wallis rank sum tests comparing the three high demand “hotspot”
scenarios—rural hotspot, rural low-transportation hotspot, and urban hotspot—in
region 0 for each SPAGI measure. The null hypothesis is that medians for 35 replications
of baseline, and the “hotspot” scenarios are equal. Rejection of the null hypothesis
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means that the SPAGI measure can detect small regions of high demand within a larger
region. Scenario details were presented in Section 3.6.1.5. Significant differences in
medians were detected by each of the 5 SPAGI measures. For simplicity, I present
results of the Dunn pairwise post-hoc tests for comparisons to baseline in Table 4-5,
rather than all pairwise comparisons. No difference between the rural hotspot scenario
and baseline could be detected by any SPAGI measure. In cases where differences were
detected from baseline, SPAGI measures were larger, indicating less equitable access.
Table 4-5: Dunn pairwise comparisons for hotspot scenarios versus baseline. Scenarios where significant
differences were detected are highlighted in grey, and differences from baseline were positive—indicating
greater inequity in hotspot scenarios.

2SFCA
baseline—rural
15.03
(p=0.565)
baseline—
41.3
rural-low-transport
(p=2.5e-5)
baseline—urban
64.3
(p=4.9e12)
4.7.1 E2SFCA SPAGI Results

mean rank difference (p-value)
E2SFCA
Logistic
Gaussian
12.7
2.83
2.96
(p=0.937) (p=2.83)
(p=1.0)
16.3
31.0
32.56
(p=0.410) (p=0.003) (0.0017)
61.0
55.36
56.2
(p=6.5e(p=4.2e-9) (p=2.3e11)
9)

Exponential
-1.6
(p=1.0)
33.9
(p=0.00096)
56.1
(p=2.5e-9)

E2SFCA could not detect difference between the rural hotspot-low-transport
scenario and baseline because E2SFCA does not account for individuals’ transport
ability. Figure 4-21 shows heat maps, SPALCs and SPALC decile summaries for the urban
scenario and baseline as measured by E2SFCA weighted spatial potential access.

SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

Population at
decile
25.7%
11.3%
9.9%
8.8%
8.0%
7.7%
7.5%
7.2%
7.0%
6.8%

a. Baseline scenario
SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

Population at
decile
30.4%
13.1%
9.2%
7.8%
7.2%
6.9%
6.6%
6.4%
6.3%
6.1%

b. Urban hotspot (marked red)
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Figure 4-21: Baseline (a) and urban hotspot (b) heat maps, SPALCs and SPALC summaries for E2SFCA weighted Spatial Potential Access
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Inspecting SPALCs and SPALC decile summaries comparing the urban hotspot
scenario and baseline for E2SFCA weighted spatial potential access shows that a greater
proportion of the population is in the lowest decile in the urban hotspot scenario. Both
curves are approximately linear in the top five deciles. The heat maps show that
capacity that was already strained in the baseline scenario, showing less than
proportional access (50-90% of equal share) in the southeastern city, which becomes
overwhelmed with a demand spike. Competition for strained capacity results in far less
than proportional access for the whole southeastern region (25-50% of equal share).
4.7.2 Willingness-weighted SPAGI Results
Figure 4-22 shows heat maps, SPALC and SPALC decile summaries for the four
scenarios as measured by Logistic weighted spatial potential access (as there is little
difference among the willingness-weighted measures).
Inspection of SPALCs and SPALC decile summaries for the urban hotspot scenario
(Figure 4-22d) compared to baseline (Figure 4-22a) in the Logistic weighted Spatial
Potential Access analysis, shows that in the urban hotspot case 50% of the population is
in the lowest access decile, as compared to 40% in the baseline scenario. This results in
a SPAGI score that is twenty percent higher than baseline. The entire southeast
quadrant of region 0 has extremely low access. In the baseline scenario, some of the
best access occurs in the rural zone between the western urban corridor and the small
eastern city. In this zone people who are willing to travel long distances have access to
many providers. In the urban hotspot scenario, when supply in the eastern urban region

SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

Population at
decile
39.8%
14.9%
10.3%
8.1%
6.9%
5.8%
4.7%
3.9%
3.1%
2.4%

a. Baseline scenario
SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

Population at
decile
42.3%
15.2%
10.8%
7.9%
6.1%
4.9%
4.1%
3.5%
2.9%
2.4%

b. Rural hotspot (marked red)
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SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

Population at
decile
42.4%
15.7%
11%
7.8%
6%
4.8%
4%
3.3%
2.7%
2.2%

c. Rural hotspot low transport (marked red)
SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

Population at
decile
50%
13.7%
9.4%
6.8%
5.3%
4.3%
3.4%
2.8%
2.3%
1.9%

d. Urban hotspot (marked red)
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Figure 4-22: Baseline (a), rural hotspot (b), rural hotspot low transport (c) and urban hotspot (d) heat maps, SPALCs and SPALC summaries. Hotspot regions
are marked by a red square. No significant difference was detected between baseline (a) and rural hotspot (b) scenarios. Differences in SPAGI between the
rural hotspot scenario (b) and rural hotspot low-transport (c) and urban hotspot (d) were significant at p<0.05, Dunn pairwise comparisons not shown.
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is overwhelmed by high demand, rural residents who are willing to travel far have less
choice. So a spike in urban demand has implications for people who live in the
surrounding rural regions.
Inspection of SPALCs and SPALC decile summaries for the rural hotspot scenario when
residents are unable to travel long distances, shows small increase in the proportions of
the population in the lowest three deciles. The increase in the lowest decile is much
smaller than in the urban hotspot case because the hotspot population is one quarter
the size. The heat map shows that in the rural low-transportation hotspot case, people
in the eastern two thirds of the hotspot region can’t reach any providers because there
are no providers in the community. Those in the eastern third of the hotspot region can
reach providers located in the suburbs of the urban corridor, but because those
providers are outside the community, they are likely highly discounted by the distance
decay function. Furthermore, all of the people in the hotspot are competing for the
same treatment spots, driving each provider’s supply to demand ratio down.
Because no significant difference was detected between the rural hotspot
scenario and baseline, I am not comparing SPALCs, but the heat map is still interesting
(Figure 4-22b). Even though there is a greater density of demanders in the hotspot
region, the mix of greater than proportional and lower than proportional access appears
to be about the same as in other rural zones about the same distance from dense urban
centers. There may be strain on small local providers, but it can’t be detected as a
difference in the aggregated SPAGI.
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4.7.3 Implications of High Demand Hotspot analysis
In general E2SFCA SPAGI cannot detect changes in region-wide Spatial Potential
Access equity of a rural hotspot. The willingness weighted measures can detect changes
in Spatial Potential Access equity when the people in the rural hotspot are unable to
travel above 30 miles for treatment. This means that SPAGI may not detect spatial
potential access equity in real regions where heavy rural demand is a known issue.
All measures did detect differences in region-wide Spatial Potential Access equity
with an urban demand spike. The willingness weighted SPAGI showed that local strain
on supply caused by a hotspot can have implications for the broader community. This is
because competition for supply is a factor in Spatial Potential Access calculations.
Overstrained providers are technically reachable, but far less desirable than providers
with less competition. So local strain is felt as a diminution in choice by people outside
the hotspot region.
4.8

Exploration of Supply Shocks
Can SPAGI detect the removal of particular providers? Specifically, can

differences in median values of the five SPAGI measures be detected with the removal
of up to 5 of the highest capacity providers, and up to 5 of the most remote providers?
Rejection of the null hypothesis means that removing some providers does have
implications for Spatial Potential Access equity in a region. Rather than report on all
fifty analyses (ten regions, 5 measures) for both sets of experiments, I will report only
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those cases where differences in SPAGI medians were detected by Kruskall-Wallis rank
sum tests.
4.8.1 High Capacity Provider Closures
Differences were detected by rank sum tests in Regions 1, 3, 5, and 6, as shown
in Table 4-6. Some differences detected by Kruskall-Wallis rank sum tests could did not
appear as detectable differences in the conservative post hoc tests. Dunn pairwise tests
failed to show pairwise differences at p <0.05 in Region 3 by 2SFCA weight, or Region 5
by Exponential weight (lighter grey highlighting).
Table 4-6: Kruskall-Wallis rank sum test results for Regions 1, 3, 5, and 6. Results significant at p<0.05 are
highlighted in grey.

2SFCA
Region 1
7.78
(p=0.162)
Region 3
11.41
(p=0.043)
Region 5
3.19
(p=0.669)
Region 6
18.55
(p=0.002)
4.8.1.1 Typical Results

Kruskall-Wallis chi-squared (p-value)
E2SFCA
Logistic
Gaussian
5.12
15.22
13.80
(p=0.400)
(p=0.009)
(p=0.016)
16.72
16.77
15.76
(p=0.005)
(p=0.005)
(p=0.0075)
12.62
8.296
8.49
(p=0.027)
(p=0.140)
(p=0.131)
16.61
17.25
18.26
(p=0.0052)
(p=0.004)
(p=0.0026)

Exponential
14.78
(p=0.011)
18.59
(p=0.002)
14.29
(p=0.013)
16.70
(p=0.005)

In six of ten regions, removing up to 5 high capacity providers did not result in
detectable differences in Spatial Potential Access equity across the whole region by any
SPAGI measure.
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4.8.1.2 Atypical Willingness Weighted Results
Because the willingness-weighted measures showed similar pairwise differences,
I am electing to analyze the Gaussian weighted results, commenting how results differ
for the other measures. Figure 4-23 shows boxplots of Gaussian weighted SPAGI for
regions 1, 3, and 6, and the caption notes pairwise difference results of Dunn’s post hoc
tests.

a.

Region 1 significant
b. Region 3 significant
c.
differences from baseline at
differences from baseline at
2 and 4
4.
Figure 4-23: Boxplots for Gaussian SPAGI measures for regions 1, 3, and 6.

Region 6 significant
differences from baseline at
1, 2, 4, and 5.

To dig deeper into these counter-intuitive results, I inspected Gaussian weighted
SPALCs and SPALC deciles and heat maps for Region 6 and compared baseline and the
‘closure of 4 providers’ scenarios (showing one run of each in Figure 4-24). In the
baseline scenario, there were 71 providers and the mean treatment capacity was 56.35
patients per provider. In the closure scenario, there were 67 providers and mean
treatment capacity was 38 patients per provider. In the closure scenario, there were
fewer treatment spots in the whole system, but the spatial allocation of this supply was
more equitable as measured over 35 replications at each closure level.

SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

a.

Baseline scenario (71 providers, mean capacity 56.35)

SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

b.

Population at
decile
41.3%
11.7%
8.8%
7.5%
6.7%
6.2%
5.7%
5.2%
4.1%
2.9%

Population at
decile
32.5%
11.8%
10.3%
9%
8.1%
7.4%
6.8%
5.9%
4.6%
3.6%

4 high capacity providers removed (67 providers remaining, mean capacity 38.3)
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Figure 4-24: Region 6 heat maps (left), SPALCs (center), and SPALC decile summaries (right). Maps and plots show one possible allocation of providers and
demanders each.
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In these particular allocations of supply and demand, a concentration of
providers in the small city in the northeast in baseline afforded people in that region a
disproportionate share of potential access. Region 6 has many small cities surrounded
by rural areas; (refer to Figure 4-1 for a population density map). In regions with small
high density towns, equality of access is sensitive to the particular allocation of high
capacity providers. If a few high capacity providers locate in a small city, access for that
fairly small population is much greater than proportional—as in the northeast in Figure
4-24a. It also means that access for some other small, dense community is going to be
disproportionately low if it has few low capacity providers or none, since Gini-style
indices are essentially zero sum. See, for example, the city in the north central region, in
which people have much lower than proportional access. If one population gets
disproportionately more than its fair share, some other population gets
disproportionately less. Allocating fewer providers with lower capacity means that it is
less likely any particular allocation of providers results in a super high capacity blip.
Regions 1, 3, and 5 have similar geography to region 6, with tiny dense regions dotting
the map, which may explain why differences were detected in these regions and not in
others.
4.8.2 Remote Provider Closures
Kruskall-Wallis rank sum tests only showed differences from baseline in Region
7, the region with the lowest population by far, and then only with 2SFCA, E2SFCA and
Exponential weighted SPAGI. Dunn post hoc tests showed significant differences from
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baseline when the 5 most remote providers were removed from the region, at p <0.05.
Figure 4-25 shows boxplots of Region 7 2SFCA, E2SFCA and Exponential weighted SPAGI
when 0-5 remote providers are removed from the simulation. Differences are small
because remote providers tend to have low numbers, and most people in this rural
region a willing to travel to the urban center.

d.

2SFCA, significantly better
e. E2SFCA, significantly worse
f. Exponential, significantly
SPAGI at 5 closures
SPAGI at 5 closures
worse SPAGI at 5 closures
Figure 4-25: Region 7 boxplots showing SPAGI when 0 to 5 of the remotest providers are removed from the
simulation. Differences are detectable when 5 providers are removed, but the differences are small.

4.8.3 Implications of Supply Shock Exploration
In general, SPAGI cannot detect region-wide equity implications of removals of
individual providers. This is likely because there is considerable run-to-run variation in
the actual locations of providers which makes it difficult to detect that a few providers
are missing. In regions with a dense urban center or two, highest capacity providers are
in high provider-density regions. So when total supply goes down, the overall spread
remains about the same because people in dense urban zones can reach a large number
of providers.
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The fact that in regions dotted with small cities removing the highest capacity
providers can result in more equitable access has an important implication to consider.
There are ways to increase equity which may not be desirable or particularly fair.
Removing a provider from a small city because people in that city have it too good when
considering equity in broader defies a commonsense notion of fairness. The broader
implication is this: equity shouldn’t be the only criterion of goodness when allocating
scarce supply to meet demand.
4.9

Reflections on Exploring SPAGI in Idealized Test Cases
To answer research question 1—What functional form should an aggregated

individual-level access inequality metric have for it to be sensitive enough to detect
differences in access equity in different regions and/or due to different policy
choices?—I generated individual Spatial Potential Access Scores using gravity model of
spatial potential access with 5 different weighting schemes (specifically, by using the
weighted 2 Step Floating Catchment Area method). I aggregated these individual Spatial
Potential Access Scores into a Spatial Potential Access Lorenz Curve (SPALC) for a given
region. I then further condensed the information captured in the Lorenz curve into a
single index, the Spatial Potential Access Gini Index (SPAGI). I then tested differences in
SPAGI across a wide variety of idealized test scenarios using simple statistical tests of
differences in medians. If statistical tests showed a difference in medians across several
simulation replications, I disaggregated the measure to understand the possible reasons
behind the difference.
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Research question 1 is exploratory, and its answer requires quantitative analysis
and argumentation. For this, I break the question into the following parts:


Is SPAGI useful and what information does SPAGI provide?



What does it mean when SPAGI is higher or lower in the context of an experiment?



How are the five weighting schemes different, which should be used for an
experiment?



What is a good analytic strategy for integrating spatial potential access analysis
into the current simulation study?

4.9.1 Is SPAGI useful?
The aggregation of individual level Spatial Potential Access Scores using the
Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient calculations results in an index that can summarize the
distribution of Spatial Potential Access within a region. The index is not particularly
informative on its own, but can be used along with simple statistical tests to discern
differences in the equitability of access distribution due to spatial allocation of supply
and demand (as shown by the allocation experiments in Section 4.3), regional
differences (as shown in Section 4.5), spikes in demand (as shown in Section 4.7) and
shocks to supply (as shown in Section 4.8). It does not provide information on the
adequacy of supply to meet demand (as shown in Section 4.8.1.2). It also tends not to
be able to detect differences at the regional level (150x150 square mile) of the removal
of a small number of individual providers (as shown in Section 4.8.2). This may also be
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an artifact of simulation, in which simulation-to-simulation variability masks small
regional effects that could be detected if SPAGI were used for empirical analysis.
These comparisons of Spatial Potential Access in simulations would be difficult
without aggregating the diffuse, individual-level access scores. Simulations that include
random inputs have random outputs, and comparisons across simulation scenarios
requires multiple runs of each. This precludes side-by-side visual comparison of heat
maps because of run-to-run variability. SPAGI is one way of aggregating and comparing
spatial potential access and its response to policy.
4.9.2 What does it mean when SPAGI is higher or lower in the context of an
experiment?
Sometimes interpreting differences in SPAGI is difficult. SPAGI can get worse
when overall capacity in the system gets better, (as shown when total capacity doubled
in Region 1 in Section 4.6), or better when overall capacity in the system gets worse (as
shown with high capacity provider closures in Region 6 in Section 4.8.1.2). When SPAGI
is better, Spatial Potential Access is more equitably distributed; each person has closer
to his or her proportional share of the supply in the system, considering all the factors
that go into calculating that person’s spatial potential access score: how close he or she
is to providers, the capacity of those providers, the other demand on those providers,
and in some calculations, how far he or she is able to go to reach providers.
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If the people were the same from one simulation to the next, improvement in
SPAGI from one scenario to the next would mean that some people who had greater
than their proportional share of access to supply in the system would have less in the
new scenario. Colloquially, there is no way for everyone to be above average. Since the
simulated people are not the same from one simulation to the next, improvement of
SPAGI from one scenario to the next means that the proportion of the people who have
less than their proportional share decreases, and the people with the best access have a
smaller piece of the total. This is easier to see in the context of wealth disparity. “The
poorest 50% have 10% of the total wealth” is clearly worse than “the poorest 50% have
40% of the total wealth.” “The richest 5% have 20%” of the total wealth is less equal
than the richest “5% have 10% of the wealth.”
In the access to treatment context, if 50% of the population with the lowest
Spatial Potential Access scores are in the lowest access decile, it means that the “accesspoorest” 50% has access to just 10% of the total supply in the system. And when 1.5% of
the population is in the highest access decile means that the “access-richest” 1.5% has
access to 10% of the total supply in the system.
4.9.3 How are the five weighting schemes different and which should be used in the
context of an experiment?
The five weighting schemes for calculating individual Spatial Potential Access
scores are of two types: those that are based on how far an individual is willing to travel,
and one that is strictly based on distance. The four willingness-based weights:
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dichotomous (2SFCA), Logistic, Gaussian, and Exponential, appear to be equally sensitive
and give similar results in most experiments. I would recommend the dichotomous
weighted measure for experiments in mostly urban regions, and any single continuous
measure for more rural, or rural/urban mixed regions. But I would not recommend using
more than one willingness-based measure in one experiment, as an additional measure
does not seem to give more information.
The dichotomous measure assumes that all providers within a persons’ stated
travel range are equally accessible. People in the densest population areas tended to
pick the smallest search radii possible, five or ten miles. Continuous weighting results in
heavy discounting of providers that are within two or three miles, which may not be
reasonable. On the other hand, dichotomous weighting may be problematic in rural or
mixed urban/rural areas, because the assumption that a provider that is 100 miles away
affords the same treatment access as a provider that is 10 miles away may be
untenable.
The E2SFCA measure is not based on travel preference, and doesn’t provide the
same information as the other measures. Median SPAGI values are incomparable to the
other SPAGI values, as shown in Section 4.2. Differences in SPAGI may be detected by
E2SFCA and not by the willingness-weighted measures, vice versa, or the differences
detected by each type of measure may be of opposite sign, as shown in Section 4.5,
Table 4-3.
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Spatial Potential Access as measured by E2SFCA removes individual
heterogeneity and provides more general information about residents of a region.
Because it gives different, and sometimes clearer information than the preferenceweighted measures, I recommend including one willingness-weighted measure along
with E2SFCA in a Spatial Potential Access analysis.
4.9.4 What is a good analytic strategy for integrating Spatial Potential Access analysis
into the current simulation study?
In order to answer research questions 3 and 4 in Chapter 5, I integrated Spatial
Potential Access analysis into policy analysis that also measured treatment utilization,
medication diversion, and opioid overdose deaths. Spatial Potential Access analysis
complements but does not replace the direct analysis of utilization, a possible side
effects and outcomes. This is because SPAGI and SPALCs only provide information on
the distribution of access, not whether access is adequate to meet need, or if any of the
treatment capacity is used.
To integrate SPAGI and SPALCs into the policy analysis, simulations were run 35
times at each policy level, and Logistic SPAGI and E2SFCA SPAGI calculated for each set
of simulation runs. Differences in SPAGI at different policy levels were tested with
Kruskall-Wallis rank sum tests and Dunn pairwise post hoc tests. When pairwise
differences from baseline were detected, I inspected SPALCs, SPALC decile summaries,
and heat maps for one baseline simulation run and one policy simulation run to get a
better understanding of what lay behind the statistically significant differences. Because
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there can be considerable run-to-run variation, for this stage of the analysis, I chose
runs whose SPAGI values lay near the median SPAGI for 35 runs for both the baseline
simulation run and the policy simulation run.
Aggregating individual-level spatial potential access information into a curve, and
further into a single index allows for policy impact comparisons using simple statistical
tests. Disaggregating from the index to the curve to the individual-level potential access
information allows examination and understanding of the spatial supply and demand
factors that generated the difference at the highest aggregation level. This analysis of
the disaggregated information is important, but not statistically rigorous. Comparing
single runs of simulations with random inputs always risks that the particular runs
compared are not representative. Generation of statistical tests at lower levels of
aggregation of spatial potential access information is a direction for future research.
In summary, the answer to Research Question 1—What functional form should
an aggregated individual-level access inequality metric have for it to be sensitive enough
to detect differences in access equity in different regions and/or due to different policy
choices?—is as follows:
The Spatial Potential Access Gini Index is an aggregated individual-level access
inequality metric that can detect differences in access equity in different regions and
due to different policy choices that effect total supply, total demand, or the spatial
allocation of supply or demand within a given region. The Spatial Potential Access Gini
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Index is generated by the two-step floating catchment area method of calculating
spatial potential access scores, as detailed in Section 3.5, using either a willingness-totravel based weighting scheme, or a weighting scheme based on Euclidean distance, as
detailed in Section 3.5.1. It is then aggregated by generating a Spatial Potential Access
Lorenz Curve and Spatial Potential Access Gini Index, as detailed in Section 3.5. Both a
willingness-weighted Index and a Euclidean distance weighted Index should be
generated because they convey complementary information about access equity in a
region.
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5

Policy Analysis Results
In Chapter 5, I present the results of policy analysis addressing research

questions two, three, and four with little commentary. Research Question 2 establishes
the baseline scenario including SPAGI measures, and Research Question 3 and 4 analyze
specific policies to increase buprenorphine access and access equity through supply
expansion. Discussion of policy analysis results follows in Chapter 6.
5.1

Model Baseline including Logistic and E2SFCA SPAGI
Descriptive statistics for the baseline simulation region are presented in Table 4-

1 (Region 0). I initialized the 35 baseline simulation runs using the Initialization data
detailed in Section 3.3.1, and the model was run with input data detailed in Section
3.3.2, and the specific input and policy parameter settings detailed in Table 5-1. The
Table 5-1: Parameter settings for input and policy variables for baseline model simulation

parameter
value
High waiver patient limit weeks 1-26
100 people/provider
High waiver patient limit weeks 27-52
275 people/provider
Opioid Overdose Crude Mortality Rate
12/1000 person-years
Percentage NPs, PAs prescribing
0%
buprenorphine
Percentage of providers accepting
59%
Medicaid
Percentage of uninsured with Medicaid
0%
patient limit for providers with the high waiver was raised from 100 to 275 in week 26
because the regulation raising the patient limit went into effect in mid-2016.
All model outputs, including SPAGI measures, were calculated at year end. As
reported in Section 3.3.3, unique BUP recipients was adjusted to the model population:
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total unique BUP recipients/ model population * 1000,000. Milligrams diverted BUP and
Opioid overdose deaths are year-end model totals for the studied region. Means and
95% confidence intervals are presented in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2: Model outcome variables for 35 baseline model simulations.

Outcome variable
measured year end 2016
Population Adjusted
unique BUP recipients

Mean [95% CI]

Milligrams diverted BUP
Opioid overdose deaths

8580 [8373, 8787] mg
283 [277, 290] people

-34673
[33949, 35397]

E2SFCA SPAGI

0.31 [0.30, 0.32] dmnl
0.54 [0.53, 0.55] dmnl

--

469.72 [465.29, 474.15]
people/100,000 population

Scaled nationally
Mean [95% CI]
1,516,000
[1,504,000; 1,529,000]

Logistic SPAGI
-Answering Research Question 2—How equitably distributed is access to OB
buprenorphine treatment in the current OB buprenorphine treatment system given:
regulatory caps on patient numbers, physician preferences, and geographic distribution
of treatment seekers and providers?—provides a baseline against which to compare
supply expansion policies. As discussed in Section 4.9.1 (Is SPAGI useful?), SPAGI
measures are not very informative on their own. However, in the context of the
explorations conducted in Chapter 4, SPAGI results indicate that there is substantial
inequity in spatial potential access in this region.
5.2

Patient Limit Change Policy Analyses
Results of the analysis to address Research Question 3—To what extent would

changing the current DATA 2000 patient limit per provider change utilization of
buprenorphine, spatial access equity, opioid overdose deaths and medication
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diversion?—follow. Details of the experiment setup are presented in Section 3.7.2. For
this analysis, I set the patient limit to 100 (for the entire year, in contrast to the baseline
scenario presented in Section 4.3), 275, 500, and 4000. Because the purpose of the
analysis is to test the impact of changing policy, the 275 person patient limit is taken to
be the status quo, and the 100 patient limit the implementation of a policy roll-back to a
more restrictive limit level. Boxplots of outcome variables and post hoc pairwise
comparisons against the status quo when significant differences were detected are
presented in Figure 5-1. The Cohen’s d effect size was medium for the change in unique
buprenorphine recipients (d = -0.695). To summarize results: the policy rollback to a 100
patient limit resulted in a small but significant decrease in utilization, but no detectable
changes in opioid overdose deaths, medication diversion, or spatial potential access
equity.
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Differences in means detected by oneway ANOVA (p = 3.9e-9)
Tukey’s post hoc pairwise comparisons
Pairwise
Difference in adj p-value
comparison mean
100-275
-15.5
0.00000
500-275
n.s.
0.701
4000-275
n.s.
0.740
a.

Unique buprenorphine recipients

No significant differences in means
detected by Kruskall-Wallis rank sum
test (p=0.507)

b.

Milligrams diverted buprenorphine

No significant differences in means
detected by one-way ANOVA
(p=0.583)

c.

Opioid overdose deaths

No significant differences in means
detected by one-way ANOVA
(p=0.958)

d.

E2SFCA SPAGI
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No significant differences in means
detected by one-way ANOVA
(p=0.963)

Logistic SPAGI
Figure 5-1: Boxplots (left) and statistical tests (right) for the patient limit policy
e.

5.3

NP PA Buprenorphine Adoption Policy Analysis
Results of the analysis to address Research Question 4—To what extent would

various levels of buprenorphine prescribing adoption by Nurse Practitioners and
Physician Assistants change utilization of buprenorphine, equality of access, opioid
overdose deaths, and medication diversion?—follow. For this analysis, I allowed the
patient limit to rise to 275 for providers who qualified for a high waiver in week 26 of
the simulation, because this reflected the actual policy in place at the time. So the NP
PA 0% prescribing level is equivalent to the baseline scenario presented in Section 5.1.
Significant differences were detected at all NP PA adoption levels for the number of
unique buprenorphine recipients, above 10% adoption for E2SFCA SPAGI, and above
20%for logistic SPAGI. No differences were detected in diversion and opioid overdose
deaths at any policy level. Boxplots, tests for differences in medians or means, and post
hoc pairwise tests are presented in Figure 5-2. Unlike the patient limit policy, the SPAGI
measures improved (decreased) at higher levels of NP PA adoption, as shown in 5-2d
and 5-2e. Cohen’s d calculations for the smallest detectable difference indicate
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Differences in means detected by one
way ANOVA (p <2e-16)
Games Howell post hoc comparisons
Pairwise
Difference in p-value
comparison mean
5%-0
13.3
<0.0001
10%-0
27.7
<0.0001
20%-0
37.5
<0.0001
30%-0
50.5
<0.0001

a.

Unique buprenorphine recipients

No significant differences in medians
detected by Kruskall-Wallis rank sum
test (p=0.6796)

b.

Milligrams diverted buprenorphine

No significant differences in means
detected by one-way ANOVA
(p=0.309)

c.

Opioid overdose deaths
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Differences in means detected oneway ANOVA (p=7.25e-9)
Tukey’s post hoc pairwise comparisons
Pairwise
Difference in p-value
comparison mean
5%-0
n.s.
0.749
10%-0
n.s.
0.056
20%-0
-0.029
<0.0001
30%-0
-0.039
<0.0001

d.

E2SFCA SPAGI

Differences in medians detected by
Kruskall-Wallis rank sum test
(p=0.00032)
Dunn’s post hoc pairwise comparisons
Pairwise
Difference in p-value
comparison median
5%-0
n.s.
0.36
10%-0
n.s.
0.21
20%-0
-0.0099
0.0008
30%-0
-0.0112
0.0003

Logistic SPAGI
Figure 5-2: Boxplots (left) and statistical tests (right) for the NP PA prescribing adoption policy
e.

that all effect sizes are large: unique recipients 5% vs 0, d = -0.84; E2SFCA SPAGI 10% vs
0, d = 3.65; Logistic SPAGI 20% vs 0, d = 0.987.
To summarize the results of the NP PA buprenorphine expansion policy:
Adoption of buprenorphine prescribing by NPs and PAs resulted in increases in
utilization at all levels of adoption (5%, 10%, 20% and 30%) and in improvements in
Spatial Potential Access equity at high levels of adoption (20%, 30%). Medication
diversion and opioid overdose deaths were not affected by this treatment supply
expansion policy.
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6

Discussion
The implications of individual exploration experiments to address Research

Question 1 were presented alongside each exploration in Sections 4.3 through 4.8.
Section 4.9 closed with a discussion of how to interpret differences in SPAGI and how to
use SPAGI in policy analysis. This Chapter begins with a discussion of the results of
policy analysis experiments presented in Chapter 5 in Sections 6.1 through 6.3, presents
limitations in Section 6.4, areas for future research in Section 6.5, implications for
research in Section 6.6, implications for substance abuse treatment research practice in
Section 6.7, and closes with a brief conclusion in Section 6.8.
6.1

How equitable is the spatial distribution of treatment supply (RQ2)
In the simulated area, a mixed rural-urban 225,000 square mile region of the

country with providers and people with OUD sited in accordance with national trends,
two measures of Spatial Potential Access equity—the E2SFCA weighted Spatial Potential
Access Gini Index and the Logistic willingness-to-travel weighted Spatial Potential Access
Gini Index—give different information about the how equitably distributed OB
buprenorphine access is in the current treatment system.
6.1.1 E2SFCA weighted SPAGI discussion
E2SFCA takes into account 1.) provider locations, 2.) the number of people those
providers are willing to treat given personal preference and patient limits, 3.) the
locations of people with OUD, and 4.) competition for the scarce provider resource, but
not the willingness or ability of people to travel. Providers within 10 miles are
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considered 100% accessible, providers between 10 and 30 miles are 60% accessible,
providers between 30 and 60 miles are 12.3% accessible.
The E2SFCA SPAGI for the region at the end of 2016 after the patient limit rose
to 275 is 0.31 (95% CI is [0.30, 0.32]). This is higher than the median E2SFCA SPAGI (0.29,
IQR 0.079) for all regions explored in this study, as shown in Table 4-2. Like the Gini
Index for wealth or income, the Index on its own is only useful for comparison. To
understand how access is apportioned, I examined the heat map of deviation from
proportional access, Spatial Potential Access Lorenz Curve (SPALC), and SPALC decile
summary, shown in Figure 6-1a.
The heat map shows that almost no people with OUD in the region have 0 access, but
the SPALC decile summary shows that in this model run about 32% of the population is
in the lowest access decile and 44% of the population is in the lowest 20% access decile.
E2SFCA weighted Spatial Potential Access considers both distance effects and
competition for scarce supply. The heat map shows that in this region with this
particular allocation of providers, the source of inequity for the worst off appears to be
due to distance decay and demand competition for limited rural provider spots in the
northeast, the west coast, and the southwest corner of the region. Heavy demand on
providers at the southern tip of the western urban corridor and outside of two pockets
in the southeastern city mean that people there have less than proportional demand
even though there are providers near by.

SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

a.

Population at
decile
32.3%
12.1%
10.3%
8.8%
7.2%
6.5%
6.1%
5.8%
5.6%
5.5%

E2SFCA Heat map, SPALC and SPALC decile summary
SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile
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b. Logistic Heat map, SPALC and SPALC decile summary
Figure 6-1: One simulation run of the baseline region after one modeled year.

Population at
decile
47.1%
13.4%
9.9%
7.3%
5.7%
4.7%
3.9%
3.2%
2.7%
2.1%
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Similarly, people with access to 25% to 50% of their proportional share of supply
(brown) and 50-90% of their proportional share of supply (yellow) are distributed in all
types of communities. The lowest decile of access includes people in the red (12%),
orange (13%), brown (11%), and yellow (24%) groups.
Far fewer people have near their fair share or greater than their proportional
share of access to supply. People on the periphery do not have near equal or greater
than proportional access to the supply in the region. This is likely due to edge effects
because providers outside the 150x150 mile region aren’t represented. People with the
most choice of providers and greatest access to treatment spots are either those who
live in rural regions around the urban corridor but can travel far and can reach almost all
providers in the urban corridor, or those who live closer to the densest urban center in
the north and can reach all providers in that city.
People in the periphery of southeastern city (but not the suburbs) have about
their proportional share of total supply. And in the densest population center in the
North, people have better than their proportional share of the total supply in the region.
Here people have about 50% more than their proportional share. If the total supply in
the system were known to be adequate to meet demand, this would suggest oversupply
of treatment providers in that region. However, this is a problematic interpretation.
One cannot infer adequacy of treatment supply in a region (or a sub-region, such as the
city in the southeast) based how close to an equal proportional share of the supply
people in the region can access. The people in the western central region appear to
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have more choice and less competition for treatment spots than people elsewhere,
even though the population of demanders is dense.
This interpretation is just one possible allocation of treatment supply and
demand in this region. Close examination of heat maps and SPALCs can give a feel for
the supply and demand pressures in a simulated region, but policy analysis using
simulation requires comparison of E2SFCA SPAGI over several simulations to
discriminate between policy effects and run-to-run variation.
6.1.2 Logistic Willingness Weighted SPAGI Discussion
Logistic willingness-to-travel weighted SPAGI tells a more complex story because
it incorporates how far people are willing to travel into the individual Potential Spatial
Access scores. Using the Logistic willingness-to-travel weighting scheme means that
providers closer than 1/6 * stated willing-to-travel distance are 100% accessible, about
1/3 * willing-to-travel distance are ~95% accessible, 2/3 * willing-to-travel distance are
~50% accessible, and exactly at willing-to-travel distance is about 10% accessible, refer
to Section 3.5.1.2 for the mathematical formulation. This means for many people in
densely populated regions, a provider must be within about 3 miles to be 100%
accessible, since many people in the model cities are willing to travel 10 miles for
treatment. It also means that many people in cities find providers greater than 10 miles
away completely inaccessible.
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Logistic SPAGI for the study region at the end of 2016 after the patient limit rose
to 275 is 0.54 (95% CI is [0.53, 0.55]). This is higher than the median (0.512, IQR 0.124)
for Logistic SPAGI for all regions explored in this study shown in Section 4.2. Again, like
other Gini Indices, Logistic SPAGI is primarily used for comparison and gives little
information on its own. Again, I examined a heat map of deviation from proportional
access, the SPALC, and SPALC decile summary for one simulation replication, shown in
Figure 6-1b. The same simulation run was used to generate the E2SFCA heat map
discussed above. Providers and people with OUD are located in the same places; all that
has changed is the weighting term in the Spatial Potential Access Score calculations.
The SPALC has a near zero slope near the origin, and 47% of the population is
in the lowest access decile. 60% of the population has access to 20% of the supply in the
system, taking into account weighting and preference. Because two people occupying
the same square mile of the model can have completely different travel preferences,
their Spatial Potential Access scores can be different. The heat map becomes too
crowded in urban areas for easy interpretation. To aid interpretation, I generated
Figure 6-2, in which each heat map color is shown separately.
People with zero access (red) tend to live in rural areas outside the large city
centers. However, people with non-zero access scores under a quarter of what would
be their proportional share (orange) are present in every community. The lion’s share
of these people with poor access are in the dense urban region in the north, where
there is high demand and low willingness to travel, and a large population.
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Figure 6-2: Heat map of deviation from proportional access in Spatial Potential Access Scores with colors
separated out.
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Similarly, people with access to 25% to 50% of their proportional share of supply
(brown) and 50-90% of their proportional share of supply (yellow) are distributed in all
types of communities. The lowest decile of access includes people in the red (12%),
orange (13%), brown (11%), and yellow (24%) groups.
Far fewer people have near their fair share or greater than their proportional
share of access to supply. People on the periphery do not have near equal or greater
than proportional access to the supply in the region. This is likely due to edge effects
because providers outside the 150x150 mile region aren’t represented. People with the
most choice of providers and greatest access to treatment spots are either those who
live in rural regions around the urban corridor but can travel far and can reach almost all
providers in the urban corridor, or those who live closer to the densest urban center in
the north and can reach all providers in that city.
6.1.3 Summary Regarding Baseline Spatial Potential Access Equity (RQ2)
The Spatial Potential Access Gini Indices, Spatial Potential Access Lorenz Curves
and heat maps indicate that treatment access is not equitably distributed in the current
treatment system. If ability to travel is not considered, there seems to be relative
oversupply in dense urban zones and undersupply in rural zones, some small cities and
exurbs. When ability to travel is considered, the situation is more complicated. People
with the best access live alongside people with the worst access, in all community
types—rural, urban, center city, suburban, exurban zones. Some of this may reflect
reality, as people with high incomes and means to travel may live very close to people of
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very limited means. This makes it difficult to devise strategies to reduce inequality of
access. Increasing the number of urban providers in the dense city center would
certainly improve access for people with limited ability to travel located near the city
center, but it would also improve access for the people who already have more than
their proportional share. SPAGI scores could go up, down or remain the same by
increasing supply in these zones.
However, it’s important to remember that the random collocation of people
with high and low ability to travel is due to simplifying model assumptions. The model
does not specify affluent or impoverished neighborhoods. If it did, the apparent random
mixing might be replaced by clear pockets of high demand with low ability to travel as in
the hot-spot exploration experiments in Section 4.7, and strategies to target people
living in specific small areas could emerge.
6.2

Discussion of Results for the Patient Limit Policy (RQ3)
As shown in Section 5.2, under model assumptions of individual provider

preferences for patient loads, a roll back to 100 patient per provider resulted in a 5%
decrease in the number of unique buprenorphine recipients in the model year. Further
expansion of the patient limit did not result in statistically detectable differences in
utilization. There were no differences detected in medication diversion, opioid
overdose deaths among, or SPAGI measures at any of the patient limit levels.
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6.2.1 Patient Limit and Buprenorphine Utilization
To generate an individual provider’s personal patient preference level, a provider
agent generates a random variable from a random distribution based on provider type.
A provider’s capacity may then be truncated at the patient limit, if the limit is lower than
the preferred patient number. To understand the relative impact of patient limits and
provider preference on total OB BUP utilization, I compared the population sizes of two
types of providers: those whose patient census counts are within 10% of the patient
limit, those whose patient census counts are within 10% of their preference level.
Results of 35 replications at each patient limit level are shown in Table 6-1. Preferences
are unchanged for each simulation run, so 95% confidence intervals for the number of
providers near maximum preferred capacity are pooled from all 140 runs.
Table 6-1: Number and percentage of providers within 90% of either their personal maximum patient levels
or the regulatory patient limit.

Number providers >= 90%
capacity [95% CI]
70.36 [68.73; 71.98]

Percent providers >= 90%
capacity [95% CI]
27% [26%; 28%]

Preferred (unlimited)
capacity
Capacity given limits
100
17.43 [16.42; 18.44]
7% [6%; 7%]
275
0.4 [0.23; 0.57]
0%
500
0.03 [-0.03; 0.09]
0%
4000
0.00 [0.00; 0.00]
0%
At each patient limit level, about 27% of providers are treating about their

maximum preferred level of patients. For some providers this number may be zero.
When the patient limit is 275 only one provider is treating up to the 275 limit in about
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40% of the replications. When the patient limit is 500, this drops to 1 provider in only 1
of the simulation runs. At 4000, no providers are near the patient limit.
This explains why the number of unique buprenorphine recipients dropped
when the patient limit policy was dropped to 100, but remained unchanged when
patient limits were further relaxed. At higher patient limit levels, the patient limit is not
meaningfully constraining utilization. This is despite the fact that patient limits are lower
than the number of patients some providers are willing to treat at all limit levels, as
shown in Table 6-2.
Table 6-2: Total and mean unconstrained capacity, and capacity given patient limits.

Preferred (unlimited)
capacity
Capacity given limits
100
275
500
4000

Total treatment spots
Mean 100 replications
[95% CI]
26,900 [26,300; 27,600]

Mean treatment spots
Mean 100 replications [95%
CI]
105 [103; 108]

10,200 [10,100; 10,300]
17,300 [17,000; 17,600]
21,700 [21,200, 22,100]
23,700 [23,200; 24,300]

40 [39; 40]
67 [66, 69]
84 [83, 86]
93 [91; 95]

This is likely due to simplifying assumptions about how patients select providers.
Patients simply choose providers that are close, who accept the right insurance, starting
with providers on who are on the SAMHSA online provider list. Advertising, word of
mouth, or reputation effects are absent from the model. Word of mouth and positive
reputation are known positive reinforcement effects that could drive potential patients
to high capacity providers who already have a lot of patients. This provider selection
effect was highlighted in the face validity interview with Dr. O’Connor. It is possible that
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more providers would be closer to the regulatory limits if the model included these
kinds of effects.
Though Cohen’s d suggests that the effect size of rolling back to a 100 patient limit
is medium, a 5% effect seems small, given the 40% reduction in capacity given patient
limit shown in Table 6-2. The patient limit was raised in 2016, and many providers did
elect to apply for the 275 waiver. Theoretical capacity (patient limit x number of
providers) nearly doubled from 2015 to 2016 as shown in Figure 2-3. If there were a
large reservoir of providers “capped out” at the 100 patient limit, the number of unique
buprenorphine recipients should have jumped from 2015 to 2016. Estimates of unique
buprenorphine recipients in 2016 were roughly the same as the number of unique
providers in 2015. Analysis conducted by Indivior, the maker of Suboxone estimated
1,387,815 total buprenorphine recipients in 2015 and 1,380,616 recipients in 2016. The
data seem to support the finding of a modest change in utilization despite a much larger
change in capacity. The model may be showing a small effect where none was seen in
the data because in the model the limit levels persisted for the whole year, without any
adoption implementation phase, or practice change rollout among providers.
Even at the 100 patient limit, only 17% of simulation providers were at or near the
patient limit, while 27% of providers were up against their personal practice limits. This
is consistent with literature on barriers to buprenorphine adoption and utilization, in
which many providers list other barriers as equally or more important in their decisions
around buprenorphine use (see for example Hutchinson, Catlin, Andrilla, Baldwin, &
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Rosenblatt, 2014). In the simulation these barriers are not modeled explicitly, but are
assumed to be latent factors that drive preferences for patient loads.
6.2.2 Patient Limit and Opioid Overdose Deaths
It is not surprising, though distressing, that changes in buprenorphine utilization
due to patient limit changes do not appear to result in changes in opioid overdose
deaths. This is consistent with the sensitivity analysis (Section 3.4.4.1) which showed
that only changes in the opioid overdose crude mortality rate resulted in changes in the
number of opioid overdose deaths. Again, this is due to model assumptions. Opioid use
disorder incidence is held to a constant rate, as is the rate of treatment seeking.
Changes in policy alter how many people who seek treatment actually get treatment,
not the total number of people who seek treatment. Modeled changes in policy effect
only about 10% of the population with OUD, the 10% seeking but not yet receiving
treatment. Even if all of these people seeking treatment got treatment, the number of
overdoses avoided would be small. Further, people who seek treatment may self-treat
with buprenorphine, reducing their risk of overdose death. Transitioning these people
from informal self-treatment to formal treatment might not result in much change in
modeled overdoses.
For policies to affect the number of opioid overdose deaths, they would have to
impact the 70% of the model population at highest overdose risk—those who are not
interested in treatment. Sensitivity analysis showed that a 30% change in the incidence
of treatment seeking (from 10% to 13%) was not enough to see significant changes in
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overdose deaths. In fact, the only parameter that impacted overdose deaths was the
opioid overdose crude mortality rate. Increasing the mortality rate directly, due to the
influx of potent opioids such as fentanyl, or because of random fluctuations in heroin
purity, results in more deaths. Decreasing the mortality rate directly, through such
strategies as increased adoption naloxone for overdose reversal, results in fewer deaths.
6.2.3 Patient Limit and Diversion
In the analysis of changes in the level of diversion with changes in the patient
limit I could not reject the null hypothesis that the mean diversion levels were all equal.
This is not surprising, given model assumptions. The people who sell or give away their
medication are a fraction of those who are in treatment who need money. Utilization
was about the same at three of the four patient limit levels. At the lowest patient limit
level, utilization was only 5% lower, which means the fraction of people who divert
buprenorphine would have gone down by perhaps 2%. Diversion model logic involves a
lot of random processes, a small reduction in the population of people diverting would
likely be obscured by random variation in the model.
Sensitivity analysis in Section 3.4.4.1 suggests that policies which impact
treatment cost and the number of people in treatment are likely to impact diversion, if
model assumptions regarding the reasons for diversion are valid. The patient limit policy
only affects the number of people in treatment, but not to a large enough degree to see
changes in diversion supply.
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6.2.4 Patient Limit and Spatial Potential Access
Changes in the patient limit did not result in detectable differences in either
E2SFCA SPAGI or Logistic SPAGI despite the large differences in total capacity, shown in
Table 6-2. New capacity (or in the case of the 100 patient limit rollback, removal of
capacity) is located in the same places at each policy level. The supply is divided the
same way, even though the size of the total supply expands or contracts. This echoes
the findings in the Doubling Capacity Exploration in Section 4.6, and the toy example in
Section 3.5, Figure 3-7. In general, changes to treatment capacity that do not change the
allocation of treatment supply are unlikely to change Spatial Potential Access equity.
Policy-makers interested in spatial equity should be aware that expanding capacity for
everyone does not necessarily mean that previously disadvantaged areas are less
disadvantaged when compared to all others. More does not necessarily mean more
equal. However, exclusive focus on equity could miss the important fact that in this
case, return to a more restrictive patient limit level means that everyone gets less. The
allocation of that smaller supply is no more or less equal spatially than at other patient
limit levels, but fewer people get treatment.
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6.3

Discussion of Results of NP PA Buprenorphine Adoption Policy (RQ4)
As shown in Section 5.3, increasing adoption of buprenorphine prescribing by

NPs and PAs resulted in increases in the number of unique buprenorphine recipients at
all levels of adoption, and improved Spatial Potential Access equity at higher adoption
levels. The policy did not result in detectable differences in opioid overdose deaths or
medication diversion.
6.3.1 NP PA Adoption and Buprenorphine Utilization
When I added NP and PA buprenorphine prescribers to the model, I did so under
the following assumptions: NPs and PAs buprenorphine prescribers are primary care
providers; they may prescribe under their own authority; 30% practice in medically
underserved areas (MUAs) and 25% of those practice in isolated rural areas; and they
are willing to treat the same number of patients as primary care physicians. I also
assumed that all NP or PA providers were new providers, which meant that they could
treat a maximum of 30 patients. As in the discussion of the Patient Limit policy, I
examine how much capacity was added to the region at each adoption level, which is
shown in Table 6-3.
For every percentage point increase in NP PA prescribing, there is about a 2
percentage point increase in the number of treatment spots in the simulated region.
Because NPs and PAs are new providers and are constrained to at most 30 patients, the
mean number of treatment spots per provider steadily decreases as the number of NPs
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Table 6-3: Total capacity, increase in capacity, and mean capacity per provider given a 30 patient limit for
new providers, a 275 patient limit for high waiver holders, and provider preferences for patient case-loads
at 4 adoption levels of NP and PA prescribing.

Total treatment spots
Mean 100 replications [95%
CI]
Baseline
% NP and PA
prescribing
5%
10%
20%
30%

%
capacity
increase

Mean treatment
spots
Mean 100
replications [95% CI]
70 [69; 71]

11%
20%
41%
64%

60 [60; 61]
53 [52; 54]
46 [45; 46]
42 [41; 42]

18,300 [18,100; 18,600]

20,400 [20,100; 20,700]
22,100 [21,800; 22,500]
26,000 [25,700; 26,300]
30,100 [29,800; 30,500]

and PAs increases. Unlike in the patient limit expansion, all these increases in capacity
also resulted in increases in utilization. The number of unique buprenorphine recipients
increased by 2.8%, 5.9%, 7.9%, 10.7% at each of the five levels of prescribing adoption.
Since increasing treatment capacity doesn’t feedback into treatment seeking, the
increased utilization arises when people seeking treatment are able to get into
treatment rather than wait or return to use. As shown in Table 6-4, at high levels of NP
and PA adoption there seems to be some shifting of patients from overburdened
physician providers to the large pool of NP and PA providers. The percentage of
providers within 10% of their personal limit drops from 26% at baseline to 21% at 20%
NP/PA adoption, and 15% at 30% NP/PA adoption. However, at lower NP/PA adoption
levels, the percentage of providers near their personal limits increases because the
decrease in physician providers near their limit is outpaced by NPs and PAs near their
limits. This supports the Dr. O’Connor’s assumption that NPs might relieve some of the
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pressure on busy addiction medicine practices initially, until those freed up spots are
backfilled by new patients. In the model, the backfilling process does not occur because
the rate of treatment seeking is held fixed.
Table 6-4: Mean patient census levels for NPs and PAs, and physicians, and the percentage of providers who
are within 10% of their personal limit on the number of patient they are willing to treat.

Baseline
% NP and PA
prescribing
5%
10%
20%
30%

Mean NP PA
patient census
0

Mean physician
census
26 [26; 27]

% providers within
10% of personal limit
26% [26%; 27%]

21 [20; 21]
19 [18; 19]
15 [15; 15]
12 [12; 12]

21 [20; 21]
16 [16; 16]
11 [11; 11]
8 [8; 8]

31% [30%; 31%]
29% [29%; 30%]
21% [21%; 22%]
15% [15%; 15%]

Because NP and PA providers in the model are limited to 30 patients, capacity
would rise in the second and third modeled years, as higher capacity NPs and PAs
choose to apply for the higher level DEA waivers. This would likely have an impact at
the lower adoption levels because the mean patient census level for NPs and PAs is high,
indicating that some of these providers are at their 30 patient limit.
I was initially reluctant to model buprenorphine prescribing adoption by over 10%
of primary care NPs and PAs because there has been such resistance to buprenorphine
prescribing among primary care physicians, where adoption has stalled at 3-5%. I was
encouraged to model high adoption by Dr. O’Connor, a primary care Nurse Practitioner
with long experience working with patients with OUD in the context of primary care. If
the enthusiasm she has seen among her colleagues translates into high adoption of
buprenorphine prescribing among NPs and PAs, the OAT treatment system might come
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closer to resembling a diffuse, primary care based system that may have been the
original vision of DATA 2000. However, the same barriers that may be preventing higher
adoption of buprenorphine prescribing among primary care physicians are present for
primary care NPs and PAs, and may even be more severe. NPs and PAs tend to be
reimbursed at lower rates than physicians for the same services. Low reimbursement
may make offering OAT cost prohibitive for some practices. Adoption may also be
hampered by laws limiting the prescribing authority of non-physician prescribers. All
states allow NPs to prescribe Schedule III drugs, and all states but Kentucky allow PAs to
prescribe Schedule III drugs, but most states limit prescriptive authority in some way. It
is not yet clear how limitations on prescriptive authority and requirements for physician
supervision may impact the ability of NPs and PAs to provide OAT.
Given the barriers and unanswered questions regarding high adoption of
buprenorphine prescribing by NPs and PAs, it is encouraging that the model shows
increased utilization at the lowest level of adoption—5%. If model assumptions on NP
and PA practice locations are valid, 30% of these new providers may serve patients in
medically underserved areas, including remote areas where community-based OAT may
not currently exist.
6.3.2 NP PA Adoption and Opioid Overdose and Diversion
As was the case in with the patient limit policy, no changes in opioid overdose
deaths or diversion were detected with changes in policy. The fact that opioid overdose
deaths did not change despite increases in treatment utilization underscores the
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reasons given in Section 6.2.2, above. Under model assumptions, expansions in
treatment supply meant that people already seeking treatment were able to get a
treatment spot. In the model, these people represented only 10% of the people with
OUD and were already at lower risk due to self-treatment with illicit buprenorphine. The
70% of the population at high risk did not change, so overdose deaths did not change. If
the model were coded so that increasing treatment capacity and availability induced
more people to seek treatment, I would expect the number of opioid overdose deaths
to decrease with increases in treatment capacity.
I had expected to see some change in diversion with the changes in utilization
because of the logic governing diversion demand. Demand for diverted buprenorphine
has two sources: explicit demand by people seeking and waiting to begin treatment, and
implicit demand as people who need money can divert medication to “the street.”
Increases in supply allow people who are seeking treatment to enter treatment,
reducing the size of the population explicitly requesting diverted buprenorphine from
friends in treatment. Reducing explicit demand should reduce total diversion.
However, it may be that decreasing demand is obscured by more people in
treatment who may need money. Implicit demand is not modeled directly. I assume
that “the street” will always demand buprenorphine from people in treatment, so that
people who need money will always get money for diverted medicine. In early
interviews with Dr. Clark, ASAM president and addiction medicine specialist treatment
provider, she predicted that a curve relating diversion and the number of people in
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treatment would be roughly hill shaped. As more people get treatment, there would be
more diversion because there are more patient sources of diverted medicine, but after a
certain threshold level of people in treatment, diversion would go down because there
would be less demand as people who would be self-treating are folded into the formal
treatment system.
It could be that in the model, both processes are occurring, canceling out the
effects of each. Explicit demand from treatment seekers reduces demand, but
increased utilization increases supply to the ever-present implicit “street” demand for
people who are in treatment but need money.
6.3.3 NP PA Adoption and Spatial Potential Access Equity
In addition to increasing utilization of buprenorphine, the NP PA buprenorphine
adoption policy also resulted in detectable improvements in the two SPAGI measures.
Statistical tests for differences when the NP PA adoption levels were treated as factors
only found significant differences at the 20% and 30% adoption levels. However, if NP
and PA prescribing adoption were treated as a continuous variable, linear regression
models predicting E2SFCA SPAGI and Logisitic SPAGI from NP PA prescribing are
significant. The model predicting E2SFCA SPAGI:
E2SFCA SPAGI = 0.305 – 0.0012 (NP/PA pct adopting)
is significant (p = 4.81e-11), and 21% of the variance in E2SFA SPAGI can be explained by
NP PA prescribing level. The model predicting Logistic SPAGI:
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Logistic SPAGI = 0.5374 – 0.000364 (NP/PA pct adopting)
is significant (p = 1.37e-5), and explains 9% of the variance in Logistic SPAGI.
The linear models show that at low adoption levels, changes to SPAGI measures
would be very small, and analyses treating the adoption levels as factors show that
these small changes to SPAGI are not detectable above the considerable run-to-run
variation, even though we may observe a linear trend in the plots.
To understand the response of E2SFCA SPAGI to changes in NP and PA prescribing,
I examined the heat maps, SPALCs and SPALC summaries for the 20% and 30% adoption
levels and compared each to baseline, as shown in Figure 6-3. There is no statistically
significant difference between 20% and 30% adoption, so I did not compare these two
scenarios directly. In the model run shown in Figure 6-3a, 32.1% of the population is in
the lowest spatial potential access decile, and 44.4% in the lowest 20%. People whose
spatial potential access scores are below one quarter of their proportional share of
supply are concentrated in the northeast and southwest corners. The large population
living at the southern tip of the urban corridor have less than proportional access, while
those in and around the dense urban core have much greater than their proportional
share of access.
E2SFCA SPAGI is almost 5 percentage points better with 20% NP and PA adoption,
but the differences in distribution of spatial access equity are diffusely spread over all
SPALC deciles. A smaller fraction of the population is in the lowest decile meaning that
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the new allocation of supply is felt by the population that previously had the least
choice and the most competition for distant providers. In the 20% adoption heat map,
there are no people with “orange level” disparity in the small city in the northeast, nor
on the central western coastal cities.
In the SPALC decile summary, when we consider the 50% of the population that
has the best access, larger populations in each decile means that allocation is more
equitable. Using the income metaphor, if the top 5% of earners earn 10% of the
income, they have more equal a share of total income than if 1% of earners earned 10%.
At the 5th decile and up, each access decile contains a slightly larger proportion of the
population, so the area between the line of perfect equality and the Spatial Potential
Access Lorenz Curve is smaller. The best access is shared by more people, which means
that access is less skewed to the “access-rich.”
In a heat map, a society with totally equal spatial potential access would be
entirely green. Changes toward the center of the color legend indicate greater access
equity. In the heat map of Figure 6-3b, high concentration orange areas were eliminated
as discussed above, a brown region in the south central area changed to yellow. Striking
changes can be seen in the urban corridor. Access equity improved for the suburbs and

SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

a.

0 NP PA adoption
SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

b.

Population at
decile
32.1%
12.3%
10.1%
8.3%
7.2%
6.5%
6.2%
6.0%
5.8%
5.6%

Population at
decile
29.9%
11.7%
9.4%
8.3%
7.5%
7.1%
6.8%
6.6%
6.4%
6.2%

20% NP PA adoption
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SPALC decile
1st decile
2nd decile
3rd decile
4th decile
5th decile
6th decile
7th decile
8th decile
9th decile
10th decile

Population at
decile
30.6%
10.8%
8.9%
8.2%
7.6%
7.3%
7.0%
6.8%
6.5%
6.3%

c.
30% NP PA adoption
Figure 6-3: E2SFCA Spatial Potential Access heat maps (left), SPALCs (center) and SPALC decile summaries (right) for baseline (a), 20% NP PA buprenorphine
adoption (b) and 30% NP PA buprenorphine adoption (c)

241

242
exurbs as shown by the expansion outward of the yellow region, especially to the west.
More people are closer to their proportional share of access at the southern tip of the
urban zone, and the number of people enjoying disproportionately high choice and less
competition for nearby providers in the dense urban center contracted.
The 30% penetration SPALC and SPALC summary tell a similar story by the
numbers. There are small reductions in the size of populations with the worst access,
and the best access is shared among a larger fractions of the populations resulting in a
smaller areas between the SPALC and the line of perfect equality. The heat map tells a
story that is different in the details, but similar in its implications. Random allocation of
providers in the rural zone in the north east improved access for those residents. The
orange zone in coastal cities is again eliminated. The urban corridor expanded, access
improved at the southern end, and the access richest region in the dense urban core
contracted.
If the simulations were run again, providers would be allocated differently and
the particular story told by the heat maps would be different. However, the heat maps
do tell the same general story. Allocation of providers in new places according to a
different allocation rule results in changes in the geographic concentration of treatment
availability, which means treatment spots are newly accessible to those who previously
didn’t have many options (orange  brown  yellow  green). Changes to geographic
concentration by adding supply outside of treatment dense areas increases equity by
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diluting the influence of high concentration zones. More access elsewhere means high
access areas are less exceptional (blue  cyan  turquoise  green).
It is notable that increasing the patient limit did not result in allocation of new providers
in new places, so the supply that was added to the system did not noticeably change the
concentration gradient of treatment supply.
Despite a Cohen’s d indicating a large effect on Logistic SPAGI at 20% NP PA
adoption, at 20% adoption the mean of Logistic SPAGI decreases by less than 1
percentage point. At 30% adoption, the mean of Logistic SPAGI decreases by a little
more than 1 percentage point. The difference is detectable even considering run-to-run
variation. However, because the difference is so close to the normal range of variation
in the Logistic SPAGI measure at baseline I concluded that SPALC, SPALC decile, and heat
map analysis of individual replications are not useful.
As I opined in Section 6.1.3, I believe the model assumption regarding the random
mixing of people with highest and lowest ability to travel based on population density
muddies the spatial distribution of access picture. This limitation is further discussed in
Section 6.4.2, below.
Even though SPALC and heat map analysis are not illuminating, and the effects are
small, there is a measurable impact on SPAGI weighted by people’s ability to travel.
When NP and PA adoption is at high levels and new sources of supply are spread more
evenly in the region, including to MUAs and remote areas, spatial potential access

244
equity improves. Limited ability to travel still puts treatment out of reach, or nearly out
of reach, for many. This suggests that treatment accessibility policies that increase
people’s ability to travel or reduce the distance they have to go can have a positive
impact on spatial potential access equity given ability to travel, as well as utilization and
retention (see for example: Friedmann, Lemon, & Stein, 2001; Hall et al., 2014).
6.4

Limitations
The chief limitations of this study are its simplifying assumptions. Because the

research questions were narrowly focused on buprenorphine treatment capacity,
several important aspects of the treatment system were left out of the model. Though
all modeling requires selection of model boundaries and each model assumption could
be discussed in turn, I did not conduct exhaustive boundary assessment. However,
several simplifying choices should be discussed because they have implications for the
measurement of utilization, diversion, and equity, the primary foci of the research
questions. I cover three main limitation areas: homogeneous population, homogeneous
population allocation, and homogeneous providers and treatment experiences.
6.4.1 Population homogeneity
First, the population with OUD is generic. Agents are coded as male or female,
but agent sex has no influence on other variables. Agents do not have variables for age,
substance use history, treatment history, race or ethnicity, language, pregnancy status,
employment status, criminal justice involvement, or comorbid physical or mental health
problems. Several of these individual factors do impact retention in treatment, how long
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treatment may last, which OAT type a person is likely to get. However, the research
questions in this study are narrow and don’t necessitate heterogeneous agents, that is:
“Do supply side changes in capacity result in greater utilization in general, given spatial
considerations?” The impact of characteristics of people with OUD on treatment
outcomes is assumed to underlie the heterogeneity in the two primary patient
outcomes: time to abstinence or reduced use, and treatment retention. Heterogeneity
is also assumed to inform people’s willingness or ability to travel. Some of the empirical
data informing model parameters could have been stratified by any number of
population characteristics, and a diverse, heterogeneous synthetic population
generated through microsimulation techniques. I argue that this dramatic increase in
agent complexity would not better answer the general questions on general utilization
levels and spatial equity.
There are racial and ethnic disparities in access to treatment services, which
must be included in studies of treatment access equity writ large. Racial and ethnic
disparities are not included in this study of access equity, because questions of equity
are narrowly limited to Spatial Potential Access. Equity is only assessed in this narrow
Spatial Potential Access context. I do not consider equity in utilization, or outcomes, nor
do I consider access equity across population groups. This is not because these studies
would be unimportant, they are simply outside the narrow focus of this work. No nonspatial aspects of accessibility are included in the model. There is great potential to
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expand the calculation of potential access to include non-spatial determinants of access,
which is a promising thread for future work.
6.4.2 Population allocation homogeneity
While the regional population density maps represent real regions, people are
placed on the maps in a plausible fashion and not directly from empirical data. There
were two major reasons for this decision. First, there aren’t good data on that would
allow geo-coding of people with OUD, although there are ways to estimate populations
by proxy measures such as those used by Dick and others (Dick et al., 2015). Second, the
original impetus for the research was to model the national implications of policy. So
rather than generate a single high resolution, high fidelity representation of a real
region, which might not be suitable for a national analysis, I chose to generate a highresolution (1 square mile), low-fidelity, plausible allocation of individuals.
People with OUD were initialized with randomly assigned poverty levels based
on NSDUH, and insurance type based on poverty level. Then they were placed on the
map so that population distribution in different types of regions (large MSA, small MSA,
etc.) matched NSDUH survey data. Once people were placed on the map, willingness to
travel were drawn from the empirical distribution for the population density of the
person’s residence (see Appendix A). This population allocation algorithm assumes
independence of poverty level and willingness to travel.
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This assumption of independence makes analysis of willingness to travel based
SPAGI problematic. People with limited ability to travel are not spatially grouped.
In future research, this shortcoming could be addressed by better methods for
generating synthetic populations. Rather than using population density to place agents
and providers, providers could be placed by zip code, and agents generated by matching
high-resolution census data and zip code data on willingness to travel and then merging
this data with representative survey data from NSDUH using iterative proportional
fitting. The resultant synthetic population would much better represent a plausible
allocation of individuals with OUD, and would vastly improve willingness to travel based
SPAGI analyses.
The resulting analyses would be regional, not national, however. National scaling
of individual-level dynamic models is an active area of research in the Agent Based
Simulation research community.
6.4.3 Provider and treatment homogeneity
The model does include some provider heterogeneity, but only on factors that
impact capacity and utilization, such as accepted insurance and cost, and especially
number of patients a provider is willing to treat. In the model, the number of patients a
provider is willing to treat depends on whether the provider is a specialist, whether they
have a high or low waiver, and whether they are on the SAMHSA searchable list. There
are many other factors that determine how many patients a provider is willing to treat,

248
including practice barriers and facilitators (Barry et al., 2008; Gordon et al., 2011;
Hutchinson et al., 2014; Roman, Abraham, & Knudsen, 2011; Schackman et al., 2006)
and practice models (see SAMHSA 2014c for examples). A rich policy model could
include barriers, facilitators, and practice models and their impact on how many
patients a provider is willing to treat. However, there are no data on how many people
a provider is willing to treat. Rather than model the impact of these variables on
preference, the magnitudes of which are not known, I chose to simplify and generate
preferences by drawing from probability distributions based on specialty and waiver
level, and calibrating to patient census data.
Testing the impact of adopting different practice models could be a fruitful
avenue for simulation research in OUD treatment.
6.5

Future Directions
There are several fruitful future directions for research using SPAGI measures

and spatial agent based models of OUD treatment access. The current research could
be strengthened substantially by using spatial synthetic population generation
techniques to generate the population with OUD. The model could then be used to
assess regional spatial potential access using geocoded provider locations. The model
could be extended to allow exploring the spatial implications of any number of
experiments for changing access and utilization, including different practice models and
regional policy models such as hub and spoke, in which stable patients are transferred

249
to primary care providers closer to where they live; or telemedicine adoption for
reaching people with limited ability to travel.
The Spatial Potential Access Gini Index itself could be developed in future
research to incorporate methodological improvements in floating catchment area
gravity models, including edge correction, different distance decay functions for urban
and rural residents. Research could explore whether non-spatial aspects of accessibility
could be incorporated into spatial potential access measures and SPAGI to give a richer
picture of access disparities. Careful attention must be paid to whether changing how
spatial potential access is measured preserves the property of 2SFCA measures which
allows for aggregation using SPAGI by assuring that the weighted average of accessibility
scores equals the total number of opportunities in the system.
More robust statistical analysis of differences in Spatial Potential Access Lorenz
Curves could be explored in future research. I compared SPALCs and SPALC decile
summaries of individual model runs to understand statistically significant differences in
SPAGI measures. However, these analyses were informal comparisons of deciles rather
than a statistically robust comparisons of all the information contained in the curves
themselves. Development of formal curve analysis could allow better understanding of
the nature of the inequity in systems described by Lorenz Curves.
Future research could explore whether SPAGI measures are useful in empirical
analyses using standard floating catchment area estimates of demand at the census
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tract level. Initial exploration could be used to compare regions for which spatial
potential access analyses have already been conducted. Once initial exploration shows
that SPAGI can detect differences between regions, SPAGI could be used to compare
supply allocation experiments in real regions.
Finally, scaling of dynamic agent based models is an active area of research. How
can researchers make national level inferences based on agent based simulation models
when spatial heterogeneity is an important driver of dynamics? Must one agent
represent one person, or can simulated individuals be “statistical individuals?” Can a
population centroid of a census tract represent a person in an agent based simulation,
allowing for a direct synthesis of empirical spatial potential access research and agent
based simulation? Can an agent based simulation of a region represent similar regions in
a statistically robust way, in the way that a statistical individual represents a large
number of people in survey research? I am currently involved in research on how to
scale individual models and spatial representativeness, which has grown from the
current work.
6.6

Implications for Research
Development of a method to aggregate complex Spatial Potential Access

information into a single metric grows the field of spatial potential access measurement
in a new direction. It addresses a fundamental question in spatial potential access
measurement: how can researchers compare mapped regions? To date, much attention
has been paid to identification of supply shortages, or supply deserts, using census-
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based spatial potential access mapping (see, for example: Lee & Lim, 2009; Sharkey,
Horel, & Dean, 2010; Wan, Zhan, Zou, & Chow, 2012). Methodological improvements
have focused on how to improve the catchment area methods (Delamater, 2013;
McGrail & Humphreys, 2009; Wan, Zou, et al., 2012), how to optimize allocation of new
supply (Ngui & Apparicio, 2011; Wang, 2012; Wang & Tang, 2013), and how to choose
distance measures and aggregation levels (Apparicio et al., 2017) or representations of
populations (Langford & Higgs, 2006). Equity is assessed within the mapped region, and
quantitative information is displayed in rich maps. However, researchers appear not to
have compared equitability of access across regions, or within regions after a policy
experiment.
The Spatial Potential Access Gini Index and Spatial Potential Access Lorenz Curve
compresses the rich information of access equity present in individual maps to allow for
direct comparison of Spatial Potential Access across maps. Spatial potential access must
be assessed the same way in all regions to be compared, and the weighted average of
spatial potential access scores must equal the total supply in the system for Lorenz
Curve aggregation to be mathematically sound. Care should also be taken to interpret
differences in SPAGI across regions because of issues in interpretation noted in Section
4.9.2. The ability to compare equitability of Spatial Potential Access across regions could
allow for hybrid empirical simulation studies, in which supply allocation policies are
tested directly on data rich, empirical maps.
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6.7

Implications for Substance Abuse Treatment Research Practice
This study shows the promise of simulation research in substance abuse

treatment policy analysis. An earlier iteration of the simulation model had a larger
scope, allowing for the exploration of more policies and policy impacts on more
outcomes. The vision of the earlier model was as a flight simulator, in which treatment
models could be swiftly operationalized, and the potential impacts explored in a
participatory process with researchers and stakeholders working together. Simulations
can be useful for testing simple what-if ideas for improving access to treatment, such as
how could people with OUD in Oregon benefit primary care providers contracted with
the Coordinated Care Organizations got and used DATA waivers to prescribe for people
receiving Medicaid. It is a simple idea, but one that has met with resistance from
providers as reported by Lucy Zammarelli, Health Equity Officer for Trillium, a
Coordinated Care Organization and health insurer operating in several counties in
Oregon. A simulation showing improved utilization and access equity when adding
primary care providers and no improvement in equity from addiction specialist supply
expansion could build evidence to support advocacy in treatment expansion in primary
care.
6.8

Conclusions
If we as a society believe that equity is important, then we should measure it.

This simulation exercise showed that if we allocate supply of OAT treatment services as
it is allocated in the United States, and we allocate people with OUD in a way that it
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consistent with representative surveys of OUD, there is substantial inequity in the
spatial allocation of OAT. If we as a society believe that equitable access to OAT is
important, then we should work to improve it. We can use simulation that includes
measurement of Spatial Potential Access to take the first steps in improving equity. We
can see what might work in simulation studies like this one, before post-hoc empirical
policy analyses have been conducted. And then we could also use empirical policy
evaluation tools, including mapping, measuring and comparing equity measures in posthoc analyses to evaluate policies after the fact.
As we do these analyses, we should ask ourselves the difficult ethical questions
that come with work to improve equity. Is it OK for things to get better for some people
before it gets better for other people? Is it OK to define equity narrowly—can we pat
ourselves on the back for improvements in Spatial Access Equity, if racial and ethnic
disparities persist? Is it OK for people who are “access rich” to get less than they’ve
grown accustomed to so that others get more? How do we make the ethical and
practical argument for redistribution given political discomfort with that concept?
Measuring, mapping, and comparing equity is an important step toward
improving equity. I hope that this work has advanced that work in some small way.
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Appendix A

Patient Willingness to Travel Based on Zip Code 2006-May 2013

The histograms below chart frequency of stated willingness to travel in 5 mile
increments for residents who live in regions with population densities within the stated
range. People who used the NAABT.org physician locator website entered information
about themselves including zip code, age and email address to the website, and might
be contacted directly by buprenorphine providers. I received de-identified data, and
grouped individuals according to the population density of their zip code. I then
generated histograms of miles willing to travel for different population density ranges.
Rather than fitting histograms with probability distributions, I used them directly in
simulation because several distributions were multimodal.
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Figure A-1: Miles willing to travel for people residing in areas with population density > 5000
people/square mile
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Figure A-2: Miles willing to travel for people residing in areas with population density 2500-5000
people/square mile
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Figure A-3: Miles willing to travel for people residing in areas with population density 1000-2500
people/square mile
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Figure A-4: Miles willing to travel for people residing in areas with population density 500-1000
people/square mile
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Figure A-5: Miles willing to travel for people residing in areas with population density 250-500
people/square mile
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Figure A-6: Miles willing to travel for people residing in areas with population density 100-250
people/square mile
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Figure A-7: Miles willing to travel for people residing in areas with population density 50-100
people/square mile
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Figure A-8: Miles willing to travel for people residing in areas with population density 25-50 people/square
mile
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Figure A-9: Miles willing to travel for people residing in areas with population density 10-25 people/square
mile
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Figure A-10: Miles willing to travel for people residing in areas with population density 0-10 people/square
mile

Model Code

Figure B-1: Model Graphical User Interface

Graphical User Interface
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Model code
Code tab
__includes
["GeoSetup1.nls"
"ProviderSetup1.nls"
"Declarations1.nls" "ProviderGo1.nls" "PtGo1.nls"
"SetupCommands1.nls" "GoCommands1.nls" "otp1.nls" ]

"PtSetup1.nls"
"Reporters1.nls"

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; SETUP PROCEDURES ;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
to setup
clear-all
setup-globals
set-initials
setup-geography
setup-OTPs
setup-providers
ask OTPs [init-OTPs]
set-capacity
if equity-experiments = "high-capacity-provider-closure"[
repeat large-capacity-n[
ask one-of real-providers with-max [total-capacity]
[
set total-capacity 0
]
]
]
if equity-experiments = "rural-provider-closure"[
let rxing-providers real-providers with [total-capacity > 0]
repeat rural-provider-n [
ask one-of rxing-providers with-min [[pop-den] of patch-here]
[
set total-capacity 0
die
]
]
]
if double-capacity?[
ask real-providers [set total-capacity 2 * total-capacity]
]
setup-people
set lorenz-with-weights-2SFCA []
set lorenz-with-weights-E2SFCA []
set lorenz-with-weights-logistic []
set lorenz-with-weights-gaussian []
set lorenz-with-weights-exponential []
set gini-index-weights-2SFCA 0
set gini-index-weights-E2SFCA 0
set gini-index-weights-logistic 0
set gini-index-weights-gaussian 0
set gini-index-weights-exponential 0
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if gini-at-setup? [
do-gini
]
reset-ticks
end
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;;; GO PROCEDURES
;;
;;; walk through time week by week. ;;
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
to go
tick
;set testlist[]
do-street-market
grow-deps
chance-OD
if model-year = 2016 and ticks = 34 [set high-cap 275 ask real-providers
[if patients-per-provider > 100[set capped-patients-per-provider min list
patients-per-provider high-cap set total-capacity capped-patients-perprovider + MTH-spots ]]]
if model-year = 2015 and ticks = 85 [set high-cap 275 ask real-providers
[if patients-per-provider > 100[set capped-patients-per-provider min list
patients-per-provider high-cap set total-capacity capped-patients-perprovider + MTH-spots]]]
age-patients
age-providers
compute-IQR
if ticks = 59 or ticks = 111 [
do-gini
]
reset-flagged-vars
end

to do-gini
do-two-step
do-lorenz-2SFCA
do-lorenz-E2SFCA
do-lorenz-logistic
do-lorenz-gaussian
do-lorenz-exponential
update-plots
end
to do-two-step
do-step-one
do-step-two
do-step-one-E2SFCA
do-step-two-E2SFCA
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end
to do-step-one
; print "2SFCA"
ask real-providers [
let sum-of-weights-2SFCA 0
let sum-of-weights-logistic 0
let sum-of-weights-gaussian 0
let sum-of-weights-exponential 0
let catchment-deps nobody
let current-dep nobody
set catchment-deps deps with [my-travel-distance > distance myself]
ask catchment-deps[
let my-weight-2SFCA 1
let my-weight-logistic 1 - (1 / (1 + e ^ ((-10 / my-travel-distance)
* ((distance myself) - (my-travel-distance / 2)))))
let my-weight-gaussian e ^ ( - ((distance myself) * (distance
myself)/(0.3 * my-travel-distance * my-travel-distance)))
let my-weight-exponential e ^ ( - (distance myself) / (.3 * mytravel-distance))
set sum-of-weights-2SFCA sum-of-weights-2SFCA + my-weight-2SFCA
set sum-of-weights-logistic sum-of-weights-logistic + my-weightlogistic
set sum-of-weights-gaussian sum-of-weights-gaussian + my-weightgaussian
set sum-of-weights-exponential sum-of-weights-exponential + myweight-exponential
]
ifelse sum-of-weights-2SFCA != 0 [
set weighted-ratio-2SFCA total-capacity / sum-of-weights-2SFCA
]
[
set weighted-ratio-2SFCA 0
]
ifelse sum-of-weights-logistic != 0 [
set
weighted-ratio-logistic
total-capacity
/
sum-of-weightslogistic
]
[
set weighted-ratio-logistic 0
]
ifelse sum-of-weights-gaussian != 0 [
set
weighted-ratio-gaussian
total-capacity
/
sum-of-weightsgaussian
]
[
set weighted-ratio-gaussian 0 ;show "no-demand"
]
ifelse sum-of-weights-exponential != 0 [
set weighted-ratio-exponential total-capacity / sum-of-weightsexponential
]
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[
set weighted-ratio-exponential 0 ;show "no-demand"
]
]
end
to do-step-one-E2SFCA
ask real-providers [
let sum-of-weights-E2SFCA 0
let catchment-deps nobody
let current-dep nobody
set catchment-deps deps with [distance myself < 60]
ask catchment-deps[
let my-weight-E2SFCA 1
if distance myself < 60[
set my-weight-E2SFCA .123
]
if distance myself < 30[
set my-weight-E2SFCA .6
]
if distance myself < 10[
set my-weight-E2SFCA 1
]
set sum-of-weights-E2SFCA sum-of-weights-E2SFCA + my-weight-E2SFCA
]
ifelse sum-of-weights-E2SFCA != 0 [
set weighted-ratio-E2SFCA total-capacity / sum-of-weights-E2SFCA
]
[
set weighted-ratio-E2SFCA 0 ;show "no-demand"
]
]
end
to do-step-two-E2SFCA
ask deps[
set reachable-providers real-providers with [distance myself < 60]
let my-weight-E2SFCA 1
set weighted-sum-of-ratios-E2SFCA 0
let current-provider nobody
ask reachable-providers[
let my-dist distance myself
ask myself [
if my-dist < 60[
set my-weight-E2SFCA .123
]
if my-dist < 30[
set my-weight-E2SFCA .6
]
if my-dist < 10[
set my-weight-E2SFCA 1
]
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set weighted-sum-of-ratios-E2SFCA weighted-sum-of-ratios-E2SFCA
+ ([weighted-ratio-E2SFCA] of myself * my-weight-E2SFCA)
]
]
]
end
to do-step-two
ask deps[
set reachable-providers real-providers with [distance myself < [mytravel-distance] of myself]
let my-weight-2SFCA 1
let my-weight-logistic 1
let my-weight-gaussian 1
let my-weight-exponential 1
set weighted-sum-of-ratios-2SFCA 0
set weighted-sum-of-ratios-logistic 0
set weighted-sum-of-ratios-gaussian 0
set weighted-sum-of-ratios-exponential 0
let current-provider nobody
ask reachable-providers[
let my-dist distance myself
ask myself [
set my-weight-logistic 1 - (1 / (1 + e ^ ((-10 / my-traveldistance) * ((my-dist) - (my-travel-distance / 2)))))
set my-weight-gaussian e ^ ( - ((distance myself) * (distance
myself)/(0.3 * my-travel-distance * my-travel-distance)))
set my-weight-exponential e ^ ( - (distance myself) / (.3 * mytravel-distance))
set weighted-sum-of-ratios-2SFCA weighted-sum-of-ratios-2SFCA +
([weighted-ratio-2SFCA] of myself * my-weight-2SFCA)
set
weighted-sum-of-ratios-logistic
weighted-sum-of-ratioslogistic + ([weighted-ratio-logistic] of myself * my-weight-logistic)
set
weighted-sum-of-ratios-gaussian
weighted-sum-of-ratiosgaussian + ([weighted-ratio-gaussian] of myself * my-weight-gaussian)
set weighted-sum-of-ratios-exponential weighted-sum-of-ratiosexponential + ([weighted-ratio-exponential] of myself * my-weightexponential)
]
]
]
end
to do-lorenz-2SFCA
let num-patients (count deps)
let sorted-ratios sort [weighted-sum-of-ratios-2SFCA] of deps
let total-ratios sum sorted-ratios
let ratio-sum-so-far 0
let index 0
set gini-index-weights-2SFCA 0
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set lorenz-with-weights-2SFCA []
repeat num-patients[
set ratio-sum-so-far (ratio-sum-so-far + item index sorted-ratios)
set lorenz-with-weights-2SFCA lput ((ratio-sum-so-far / total-ratios)
* 100) lorenz-with-weights-2SFCA
set index (index + 1)
set gini-index-weights-2SFCA gini-index-weights-2SFCA + (index / numpatients) - (ratio-sum-so-far / total-ratios )
]
set gini-index-weights-2SFCA (gini-index-weights-2SFCA / num-patients)
* 2
end
to do-lorenz-logistic
let num-patients (count deps)
let sorted-ratios sort [weighted-sum-of-ratios-logistic] of deps
let sorted-deps []
if show-log-map? [
set sorted-deps sort-on [weighted-sum-of-ratios-logistic] deps
ask patches [set pcolor black]
ask otps [set shape "circle" set size 2 set color white]
ask providers [set shape "circle" set size 2 set color white]
]
let total-ratios sum sorted-ratios
;show total-ratios
let ratio-sum-so-far 0
let prev-ratio-sum-so-far 0
let index 0
set gini-index-weights-logistic 0
set lorenz-with-weights-logistic []
repeat num-patients[
set ratio-sum-so-far (ratio-sum-so-far + item index sorted-ratios)
set lorenz-with-weights-logistic lput ((ratio-sum-so-far / totalratios) * 100) lorenz-with-weights-logistic
if show-log-map?[
ask item index sorted-deps
[
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients = 0 ) [set size 3 set color red]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= .25 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > 0) [set size 3 set color ORANGE]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= .5 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > .25) [set size 3 set color brown]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= .9 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > .5) [set size 3 set color yellow]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 1.1 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > .9) [set size 3 set color green]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 1.25 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > 1.1) [set size 3 set color turquoise]
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if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 1.5 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > 1.25) [set size 3 set color cyan]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 2 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / totalratios * num-patients > 1.5) [set size 3 set color sky ]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients > 2) [set size 3 set color blue]
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if

(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far

/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/

total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios

<
<
<
<
<
<
<
<
<
<

1) [set decile 10]
.9) [set decile 9]
.8) [set decile 8]
.7) [set decile 7]
.6) [set decile 6]
.5) [set decile 5]
.4) [set decile 4]
.3) [set decile 3]
.2) [set decile 2]
.1) [set decile 1]

]
]
set prev-ratio-sum-so-far ratio-sum-so-far
set index (index + 1)
set gini-index-weights-logistic gini-index-weights-logistic + (index
/ num-patients) - (ratio-sum-so-far / total-ratios )
]
set gini-index-weights-logistic (gini-index-weights-logistic / numpatients) * 2
if show-log-map?[
show word "1st " (precision (count deps with [decile = 1] / count
deps) 3)
show word "2nd " (precision (count deps with [decile = 2] / count
deps) 3)
show word "3rd " (precision (count deps with [decile = 3] / count
deps) 3)
show word "4th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 4] / count
deps) 3)
show word "5th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 5] / count
deps) 3)
show word "6th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 6] / count
deps) 3)
show word "7th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 7] / count
deps) 3)
show word "8th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 8] / count
deps) 3)
show word "9th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 9] / count
deps) 3)
show word "10th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 10] / count
deps) 3)
]
end
to do-lorenz-gaussian
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let num-patients (count deps)
let sorted-ratios sort [weighted-sum-of-ratios-gaussian] of deps
let sorted-deps []
if show-gaussian-map? [
set sorted-deps sort-on [weighted-sum-of-ratios-gaussian] deps
ask patches [set pcolor black]
ask otps [set shape "circle" set size 2 set color white]
ask providers [set shape "circle" set size 2 set color white]
]
let total-ratios sum sorted-ratios
;show total-ratios
let ratio-sum-so-far 0
let prev-ratio-sum-so-far 0
let index 0
set gini-index-weights-gaussian 0
set lorenz-with-weights-gaussian []
repeat num-patients[
set ratio-sum-so-far (ratio-sum-so-far + item index sorted-ratios)
set lorenz-with-weights-gaussian lput ((ratio-sum-so-far / totalratios) * 100) lorenz-with-weights-gaussian
if show-gaussian-map?[
ask item index sorted-deps
[
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients = 0 ) [set size 3 set color red]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= .25 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > 0) [set size 3 set color ORANGE]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= .5 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > .25) [set size 3 set color brown]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= .9 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > .5) [set size 3 set color yellow]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 1.1 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > .9) [set size 3 set color green]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 1.25 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > 1.1) [set size 3 set color turquoise]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 1.5 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > 1.25) [set size 3 set color cyan]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 2 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / totalratios * num-patients > 1.5) [set size 3 set color sky ]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients > 2) [set size 3 set color blue]
if
if
if
if
if

(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far

/
/
/
/
/

total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios

<
<
<
<
<

1) [set decile 10]
.9) [set decile 9]
.8) [set decile 8]
.7) [set decile 7]
.6) [set decile 6]

285
if
if
if
if
if

(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far

/
/
/
/
/

total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios

<
<
<
<
<

.5)
.4)
.3)
.2)
.1)

[set
[set
[set
[set
[set

decile
decile
decile
decile
decile

5]
4]
3]
2]
1]

]
]
set prev-ratio-sum-so-far ratio-sum-so-far
set index (index + 1)
set gini-index-weights-gaussian gini-index-weights-gaussian + (index
/ num-patients) - (ratio-sum-so-far / total-ratios )
]
set gini-index-weights-gaussian (gini-index-weights-gaussian / numpatients) * 2
if show-gaussian-map?[
show word "1st " (precision (count deps with [decile = 1] / count
deps) 3)
show word "2nd " (precision (count deps with [decile = 2] / count
deps) 3)
show word "3rd " (precision (count deps with [decile = 3] / count
deps) 3)
show word "4th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 4] / count
deps) 3)
show word "5th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 5] / count
deps) 3)
show word "6th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 6] / count
deps) 3)
show word "7th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 7] / count
deps) 3)
show word "8th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 8] / count
deps) 3)
show word "9th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 9] / count
deps) 3)
show word "10th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 10] / count
deps) 3)
]
end
to do-lorenz-exponential
let num-patients (count deps)
let sorted-ratios sort [weighted-sum-of-ratios-exponential] of deps
let total-ratios sum sorted-ratios
;show total-ratios
let ratio-sum-so-far 0
let index 0
set gini-index-weights-exponential 0
set lorenz-with-weights-exponential []
repeat num-patients[
set ratio-sum-so-far (ratio-sum-so-far + item index sorted-ratios)
set lorenz-with-weights-exponential lput ((ratio-sum-so-far / totalratios) * 100) lorenz-with-weights-exponential
set index (index + 1)
set gini-index-weights-exponential gini-index-weights-exponential +
(index / num-patients) - (ratio-sum-so-far / total-ratios )
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]
set gini-index-weights-exponential
num-patients) * 2
end

(gini-index-weights-exponential

/

to do-lorenz-E2SFCA
let num-patients (count deps)
let sorted-ratios sort [weighted-sum-of-ratios-E2SFCA] of deps
let sorted-deps []
if show-e2-map? [
set sorted-deps sort-on [weighted-sum-of-ratios-E2SFCA] deps
ask patches [set pcolor black]
ask otps [set shape "circle" set size 2 set color white]
ask providers [set shape "circle" set size 2 set color white]
]
let total-ratios sum sorted-ratios
let ratio-sum-so-far 0
let prev-ratio-sum-so-far 0
let index 0
set gini-index-weights-E2SFCA 0
set lorenz-with-weights-E2SFCA []
repeat num-patients[
set ratio-sum-so-far (ratio-sum-so-far + item index sorted-ratios)
set lorenz-with-weights-E2SFCA lput ((ratio-sum-so-far / total-ratios)
* 100) lorenz-with-weights-E2SFCA
if show-e2-map?[
ask item index sorted-deps
[
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients = 0 ) [set size 3 set color red]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= .25 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > 0) [set size 3 set color ORANGE]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= .5 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > .25) [set size 3 set color brown]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= .9 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > .5) [set size 3 set color yellow]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 1.1 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > .9) [set size 3 set color green]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 1.25 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > 1.1) [set size 3 set color turquoise]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 1.5 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) /
total-ratios * num-patients > 1.25) [set size 3 set color cyan]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients <= 2 and (ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / totalratios * num-patients > 1.5) [set size 3 set color sky ]
if ((ratio-sum-so-far - prev-ratio-sum-so-far) / total-ratios *
num-patients > 2) [set size 3 set color blue]
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if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if
if

(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far
(ratio-sum-so-far

/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/

total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios
total-ratios

<
<
<
<
<
<
<
<
<
<

1) [set decile 10]
.9) [set decile 9]
.8) [set decile 8]
.7) [set decile 7]
.6) [set decile 6]
.5) [set decile 5]
.4) [set decile 4]
.3) [set decile 3]
.2) [set decile 2]
.1) [set decile 1]

]
]
set index (index + 1)
set prev-ratio-sum-so-far ratio-sum-so-far
set gini-index-weights-E2SFCA gini-index-weights-E2SFCA + (index /
num-patients) - (ratio-sum-so-far / total-ratios )
]
if show-e2-map?[
show word "1st " (precision (count deps with [decile = 1] / count deps)
3)
show word "2nd " (precision (count deps with [decile = 2] / count deps)
3)
show word "3rd " (precision (count deps with [decile = 3] / count deps)
3)
show word "4th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 4] / count deps)
3)
show word "5th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 5] / count deps)
3)
show word "6th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 6] / count deps)
3)
show word "7th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 7] / count deps)
3)
show word "8th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 8] / count deps)
3)
show word "9th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 9] / count deps)
3)
show word "10th " (precision (count deps with [decile = 10] / count
deps) 3)
]
set
gini-index-weights-E2SFCA
(gini-index-weights-E2SFCA
/
numpatients) * 2
end
to compute-IQR
let nonOTPproviders providers with [otp-doc? = false]
let RxingnonOTPproviders nonOTPproviders with [(count BUP-patients +
count tele-patients) > 0]
let sortedDocList sort-on [count tele-patients + count BUP-patients]
RxingnonOTPproviders
let firstQIndex round (length sortedDocList / 4) - 1
let thirdQIndex round (length sortedDocList * .75) - 1
let medianIndex round (length sortedDocList / 2) - 1
let firstDoc item firstQIndex sortedDocList
let thirdDoc item thirdQIndex sortedDocList
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let medianDoc item medianIndex sortedDocList
set firstQuartile [count tele-patients + count BUP-patients] of
firstDoc
set thirdQuartile [count tele-patients + count BUP-patients] of
thirdDoc
set medianPts [(count BUP-patients + count tele-patients)] of medianDoc
set OneToThree round (100 * count RxingnonOTPproviders with [(count
BUP-patients + count tele-patients) > 0 and (count BUP-patients + count
tele-patients) < 4] / (count RxingnonOTPproviders))
set FourTo30 round (100 * count RxingnonOTPproviders with [(count BUPpatients + count tele-patients) >= 4 and (count BUP-patients + count telepatients) <= 30] / (count RxingnonOTPproviders))
set ThirtyoneTo75 round (100 * count RxingnonOTPproviders with [(count
BUP-patients + count tele-patients) >= 31 and (count BUP-patients + count
tele-patients) <= 75] / (count RxingnonOTPproviders))
set MoreThan75 round (100 * count RxingnonOTPproviders with [(count
BUP-patients
+
count
tele-patients)
>=
76]
/
(count
RxingnonOTPproviders))
end

Declarations.nls
breed [providers provider]
breed[deps dep]
breed[OTPs OTP]
globals[
filename
lorenz-points
untreated-dependent
open-capacity
number-docs
number-patients
max-patch-density
total-number-dependent
weekly-add-docs
weekly-add-APN
dead-number
diverted-medicine
all-insurance
gini-index-reserve
ods-deps
ods-pats
in-tx
n
men
women
gini-index-weights-2SFCA
gini-index-weights-E2SFCA
gini-index-weights-logistic
gini-index-weights-gaussian
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gini-index-weights-exponential
lorenz-with-weights-2SFCA
lorenz-with-weights-E2SFCA
lorenz-with-weights-logistic
lorenz-with-weights-gaussian
lorenz-with-weights-exponential
firstQuartile
thirdQuartile
medianPts
OneToThree
FourTo30
ThirtyOneto75
MoreThan75
dummy-doc
rural-areas
small-cities
large-cities
patches-with-pills
initial-pct-patients-in-tx
low-spec
high-spec
non-high-list
non-low-list
non-low-nolist
low-spec-random
high-spec-random
non-high-list-random
non-low-list-random
non-low-nolist-random
pa-pop
pa-pcp-pct
dep-incidence
seeking-incidence
initial-pct-deps-seeking-or-in-tx
remote-dep-pct
np-pop
np-pcp-pct
MUA-pct
remote-pct
APN-discount
lowest-cost
APN-random
small-city-pct
rural-threshold
small-city-threshold
divertAfford
wanted$
percentSayYes
colleague-radius
rural-dep-pct
pct-of-income
pct-poverty
pct-twox-poverty
coinsurance-base
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coinsurance-random
never-abstain-pct
abstinence-floor
abstinence-mean
dose-sixteen
dose-eight
dose-tfour
mth-cost
pct-try-bup-first
mth-weekly-quit-rate
first-week-bup-quit
second-week-bup-quit
show-street-market?
my-wait-time
total-population
docs-per-pop
pts-dependent
poverty-level
female-pct
num-otps
va-pct
gvt-pct
pnp-pct
ods-pts-in-tx
post-tx-die
]
providers-own [
patients-per-provider
capped-patients-per-provider
BUP-years
wait-list
colleagues
specialist?
onList?
Rxing?
CapHigh?
willAdd?
provider-type
accepted-insurance-list
visit-cost
OTP-doc?
MTH-spots
total-capacity
no-pay?
do-telemedicine?
weighted-ratio-2SFCA
weighted-ratio-E2SFCA
weighted-ratio-logistic
weighted-ratio-gaussian
weighted-ratio-exponential
tele-patients
BUP-patients
MTH-patients
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rxerType
]
deps-own[
pt?
seeking-BUP?
getting-BUP-weeks
stable-abstinence?
abstinence-threshold
provider-group
provider-list
my-provider
my-travel-distance
waitlisted?
my-wait-threshold
indexprovider
too-far?
weeks-waiting
no-access-flag?
sought?
have-purchased-pills?
pill-source
dose
weeks-of-pills
total-tx-cost
have-diverted?
divert-reason
insurance
coinsurance
cantAfford?
monthly-out-of-pocket-payment
monthly-medication-cost
poverty
income
sex
relapse?
recipient-flag?
got-any-tx-flag?
weighted-sum-of-ratios-2SFCA
weighted-sum-of-ratios-E2SFCA
weighted-sum-of-ratios-logistic
weighted-sum-of-ratios-gaussian
weighted-sum-of-ratios-exponential
reachable-providers
decile
]
patches-own[
pop-den
lambda
nn-distance
xP
yP
MUA?
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pills-here
]
OTPs-own
[
OTP-type
accepted-insurance-list
no-pay?
OTP-docs
give-BUP?
MTH-spots
MTH-pts
]

GeoSetup.nls
to setup-geography
set small-city-pct 35.5
set rural-threshold 35.0
set small-city-threshold 1000
make-MUA
make-real-map
set show-street-market? false
end
to make-MUA
let mapfilename (word "map" map-number "MUA.png")
import-pcolors mapfilename
ask patches [set pcolor round pcolor ifelse pcolor = 109 or (pcolor >
14 and pcolor < 20) [set MUA? true][ set MUA? false]]
ask patches [set pcolor black]
end
to make-real-map
let mapfilename (word "map" map-number ".png")
import-pcolors mapfilename
ask patches [set pcolor round pcolor]
ask patches [remove-lines]
ask patches [set-density]
diffuse pop-den .2
ask patches [set pop-den round pop-den]
set max-patch-density max [pop-den] of patches
set rural-areas patches with [pop-den < rural-threshold]
set small-cities patches with [pop-den < small-city-threshold and
pop-den > rural-threshold]
set large-cities patches with [pop-den > small-city-threshold]
set patches-with-pills patch-set nobody
end
to remove-lines
if pcolor = 4 or pcolor = 5 or pcolor = 133 [set pcolor [pcolor] of
one-of patches in-radius 3 with [pcolor > 5] remove-lines]
end
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to set-density
if pcolor = 74
if pcolor = 55
if pcolor = 56
if pcolor = 57
if pcolor = 58
if pcolor = 47
if pcolor = 28
if pcolor = 27
if pcolor = 26
if pcolor = 16
if pcolor = 15
end

[set
[set
[set
[set
[set
[set
[set
[set
[set
[set
[set

pop-den
pop-den
pop-den
pop-den
pop-den
pop-den
pop-den
pop-den
pop-den
pop-den
pop-den

1]
(1 + random 10)]
(10 + random 15)]
(25 + random 25)]
(50 + random 50)]
(100 + random 150)]
(250 + random 250)]
(500 + random 500)]
(1000 + random 1500)]
(2500 + random 2500)]
(5000 + random 2000)]

SetupCommands.nls
to set-initials
set all-insurance ["public" "private" "none"]
set diverted-medicine 0
if model-year = 2013
[
set total-population 316500000
set docs-per-pop (22631 / total-population)
set pts-dependent 3556000
set initial-pct-patients-in-tx .6
set od-deps-CMR 8
]
if model-year = 2014
[
set total-population 318600000
set docs-per-pop (22218 / total-population)
set pts-dependent 3400000
set initial-pct-patients-in-tx .7
set od-deps-CMR 10.5
]
if model-year = 2015
[
set total-population 320900000
set docs-per-pop (25504 / total-population)
set pts-dependent 3418000
set initial-pct-patients-in-tx .8
set od-deps-CMR 12
]
if model-year = 2016
[
set total-population 323100000
set docs-per-pop (29961 / total-population)
set pts-dependent 3538000
set initial-pct-patients-in-tx .8
set od-deps-CMR 12
]
end
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to setup-people
set total-number-dependent floor (pts-dependent * total-pop / totalpopulation)
calculate-number-patients (total-number-dependent / 1)
ifelse dep-locations = "baseline-model" or dep-locations = "randomlocation"[
create-deps (total-number-dependent / 1)
]
[
ask patches [sprout-deps (round (pop-den * total-number-dependent /
total-pop))]
]
ask deps[
set-initial-dep-stats
set-initial-pt-location
set-distance
if dep-locations = "random-location" [move-to one-of patches]
if [pop-den] of patch-here = 0 [move-to one-of patches with [popden = 1]]
]
if equity-experiments = "rural-hotspot" or equity-experiments =
"rural-hotspot-low-transport"
[
let hotspot-pop sum [pop-den] of patches with [pxcor >= 75 and
pxcor <= 100 and pycor >= 75 and pycor <= 100]
create-deps hotspot-pop / 5 [
move-to one-of patches with [pxcor >= 75 and pxcor <= 100 and
pycor >= 75 and pycor <= 100]
set-initial-dep-stats
set color orange
ifelse equity-experiments = "rural-hotspot"[
set-distance
]
[
set my-travel-distance 10 + random 20
]
]
]
if equity-experiments = "urban-hotspot"
[
let hotspot-pop sum [pop-den] of patches with [pxcor >= 130 and
pxcor <= 145 and pycor >= 35 and pycor <= 50]
create-deps hotspot-pop / 10 [
move-to one-of patches with [pxcor >= 130 and pxcor <= 145 and
pycor >= 35 and pycor <= 50]
set-initial-dep-stats
set color orange
set-distance
]
]
setup-patients
end
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to set-initial-dep-stats
ht
set pt? false
set abstinence-threshold 0
set abstinence-mean 200
set seeking-BUP? FALSE
set getting-BUP-weeks -1
set stable-abstinence? FALSE
set my-provider NOBODY
set provider-list []
set provider-group nobody
set indexprovider 0
set waitlisted? false
set relapse? false
set too-far? false
set my-wait-threshold random-exponential my-wait-time
set weeks-waiting 0
set cantAfford? false
set weeks-of-pills 0
set dose 0
set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment 0
set monthly-medication-cost 0
set my-travel-distance my-travel-distance / 1.3 ;;converting crows
fly distance to taxicab distance
set
set
set
set

have-purchased-pills? false
pill-source []
have-diverted? false
divert-reason []

set
set
set
set

recipient-flag? false
got-any-tx-flag? false
no-access-flag? false
sought? false

set-sex
init-poverty-insurance
set-abstinence-thresholds
end
to calculate-number-patients [total-deps]
set number-patients floor (total-deps * initial-pct-deps-seeking-orin-tx)
end
to set-initial-pt-location
ifelse random 100 < rural-dep-pct
[
move-to one-of rural-areas
let big-neighborhood patches in-radius 5
if random 100 < remote-dep-pct [move-to max-one-of big-neighborhood
[pop-den]]
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]
[
ifelse random 100 < small-city-pct
[move-to one-of small-cities]
[if large-cities != nobody [move-to one-of large-cities]]
]
end
to set-sex
ifelse random 100 < female-pct[set sex "female"][set sex "male"]
end
to init-poverty-insurance
let m random 100
if m < pct-poverty [set poverty 1]
if m >= pct-poverty AND m < pct-poverty + pct-twox-poverty [set poverty
2]
if m >= pct-poverty + pct-twox-poverty [set poverty 3]
if poverty = 1 [
let q random 100
if q < 47 [set insurance "public" set coinsurance 100]
if q >= 47 and q < 67 [set insurance "private" set coinsurance
coinsurance-base + random coinsurance-random]
if q >= 67 [set insurance "none" set coinsurance 0]
]
if poverty = 2 [
let q random 100
if q < 30 [set insurance "public" set coinsurance 100]
if q >= 30 and q < 64 [set insurance "private" set coinsurance
coinsurance-base + random coinsurance-random]
if q >= 64 [set insurance "none" set coinsurance 0]
]
if poverty = 3 [
let q random 100
if q < 11 [set insurance "public" set coinsurance 100]
if q >= 11 and q < 83 [set insurance "private" set coinsurance
coinsurance-base + random coinsurance-random]
if q >= 83 [set insurance "none" set coinsurance 0]
]
set income (poverty - 1) * poverty-level + random poverty-level
if medicaid-expansion? [if random 100 < pct-uninsured-now-have-medicaid
[if insurance = "none" and poverty = 1
[set insurance "public" set coinsurance 100]]]
end
to set-abstinence-thresholds
ifelse random 100 < never-abstain-pct ;;data?
[set abstinence-threshold 10000]
[while [abstinence-threshold <= abstinence-floor] ;
[set abstinence-threshold round random-normal abstinence-mean
abstinence-mean]
]
end
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to setup-globals
set ods-deps 0
set ods-pats 0
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set

initial-pct-deps-seeking-or-in-tx .36
remote-dep-pct 52.0
low-spec .046
high-spec .12
non-high-list .2040
non-low-list .0780
non-low-nolist .48
low-spec-random 2
high-spec-random 2
non-high-list-random 2
non-low-list-random 2
non-low-nolist-random 2
pa-pop 101318
pa-pcp-pct .265
dep-incidence .1
seeking-incidence .4
np-pop 220000
np-pcp-pct .710
MUA-pct .3
remote-pct .25
APN-discount .7
lowest-cost 60
APN-random 2
divertAfford 54
wanted$ 14
percentSayYes 35
colleague-radius 5
rural-dep-pct 14.5
pct-of-income .30
pct-poverty 30
pct-twox-poverty 26
coinsurance-base 50
coinsurance-random 19
never-abstain-pct 50
abstinence-floor 10

set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set

dose-sixteen 63
dose-eight 18
dose-tfour 15
mth-cost 20
pct-try-bup-first 80
mth-weekly-quit-rate .0070
first-week-bup-quit 24
second-week-bup-quit 12
my-wait-time 4
poverty-level 1000
female-pct 30

set ods-pts-in-tx 3
set post-tx-die 8
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end

ProviderSetup.nls
to setup-providers
setup-docs
if NP-PAs? [setup-APN]
ask providers[
set colleagues other providers in-radius colleague-radius
if not any? colleagues [let other-guys min-n-of 2 providers
[distance myself] set other-guys other other-guys set colleagues otherguys ]
]
create-dummy-doc
end
to setup-docs
set-doc-pop
ifelse doc-locations = "baseline-model" or doc-locations = "randomlocation"[
create-providers number-docs
]
[
while [count providers < number-docs][
ask one-of patches [if random-float 1 > (pop-den * number-docs /
total-pop) [sprout-providers (ceiling (pop-den * number-docs / totalpop))]]
]
]
ask providers[
set size 4
set color red
set provider-type "doc"
set OTP-doc? FALSE
set do-telemedicine? FALSE
set BUP-patients turtle-set nobody
set tele-patients turtle-set nobody
set MTH-patients turtle-set nobody
set-practice-characteristics
set-doc-characteristics
set-initial-doc-location
]
end
to set-doc-pop
set number-docs floor (docs-per-pop * total-pop)
set weekly-add-docs growth-rate-docs / 52 * (total-pop / totalpopulation)
end
to set-practice-characteristics
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while [visit-cost < lowest-cost] [set visit-cost visit-cost-mean +
random-normal visit-cost-mean visit-cost-mean]
set-insurance
if accepted-insurance-list = 0 [set accepted-insurance-list ["none"]]
end
to set-insurance
set accepted-insurance-list []
if random 100 < accept-cash [set accepted-insurance-list ["none"]]
if random 100 < accept-private [set accepted-insurance-list lput
"private" accepted-insurance-list]
if random 100 < accept-public [set accepted-insurance-list lput
"public" accepted-insurance-list]
if accepted-insurance-list = [] [set accepted-insurance-list ["none"]]
end
to set-doc-characteristics
set willAdd? FALSE
let r random-float 1
;set rxerType 0
if r <= low-spec
[
set BUP-years random-float 1
set specialist? TRUE set onList? TRUE set Rxing? TRUE set capHigh?
FALSE set willAdd? TRUE
ifelse low-spec-random = 4 [set patients-per-provider high-cap]
[
ifelse low-spec-random = 2[set patients-per-provider 30 + round
random-exponential 250]
[ifelse low-spec-random = 1 [set patients-per-provider random
150][set patients-per-provider random 1000]]
]
set-telemedicine
set rxerType 1
]
if r > low-spec and r <= (low-spec + high-spec)
[
set BUP-years 1 + random-float 12
set specialist? TRUE set onList? TRUE set Rxing? TRUE set capHigh?
TRUE set willAdd? TRUE
ifelse high-spec-random = 4 [set patients-per-provider high-cap]
[
ifelse high-spec-random = 2[set patients-per-provider 30 + round
random-exponential 250]
[ifelse high-spec-random = 1 [set patients-per-provider random
150][set patients-per-provider random 1000]]
]
set-telemedicine
set rxerType 2
]
if r > (low-spec + high-spec) and r <= (low-spec + high-spec + nonhigh-list)
[
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set BUP-years 1 + random-float 12
set specialist? FALSE set onList? TRUE set Rxing? TRUE set capHigh?
TRUE set willAdd? TRUE
ifelse non-high-list-random = 4 [set patients-per-provider highcap]
[
ifelse non-high-list-random = 2[ set patients-per-provider 30 +
round random-exponential 220 ] ;; goosing high end
[ifelse non-high-list-random = 1 [set patients-per-provider random
100][set patients-per-provider random 1000]]
while [patients-per-provider < 30 and non-high-list-random = 2]
[set patients-per-provider 20 + round random-exponential 40]
]
set rxerType 3
]
if r > (low-spec + high-spec + non-high-list) and r <= (low-spec +
high-spec + non-high-list + non-low-list)
[
set specialist? FALSE set onList? TRUE set Rxing? TRUE set capHigh?
FALSE
ifelse random 100 < pct-get-high-cap
[
ifelse non-low-list-random = 4 [set patients-per-provider highcap]
[
ifelse non-low-list-random = 2[set patients-per-provider 20 +
round random-exponential 40]
[ifelse non-low-list-random = 1 [set patients-per-provider random
100][set patients-per-provider random 200]]
while [patients-per-provider < 30 and non-low-list-random = 2]
[set patients-per-provider 20 + round random-exponential 40]
] ;; 7% will go on to get 100
set BUP-years random-float 1
set willAdd? TRUE
]
[
ifelse non-low-list-random = 4 [set patients-per-provider lowcap]
[
ifelse non-low-list-random = 2[set patients-per-provider round
random-normal 20 7 ] ;; calibrate to lower
[ifelse non-low-list-random = 1 [set patients-per-provider random
10][set patients-per-provider random 30]]
while [(patients-per-provider < 0 or patients-per-provider > 30)
and non-low-list-random = 2] [set patients-per-provider round randomnormal 20 7]
]
set BUP-years random-float 13
]
set rxerType 4
]
ifelse (low-spec + high-spec + non-high-list + non-low-list + nonlow-nolist) > (1 - pct-not-rxing) [
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if r > (low-spec + high-spec + non-high-list + non-low-list) and r
<= (low-spec + high-spec + non-high-list + non-low-list + non-lownolist )
[
set specialist? FALSE set onList? FALSE set Rxing? TRUE set
capHigh? FALSE
ifelse random 100 < pct-get-high-cap
[
ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 4 [set patients-per-provider
high-cap]
[
ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 2[set patients-per-provider 20 +
round random-exponential 40]
[ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 1 [set patients-per-provider
random 100][set patients-per-provider random 200]]
while [patients-per-provider < 30 and non-low-nolist-random =
2] [set patients-per-provider 20 + round random-exponential 40]
] ;; 7% will go on to get 100
set BUP-years random-float 1
set willAdd? TRUE
]
[
ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 4 [set patients-per-provider
low-cap]
[
ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 2[set patients-per-provider
round random-normal 20 7]
[ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 1 [set patients-per-provider
random 10][set patients-per-provider random 30]]
while [patients-per-provider < 0 or patients-per-provider >
30] [set patients-per-provider round random-normal 20 7]
]
set BUP-years random-float 13
]
set rxerType 5
]
if r > (low-spec + high-spec + non-high-list + non-low-list + nonlow-nolist )
[
set BUP-years random-float 13
set specialist? FALSE set onList? FALSE set Rxing? FALSE set
capHigh? FALSE
set patients-per-provider 0
set rxerType 6
]
]
[
if r > (low-spec + high-spec + non-high-list + non-low-list) and r
<= (1 - pct-not-rxing )
[
set specialist? FALSE set onList? FALSE set Rxing? TRUE set
capHigh? FALSE
ifelse random 100 < pct-get-high-cap
[
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ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 4 [set patients-per-provider
high-cap]
[
ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 2[set patients-per-provider 20 +
round random-exponential 40]
[ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 1 [set patients-per-provider
random 100][set patients-per-provider random 200]]
while [patients-per-provider < 30 and non-low-nolist-random =
2] [set patients-per-provider 20 + round random-exponential 40]
]
set BUP-years random-float 1
set willAdd? TRUE
]
[
ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 4 [set patients-per-provider
low-cap]
[
ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 2[set patients-per-provider
round random-normal 20 7]
[ifelse non-low-nolist-random = 1 [set patients-per-provider
random 10][set patients-per-provider random 30]]
while [patients-per-provider < 0 or patients-per-provider >
30] [set patients-per-provider round random-normal 20 7]
]
set BUP-years random-float 13
]
set rxerType 5
]
if r > (1 - pct-not-rxing)
[
set BUP-years random-float 13
set specialist? FALSE set onList? FALSE set Rxing? FALSE set
capHigh? FALSE
set patients-per-provider 0
set rxerType 6
]
]
if specialist? = 0 ;; anyone left over goes in this pile
[
set specialist? FALSE set onList? FALSE set Rxing? TRUE set
capHigh? FALSE
ifelse random 100 < pct-get-high-cap
[
set patients-per-provider 20 + round random-exponential 40
while [patients-per-provider < 30] [set patients-per-provider 20
+ round random-exponential 40]
set BUP-years random-float 1
set willAdd? TRUE
]
[
set patients-per-provider round random-normal 20 7
while [patients-per-provider < 0 or patients-per-provider > 30]
[set patients-per-provider round random-normal 20 7]
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set BUP-years random-float 13
]
set rxerType 7
]
end
to set-telemedicine
if telemedicine?[
if random 100 < pct-specialists-telemedicine[set do-telemedicine?
true]
]
end
to set-initial-doc-location
if doc-locations = "random-location"[
move-to one-of patches
]
if doc-locations = "baseline-model"
[
ifelse capHigh? = false[
let temp-my-patch-den random-lognormal 46300 9460
while [temp-my-patch-den > max-patch-density] [set temp-my-patchden random-lognormal 46300 9460]
let density-low-bound temp-my-patch-den - .4 * temp-my-patch-den
let density-upper-bound temp-my-patch-den + 4 * temp-my-patch-den
let move-to-patch one-of patches with [pop-den > density-lowbound AND pop-den < density-upper-bound]
if move-to-patch != nobody[ move-to move-to-patch]
]
[
let temp-my-patch-den random-lognormal 19600 5570
while [temp-my-patch-den > max-patch-density] [set temp-my-patchden random-lognormal 19600 5570]
let density-low-bound temp-my-patch-den - .4 * temp-my-patch-den
let density-upper-bound temp-my-patch-den + 4 * temp-my-patch-den
let move-to-patch one-of patches with [pop-den > density-lowbound AND pop-den < density-upper-bound]
if move-to-patch != nobody[ move-to move-to-patch]
]
]
end
to set-capacity
ask providers with [BUP-years < 1 and provider-type != "MTH-doc"][
ifelse (patients-per-provider > low-cap)
[set capped-patients-per-provider low-cap]
[set capped-patients-per-provider patients-per-provider]
if OTP-doc? = false [set total-capacity capped-patients-perprovider]
]
ask providers with [BUP-years >= 1 and provider-type != "MTH-doc"][
ifelse (patients-per-provider > high-cap)
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[set capped-patients-per-provider high-cap]
[set capped-patients-per-provider patients-per-provider]
if OTP-doc? = false [set total-capacity capped-patients-perprovider]
]
set open-capacity (sum [capped-patients-per-provider] of providers) (sum [count my-links] of providers)
end
to setup-APN
setup-PAs
setup-NPs
end
to setup-PAs
let number-PAs pa-pop * (total-pop / total-population) * pa-pcp-pct *
pct-NPs-PAs-rxing / 100
create-providers number-PAs[
set size 3
set color black
set provider-type "PA"
set OTP-doc? FALSE
set do-telemedicine? FALSE
set BUP-patients turtle-set nobody
set tele-patients turtle-set nobody
set MTH-patients turtle-set nobody
set-APN-characteristics
set-initial-APN-location
set-APN-practice-characteristics
]
end
to setup-NPs
let number-NPs np-pop * (total-pop / total-population) * np-pcp-pct *
pct-NPs-PAs-rxing / 100
create-providers number-NPs[
set size 3
set color black
set OTP-doc? FALSE
set do-telemedicine? FALSE
set BUP-patients turtle-set nobody
set tele-patients turtle-set nobody
set MTH-patients turtle-set nobody
set provider-type "NP"
set-APN-characteristics
set-initial-APN-location
set-APN-practice-characteristics
]
end
to set-APN-characteristics
set BUP-years 0.02
set specialist? FALSE set onList? TRUE set Rxing? TRUE set capHigh?
FALSE
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ifelse random 100 < pct-get-high-cap
[
if APN-random = 2[set patients-per-provider 30 + round randomexponential 220]
while [patients-per-provider < 0] [set patients-per-provider 30 +
round random-exponential 220]
set willAdd? TRUE
]
[
if APN-random = 2[set patients-per-provider 20 + round randomexponential 40 ]
while [patients-per-provider < 0 or patients-per-provider > 30]
[set patients-per-provider 20 + round random-exponential 40 ]
set willAdd? FALSE
]
end
to set-APN-practice-characteristics
while [visit-cost < lowest-cost] [set visit-cost visit-cost-mean +
random-normal visit-cost-mean visit-cost-mean]
set visit-cost APN-discount * visit-cost
set-insurance
if accepted-insurance-list = 0 [set accepted-insurance-list ["none"]]
end
to set-initial-APN-location
let t random-float 1
ifelse t < MUA-pct [
ifelse random-float 1 < remote-pct
[move-to one-of patches with [MUA? and pop-den < rural-threshold
and pop-den > 0]]
[move-to one-of patches with [MUA? and pop-den >= rural-threshold]]
]
[
move-to one-of patches with [MUA? = FALSE and count providers-here
> 0]
]
end
to create-dummy-doc
create-providers 1 [
ht
set provider-type "dummy"
set OTP-doc? FALSE
set do-telemedicine? FALSE
set accepted-insurance-list (list "none" "public" "private")
set total-capacity 100000
set capped-patients-per-provider 100000
set patients-per-provider 10000
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set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set
set

rxing? false
willAdd? false
specialist? false
capHigh? false
onList? false
BUP-patients turtle-set nobody
tele-patients turtle-set nobody
MTH-patients turtle-set nobody
BUP-years 10
dummy-doc self

]
end

Otp.nls
to setup-OTPs
set num-otps 1368
set va-pct 3
set gvt-pct 6
set pnp-pct 36
let number-OTPs floor (num-otps * (total-pop / total-population))
create-OTPs number-OTPs
[
set accepted-insurance-list (list)
set-OTP-location
set size 4
set shape "square"
set color 125
set-OTP-type-insurance
]
end
to set-OTP-type-insurance
let pct random 100
let cash-pct random 100
let private-pct random 100
let public-pct random 100
let nopay-pct random 100
let give-bup random 100
if pct < va-pct
[
set OTP-type "VA"
if cash-pct < 64 [set accepted-insurance-list lput "none" acceptedinsurance-list]
if private-pct < 91 [set accepted-insurance-list lput "private"
accepted-insurance-list]
if public-pct < 35[set accepted-insurance-list lput "public"
accepted-insurance-list]
ifelse nopay-pct < 94 [set no-pay? true][set no-pay? false]
ifelse give-bup < 94[set give-BUP? true][set give-BUP? false]
if empty? accepted-insurance-list [set accepted-insurance-list lput
"none" accepted-insurance-list]
while [MTH-spots <= 0][set MTH-spots round (random-normal 103 89)]
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]
if pct >= va-pct and pct < va-pct + gvt-pct
[set OTP-type "gvt"
if cash-pct < 92 [set accepted-insurance-list lput "none" acceptedinsurance-list]
if private-pct < 49 [set accepted-insurance-list lput "private"
accepted-insurance-list]
if public-pct < 71 [set accepted-insurance-list lput "public"
accepted-insurance-list]
ifelse nopay-pct < 70 [set no-pay? true][set no-pay? false]
ifelse give-bup < 35[set give-BUP? true][set give-BUP? false]
if empty? accepted-insurance-list [set accepted-insurance-list lput
"none" accepted-insurance-list]
while [MTH-spots <= 0][set MTH-spots round (random-normal 362 469
)]
]
if pct >= va-pct + gvt-pct and pct < va-pct + gvt-pct + pnp-pct
[set OTP-type "PNP"
if cash-pct < 96 [set accepted-insurance-list lput "none" acceptedinsurance-list]
if private-pct < 58 [set accepted-insurance-list lput "private"
accepted-insurance-list]
if public-pct < 92 [set accepted-insurance-list lput "public"
accepted-insurance-list]
ifelse nopay-pct < 44 [set no-pay? true][set no-pay? false]
ifelse give-bup < 44[set give-BUP? true][set give-BUP? false]
if empty? accepted-insurance-list [set accepted-insurance-list lput
"none" accepted-insurance-list]
while [MTH-spots <= 0][set MTH-spots round (random-normal 235 213)]
]
if pct >= va-pct + gvt-pct + pnp-pct
[set OTP-type "PFP"
if cash-pct < 100[set accepted-insurance-list lput "none" acceptedinsurance-list]
if private-pct < 33[set accepted-insurance-list lput "private"
accepted-insurance-list]
if public-pct < 46 [set accepted-insurance-list lput "public"
accepted-insurance-list]
ifelse nopay-pct < 8 [set no-pay? true][set no-pay? false]
ifelse give-bup < 48[set give-BUP? true][set give-BUP? false]
if empty? accepted-insurance-list [set accepted-insurance-list lput
"none" accepted-insurance-list]
while [MTH-spots <= 0][set MTH-spots round (random-normal 255 204)]
]
end
to set-OTP-location
ifelse doc-locations = "random-location" [
move-to one-of patches
]
[
let OTP-location-den 3 + random-lognormal 32900 9050
let max-den max [pop-den] of patches
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while [OTP-location-den > max-den] [set OTP-location-den randomlognormal 32900 9050]
let density-low-bound OTP-location-den - .4 * OTP-location-den
let density-upper-bound OTP-location-den + 4 * OTP-location-den
if one-of patches with [pop-den > density-low-bound AND pop-den <
density-upper-bound] != nobody[ move-to one-of patches with [pop-den >
density-low-bound AND pop-den < density-upper-bound]]
]
end
to init-OTPs
let temp-list accepted-insurance-list
let my-patch patch-here
let temp-MTH-spots MTH-spots
let temp-no-pay? no-pay?
ifelse give-BUP?
[
ask n-of 2 providers with [specialist? and capHigh?]
[
move-to my-patch
set onList? TRUE set Rxing? TRUE
set OTP-doc? TRUE
set MTH-spots round (temp-MTH-spots / 2)
set capped-patients-per-provider high-cap
set total-capacity (capped-patients-per-provider + MTH-spots)
set do-telemedicine? FALSE
set BUP-patients turtle-set nobody
set tele-patients turtle-set nobody
set MTH-patients turtle-set nobody
set accepted-insurance-list (list)
set colleagues other providers in-radius colleague-radius
foreach temp-list[x -> set accepted-insurance-list fput x
accepted-insurance-list]
set no-pay? temp-no-pay?]
set OTP-docs providers-here
]
[
let num-doc 1 + random 2
hatch-providers num-doc
[
set specialist? true
set onList? false
set Rxing? false
set CapHigh? false
set willAdd? false
set provider-type "MTH-doc"
set do-telemedicine? false
set BUP-patients turtle-set nobody
set tele-patients turtle-set nobody
set MTH-patients turtle-set nobody
set patients-per-provider 0
set capped-patients-per-provider 0
set MTH-spots round (temp-MTH-spots / num-doc)
set total-capacity MTH-spots
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set accepted-insurance-list (list)
foreach temp-list[x -> set accepted-insurance-list fput x
accepted-insurance-list]
set visit-cost 40 + random 60
set OTP-doc? true
set colleagues other providers in-radius colleague-radius
if not any? colleagues [let other-guys min-n-of 2 providers
[distance myself] set other-guys other other-guys set colleagues otherguys ]
set no-pay? temp-no-pay?
]
set OTP-docs providers-here with [provider-type = "MTH-doc"]
]
end

PtSetup.nls
to setup-patients
ask n-of (number-patients) deps [init-patient]
ask patients[set-initial-intreatment]
ask patients with [getting-bup-weeks > -1][get-provider]
end
to init-patient
set pt? true
set-dose
set monthly-medication-cost dose * medication-cost-base
set-provider-groups
set color blue
st
end
to set-dose
ifelse random 100 < dose-sixteen [set dose 16]
[ifelse random 100 < dose-eight [set dose 8]
[ifelse random 100 < dose-tfour [set dose 24]
[set dose 32]
]
]
if dose = 0 [set dose 16]
end
to set-provider-groups
let inradius-OTP-docs providers with [provider-type = "MTH-doc" and
member? [insurance] of myself accepted-insurance-list and distance
myself < [my-travel-distance] of myself]
let inradius-providers providers with [onList? and member?
[insurance] of myself accepted-insurance-list and distance myself <
[my-travel-distance] of myself]
set inradius-providers (turtle-set inradius-OTP-docs inradiusproviders)
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let ref-OTP-provider min-one-of inradius-providers with [otpdoc?][distance myself]
let ref-provider min-one-of inradius-providers with [otp-doc? =
false][distance myself]
if ref-OTP-provider != nobody
[
set my-provider ref-OTP-provider
set indexprovider 0
set too-far? FALSE
set provider-group (turtle-set my-provider provider-group)
]
ifelse ref-provider != nobody
[
if my-provider = nobody or ref-OTP-provider = nobody or
distance ref-provider < distance ref-OTP-provider [set my-provider refprovider]
set indexprovider 0
set too-far? FALSE
set provider-group (turtle-set ref-provider ref-OTP-provider)
]
[
if telemedicine?[ set provider-group turtle-set providers with
[do-telemedicine? and onList? and member? [insurance] of myself
accepted-insurance-list = TRUE]]
ifelse provider-group = nobody [set my-provider dummy-doc ]
[set my-provider one-of
provider-group]
if my-provider = nobody [set my-provider dummy-doc]
]
set seeking-BUP? true
set sought? TRUE
end
to set-initial-intreatment
if random-float 1 < initial-pct-patients-in-tx
[
set seeking-BUP? false
set sought? false
set getting-BUP-weeks ceiling random-exponential 10
if my-provider != dummy-doc[
set provider-group
(turtle-set my-provider
([colleagues] of my-provider) with [member? [insurance] of
myself accepted-insurance-list = TRUE]
providers with [do-telemedicine? and member? [insurance] of
myself accepted-insurance-list = TRUE])
]
]
end
to set-distance ;; plug for data on willingness to travel.
if [pop-den] of patch-here > 5000 [draw-5000]
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if [pop-den] of patch-here < 5000 and [pop-den] of patch-here > 2500
[draw-2500]
if [pop-den] of patch-here < 2500 and [pop-den] of patch-here > 1000
[draw-1000]
if [pop-den] of patch-here < 1000 and [pop-den] of patch-here > 500
[draw-500]
if [pop-den] of patch-here < 500 and [pop-den] of patch-here > 250
[draw-250]
if [pop-den] of patch-here < 250 and [pop-den] of patch-here > 100
[draw-100]
if [pop-den] of patch-here < 100 and [pop-den] of patch-here > 50
[draw-50]
if [pop-den] of patch-here < 50 and [pop-den] of patch-here > 25
[draw-25]
if [pop-den] of patch-here < 25 and [pop-den] of patch-here > 10
[draw-10]
if [pop-den] of patch-here < 10 and [pop-den] of patch-here > 0
[draw-0]
if my-travel-distance = 0 [set my-travel-distance 5]
end
to draw-5000
let nn random-float 1
if nn < 1 [set my-travel-distance 100]
if nn < .985085 [set my-travel-distance 95]
if nn < .9849 [set my-travel-distance 90]
if nn < .9843 [set my-travel-distance 85]
if nn < .9841 [set my-travel-distance 80]
if nn < .9835 [set my-travel-distance 75]
if nn < .9820 [set my-travel-distance 70]
if nn < .9813 [set my-travel-distance 65]
if nn < .9808 [set my-travel-distance 60]
if nn < .9757 [set my-travel-distance 55]
if nn < .9749 [set my-travel-distance 50]
if nn < .9567 [set my-travel-distance 45]
if nn < .9525 [set my-travel-distance 40]
if nn < .94012 [set my-travel-distance 35]
if nn < .931733 [set my-travel-distance 30]
if nn < .8922 [set my-travel-distance 25]
if nn < .85049 [set my-travel-distance 20]
if nn < .7391 [set my-travel-distance 15]
if nn < .5769 [set my-travel-distance 10 ]
if nn < .218 [set my-travel-distance 5]
end
to draw-2500
let nn random-float 1
if nn < 1 [set my-travel-distance 100]
if nn < .97884343 [set my-travel-distance 95]
if nn < 0.978667137
[set my-travel-distance 90]
if nn < 0.977697461
[set my-travel-distance 85]
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if nn < 0.977433004
[set my-travel-distance 80]
if nn < 0.975141044
[set my-travel-distance 75]
if nn < 0.97196756
[set my-travel-distance 70]
if nn < 0.969851904
[set my-travel-distance 65]
if nn < 0.967295487
[set my-travel-distance 60]
if nn < 0.954777856
[set my-travel-distance 55]
if nn < 0.951428068
[set my-travel-distance 50]
if nn < 0.91969323
[set my-travel-distance 45]
if nn < 0.911583216
[set my-travel-distance 40]
if nn < 0.888751763
[set my-travel-distance 35]
if nn < 0.871385755
[set my-travel-distance 30]
if nn < 0.79698519
[set my-travel-distance 25]
if nn < 0.719058533
[set my-travel-distance 20]
if nn < 0.527062764
[set my-travel-distance 15]
if nn < 0.298748237
[set my-travel-distance 10 ]
if nn < 0.052803244
[set my-travel-distance 5]
end
to draw-1000
let nn random-float 1
if nn < 1 [set my-travel-distance 100]
if nn < 0.980004957
[set my-travel-distance 95]
if nn < 0.979426588
[set my-travel-distance 90]
if nn < 0.977939354
[set my-travel-distance 85]
if nn < 0.977360985
[set my-travel-distance 80]
if nn < 0.974221267
[set my-travel-distance 75]
if nn < 0.968602826
[set my-travel-distance 70]
if nn < 0.963480129
[set my-travel-distance 65]
if nn < 0.959431546
[set my-travel-distance 60]
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if nn < 0.941832603
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.936296786
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.896554573
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.884491448
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.849458812
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.820457738
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.71759068
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.603734611
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.387341981
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.175989424
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.025448236
[set my-travel-distance

55]
50]
45]
40]
35]
30]
25]
20]
15]
10 ]
5]

end
to draw-500
let nn random-float 1
if nn < 1 [set my-travel-distance 100]
if nn < 0.970779221
[set my-travel-distance 95]
if nn < 0.97038961
[set my-travel-distance 90]
if nn < 0.967662338
[set my-travel-distance 85]
if nn < 0.965844156
[set my-travel-distance 80]
if nn < 0.961038961
[set my-travel-distance 75]
if nn < 0.954415584
[set my-travel-distance 70]
if nn < 0.947922078
[set my-travel-distance 65]
if nn < 0.93974026
[set my-travel-distance 60]
if nn < 0.916753247
[set my-travel-distance 55]
if nn < 0.906363636
[set my-travel-distance 50]
if nn < 0.843766234
[set my-travel-distance 45]
if nn < 0.820649351
[set my-travel-distance 40]
if nn < 0.76987013
[set my-travel-distance 35]
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if nn < 0.717012987
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.578961039
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.436103896
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.231688312
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.09012987
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.015064935
[set my-travel-distance

30]
25]
20]
15]
10 ]
5]

end
to draw-250
let nn random-float 1
if nn < 1 [set my-travel-distance 100]
if nn < 0.952435312
[set my-travel-distance 95]
if nn < 0.951674277
[set my-travel-distance 90]
if nn < 0.945459158
[set my-travel-distance 85]
if nn < 0.941146626
[set my-travel-distance 80]
if nn < 0.932648402
[set my-travel-distance 75]
if nn < 0.917047184
[set my-travel-distance 70]
if nn < 0.900431253
[set my-travel-distance 65]
if nn < 0.887747336
[set my-travel-distance 60]
if nn < 0.846905124
[set my-travel-distance 55]
if nn < 0.829020802
[set my-travel-distance 50]
if nn < 0.745560629
[set my-travel-distance 45]
if nn < 0.70890411
[set my-travel-distance 40]
if nn < 0.643708777
[set my-travel-distance 35]
if nn < 0.581557585
[set my-travel-distance 30]
if nn < 0.428589548
[set my-travel-distance 25]
if nn < 0.297945205
[set my-travel-distance 20]
if nn < 0.14028412
[set my-travel-distance 15]
if nn < 0.063926941
[set my-travel-distance 10 ]
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if nn < 0.013191273
[set my-travel-distance 5]
end
to draw-100
let nn random-float 1
if nn < 1 [set my-travel-distance 100 ]
if nn < 0.925048411
[set my-travel-distance 95]
if nn < 0.92322588
[set my-travel-distance 90]
if nn < 0.916733113
[set my-travel-distance 85]
if nn < 0.912632418
[set my-travel-distance 80]
if nn < 0.898849527
[set my-travel-distance 75]
if nn < 0.877206971
[set my-travel-distance 70]
if nn < 0.855222691
[set my-travel-distance 65]
if nn < 0.832896685
[set my-travel-distance 60]
if nn < 0.770816722
[set my-travel-distance 55]
if nn < 0.74074496
[set my-travel-distance 50]
if nn < 0.612826062
[set my-travel-distance 45]
if nn < 0.56133956
[set my-travel-distance 40]
if nn < 0.47385807
[set my-travel-distance 35]
if nn < 0.402323727
[set my-travel-distance 30]
if nn < 0.256065611
[set my-travel-distance 25]
if nn < 0.163116528
[set my-travel-distance 20]
if nn < 0.071989976
[set my-travel-distance 15]
if nn < 0.032577742
[set my-travel-distance 10 ]
if nn < 0.009112655
[set my-travel-distance 5]
end
to draw-50
let nn random-float 1
if nn < 1
[set my-travel-distance 100]
if nn < 0.952435312
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[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.951674277
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.945459158
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.941146626
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.932648402
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.917047184
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.900431253
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.887747336
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.846905124
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.829020802
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.745560629
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.70890411
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.643708777
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.581557585
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.428589548
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.297945205
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.14028412
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.063926941
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.013191273
[set my-travel-distance

95]
90]
85]
80]
75]
70]
65]
60]
55]
50]
45]
40]
35]
30]
25]
20]
15]
10 ]
5]

end
to draw-25
let nn random-float 1
if nn < 1
[set my-travel-distance 100]
if nn < 0.842581661
[set my-travel-distance 95]
if nn < 0.839433294
[set my-travel-distance 90]
if nn < 0.826446281
[set my-travel-distance 85]
if nn < 0.807949626
[set my-travel-distance 80]
if nn < 0.780401417
[set my-travel-distance 75]
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if nn < 0.733175915
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.690279418
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.662337662
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.556080283
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.50806769
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.346713892
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.303423849
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.225108225
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.174734357
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.093663912
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.058638331
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.029515939
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.018103109
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.008658009
[set my-travel-distance

70]
65]
60]
55]
50]
45]
40]
35]
30]
25]
20]
15]
10 ]
5]

end
to draw-10
let nn random-float 1
if nn < 1
[set my-travel-distance 100]
if nn < 0.72
[set my-travel-distance 95]
if nn < 0.714545455
[set my-travel-distance 90]
if nn < 0.691818182
[set my-travel-distance 85]
if nn < 0.680909091
[set my-travel-distance 80]
if nn < 0.647272727
[set my-travel-distance 75]
if nn < 0.595454545
[set my-travel-distance 70]
if nn < 0.551818182
[set my-travel-distance 65]
if nn < 0.515454545
[set my-travel-distance 60]
if nn < 0.431818182
[set my-travel-distance 55]
if nn < 0.394545455

318
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.26
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.222727273
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.166363636
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.132727273
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.072727273
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.054545455
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.023636364
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.015454545
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.008181818
[set my-travel-distance

50]
45]
40]
35]
30]
25]
20]
15]
10 ]
5]

end
to draw-0
let nn random-float 1
if nn < 1
[set my-travel-distance 100]
if nn < 0.48372093
[set my-travel-distance 95]
if nn < 0.479069767
[set my-travel-distance 90]
if nn < 0.460465116
[set my-travel-distance 85]
if nn < 0.446511628
[set my-travel-distance 80]
if nn < 0.41627907
[set my-travel-distance 75]
if nn < 0.381395349
[set my-travel-distance 70]
if nn < 0.360465116
[set my-travel-distance 65]
if nn < 0.334883721
[set my-travel-distance 60]
if nn < 0.272093023
[set my-travel-distance 55]
if nn < 0.255813953
[set my-travel-distance 50]
if nn < 0.202325581
[set my-travel-distance 45]
if nn < 0.186046512
[set my-travel-distance 40]
if nn < 0.16744186
[set my-travel-distance 35]
if nn < 0.162790698
[set my-travel-distance 30]
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if nn < 0.125581395
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.104651163
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.072093023
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.06744186
[set my-travel-distance
if nn < 0.034883721
[set my-travel-distance

25]
20]
15]
10 ]
5]

end

ProviderGo.nls
to age-providers
let short-tick 1 / 52
add-docs
ask providers [
set BUP-years BUP-years + short-tick
if BUP-years > 1 AND BUP-years < 2 and willAdd?
[
set capped-patients-per-provider patients-per-provider
if patients-per-provider > high-cap [set capped-patients-perprovider high-cap]
]
]
end
to add-docs
let weekrate 0
let randomizer weekly-add-docs - floor weekly-add-docs
ifelse random-float 1 < randomizer [set weekrate floor weekly-adddocs + 1][set weekrate floor weekly-add-docs]
create-providers weekrate [
set color black
set-initial-doc-location
set BUP-years 0
set provider-type "doc"
set OTP-doc? FALSE
set do-telemedicine? FALSE
set BUP-patients turtle-set nobody
set tele-patients turtle-set nobody
set MTH-patients turtle-set nobody
set-practice-characteristics
set-doc-characteristics
set-capacity
set colleagues other providers in-radius colleague-radius
if not any? colleagues [let other-guys min-n-of 2 providers
[distance myself] set other-guys other other-guys set colleagues otherguys ]
]
set number-docs count providers with [provider-type = "doc"]
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end

GoCommands.nls
to do-street-market
diffuse pills-here (8 / 9)
set patches-with-pills patches with [pills-here > 0]
if show-street-market? [
ask turtles [ht]
ask patches [set pcolor scale-color green pills-here 0 20]
]
end
to grow-deps
let num-new-deps ((pts-dependent * dep-incidence * total-pop / (totalpopulation * 52)))
create-deps num-new-deps [set-initial-dep-stats]
end
to chance-OD
ask nonpats [
let m random-float 1
ifelse weeks-of-pills >= 1 [
set weeks-of-pills weeks-of-pills - 1
if m < (ods-pts-in-tx / (1000 * 52 ))[
set ods-deps ods-deps + 1 die
]
]
[
if weeks-of-pills > 0
[
set weeks-of-pills 0
]
if m < (od-deps-CMR / (1000 * 52))[
set ods-deps ods-deps + 1 die
]
]
]
end
to reset-flagged-vars
if ticks mod 52 - 8 = 0
[
ask deps with [no-access-flag? and recipient-flag? = FALSE][ht]
ask deps with [seeking-bup? = false and getting-bup-weeks = -1][ht]
ask deps with [recipient-flag?][set recipient-flag? FALSE]
ask deps with [got-any-tx-flag?][set got-any-tx-flag? FALSE]
ask deps with [getting-BUP-weeks >= 0][set recipient-flag? TRUE set
got-any-tx-flag? TRUE]
ask deps with [getting-BUP-weeks = -200][set got-any-tx-flag? TRUE
]
ask deps with [getting-BUP-weeks = -1] [set recipient-flag? FALSE
set got-any-tx-flag? FALSE]
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ask deps [set no-access-flag? FALSE]
ask deps [set sought? FALSE]
]
reset-counters
end
to reset-counters
if ticks mod 52 - 8 = 0 [
set ODs-pats 0
set ODs-deps 0
set diverted-medicine 0
]
end

PtGo.nls
to age-patients
let current-patients patients
ask current-patients with [(getting-BUP-weeks != -1 or stableabstinence?) ][if random-float 1 < (ods-pts-in-tx / (1000 * 52 ))
[stop-provider-link set-dead]]
ask current-patients with [weeks-waiting > my-wait-threshold ][dorelapse];;
ask current-patients with [getting-bup-weeks = -200][do-methadone]
ask current-patients with [getting-bup-weeks >= 0][do-buprenorphine]
ask current-patients with [waitlisted? and getting-bup-weeks = 1][initiate-tx]
ask current-patients with [waitlisted? = false and getting-bup-weeks =
-1][initiate-tx]
start-seeking-tx
end
to stop-provider-link
ifelse getting-bup-weeks = -200 [
let local-mth-set [MTH-patients] of my-provider
set local-mth-set other local-mth-set
ask my-provider [
set MTH-patients local-mth-set
]
]
[
let local-BUP-set [BUP-patients] of my-provider
let local-TELE-set [tele-patients] of my-provider
if member? self local-BUP-set [
set local-BUP-set other local-BUP-set
ask my-provider [
set BUP-patients local-BUP-set
]
]
if member? self local-TELE-set [
set local-TELE-set other local-TELE-set
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ask my-provider [
set tele-patients local-TELE-set
]
]
]
end
to set-dead
ifelse getting-bup-weeks = -1 and stable-abstinence? = false
[set ods-deps ods-deps + 1]
[set ods-pats ods-pats + 1]
die
end

to do-relapse
set relapse? true
set pt? false
set getting-bup-weeks -1
set seeking-bup? false
set indexprovider 0
set color white
if weeks-of-pills > 0 and getting-bup-weeks > 4
[ask patch-here [set pills-here pills-here + [weeks-of-pills] of
myself * [dose] of myself]]
if weeks-of-pills > 0 and getting-bup-weeks < 4
[ask patch-here [set pills-here pills-here + (([weeks-of-pills] of
myself * [dose] of myself) / 4)]]
end
to do-methadone
if random-float 1 < mth-weekly-quit-rate [
stop-provider-link
if random-float 1 < (post-tx-die / (1000 * 52 )) [set getting-bupweeks -1 set-dead]
do-relapse
]
end
to do-buprenorphine
ifelse (getting-BUP-weeks = 0 AND random 100 < first-week-bup-quit)
or (getting-BUP-weeks = 1 AND random 100 < second-week-bup-quit)
or (getting-BUP-weeks >= 2 AND random 500 < (100 / getting-BUPweeks))
[
stop-provider-link
if random-float 1 < (post-tx-die / (1000 * 52 )) [set gettingbup-weeks -1 set-dead]
do-relapse
]
[
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ifelse getting-BUP-weeks >= abstinence-threshold
[
stop-provider-link
set getting-BUP-weeks -1
set relapse? false
set stable-abstinence? true
set color pink
]
[
get-pills
divert-pills
use-pills
set getting-BUP-weeks getting-BUP-weeks + 1
set relapse? false
]
]
end
to get-pills
if getting-BUP-weeks mod 4 = 0
[
set weeks-of-pills 4
ifelse getting-BUP-weeks != 0
[
ifelse [accepted-insurance-list] of my-provider = ["none"]
[set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment [visit-cost] of my-provider +
monthly-medication-cost * (100 - coinsurance) / 100 ]
[set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment [visit-cost] of my-provider *
(100 - coinsurance) / 100 + monthly-medication-cost * (100 coinsurance) / 100 ]
set total-tx-cost total-tx-cost + [visit-cost] of my-provider +
monthly-medication-cost
]
[
ifelse [accepted-insurance-list] of my-provider = ["none"]
[set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment [visit-cost] of my-provider *
2 + monthly-medication-cost * (100 - coinsurance) / 100 ]
[set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment [visit-cost] of my-provider *
2 * (100 - coinsurance) / 100 + monthly-medication-cost * (100 coinsurance) / 100 ]
set total-tx-cost total-tx-cost + [visit-cost] of my-provider * 2
+ monthly-medication-cost
]
ifelse monthly-out-of-pocket-payment > income * pct-of-income [set
cantAfford? TRUE][set cantAfford? FALSE]
]
end
to divert-pills
let need-money false
if poverty < 3 and wanted$ > random 5200 [set need-money true]
ifelse cantAfford? = true and random 5200 < divertAfford
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[
let m one-of [ .14 .28 .35]
if weeks-of-pills - m > 0[
set weeks-of-pills weeks-of-pills - m
set diverted-medicine diverted-medicine + (m * dose)
set have-diverted? True
set divert-reason lput "afford" divert-reason
ask patch-here [set pills-here m * [dose] of myself ]
]
]
[
if need-money = true
[
let m one-of [ .14 .28 .35]
if weeks-of-pills - m > 0[
set weeks-of-pills weeks-of-pills - m
set diverted-medicine diverted-medicine + (m * dose)
set have-diverted? True
set divert-reason lput "money" divert-reason
ask patch-here [set pills-here m * [dose] of myself ]
]
]
]
end
to use-pills
set weeks-of-pills weeks-of-pills - 1
if weeks-of-pills <= 0 [set weeks-of-pills 0]
end
to initiate-tx
if seeking-BUP?
[
get-provider
]
end
to get-provider ;;
ifelse [provider-type] of my-provider = "dummy"
[
ifelse any? insurance-not-dummies with [distance myself < [mytravel-distance] of myself]
[set-provider-groups]
[
set no-access-flag? TRUE
set too-far? true
set getting-BUP-weeks -1
set seeking-BUP? true
set sought? true
set got-any-tx-flag? false
set recipient-flag? false
set color yellow
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st
set size 1
get-diverted-bup
]
]
[
ifelse provider-group != nobody and (indexprovider < count
provider-group)
[
if indexprovider = 1 or waitlisted?[set provider-list sort-on
[distance myself] provider-group]
if indexprovider != 0 [set my-provider item indexprovider
provider-list]
ifelse my-travel-distance < distance my-provider
[
set no-access-flag? TRUE
set getting-BUP-weeks -1
set seeking-BUP? true
set sought? true
set got-any-tx-flag? false
set color orange + 2
set waitlisted? true
st
set size 1
try-telemedicine
if getting-BUP-weeks = -1 [
get-diverted-bup
]
]
[
ifelse ([provider-type] of my-provider = "MTH-doc" and
([count MTH-patients] of my-provider < ([total-capacity] of myprovider) ))
;
[
try-to-start-mth-tx
if getting-bup-weeks = -200
[
set color red
add-to-MTH-list
]
]
[
ifelse(getting-bup-weeks != -200 and ([count tele-patients]
of my-provider + [count BUP-patients] of my-provider) < ([totalcapacity] of my-provider))
[
set color black
start-tx
if getting-bup-weeks >= 0 and recipient-flag? [
add-to-BUP-list
]
if getting-bup-weeks = -200
[
set color red
add-to-MTH-list
]
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]
[
set indexprovider indexprovider + 1
get-provider
]
]
]
]
[
if getting-bup-weeks = -1
[set color orange
st
set size 1
set no-access-flag? TRUE
set waitlisted? true
set provider-group
(turtle-set my-provider
([colleagues] of my-provider) with [member? [insurance] of
myself accepted-insurance-list = TRUE]
providers with [do-telemedicine? and member? [insurance] of
myself accepted-insurance-list = TRUE]
)
set indexprovider 0
get-diverted-bup
set seeking-BUP? true set sought? true
set getting-BUP-weeks -1
set my-provider min-one-of provider-group [distance myself]
]
]
]
end

to try-telemedicine
let teledocs turtle-set provider-group with [do-telemedicine? and
capped-patients-per-provider - (count BUP-patients + count telepatients) > 0]
if any? teledocs
[
set my-provider one-of teledocs
start-tx
ifelse getting-bup-weeks >= 0 and seeking-bup? = FALSE
[
add-to-tele-list
]
[set getting-bup-weeks -1 set waitlisted? true]
]
end
to get-diverted-bup
if random-float 5200 < percentSayYes
if ask-friends-for-pills = true

[
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[set have-purchased-pills? true set pill-source lput "friends"
pill-source ]
]
ifelse weeks-of-pills >= 1 [set relapse? false ]
[
let street-market patches-with-pills with [distance myself < [mytravel-distance] of myself]
let pills-on-street sum [pills-here] of street-market
if pills-on-street > 0[
ifelse pills-on-street <= dose * 7 * (1 - weeks-of-pills)
[
set weeks-waiting weeks-waiting + 1
set weeks-of-pills weeks-of-pills + (pills-on-street / (dose
* 7))
]
[
set weeks-of-pills 1
set relapse? false
]
buy-street-pills street-market pills-on-street
set have-purchased-pills? true
set pill-source lput "street" pill-source
]
]
if have-purchased-pills? = false [set weeks-waiting weeks-waiting +
1]
end

to-report ask-friends-for-pills
let purchased-pills? false
let my-radius min list 5 my-travel-distance
let candidate-friends other patients with [weeks-of-pills > 0 and
distance myself < my-radius ]
let friends n-of min list 5 count candidate-friends candidate-friends
let total-pills sum [weeks-of-pills] of friends
while [any? friends and purchased-pills? = FALSE and total-pills >
0][
ask one-of friends [
let m ([dose] of myself / dose)
if m > 1 [set m 1]
if weeks-of-pills - m > 0
[
set weeks-of-pills weeks-of-pills - m
set diverted-medicine diverted-medicine + (m * dose)
set have-diverted? true
set divert-reason lput "friends" divert-reason
set purchased-pills? true
ask myself [set weeks-of-pills m]
]
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set friends turtle-set other friends
]
]
ifelse purchased-pills? [report TRUE]
[report FALSE]
end
to buy-street-pills [street-market pills-on-street]
let purchased-pills 0
let pill-need dose * 7 * (1 - weeks-of-pills)
ifelse pills-on-street > pill-need
[
while [purchased-pills < pill-need]
[
if any? street-market with [pills-here > 0] [
ask one-of street-market with [pills-here > 0]
[
ifelse pills-here < ([pill-need] of myself - purchased-pills)
[ set purchased-pills purchased-pills + pills-here set pillshere 0 set street-market other street-market ]
[ set pills-here pills-here - purchased-pills set purchasedpills [pill-need] of myself ]
]
]
]
]
[set purchased-pills pills-on-street ask street-market [set pills-here
0 ]]
end
to start-tx
ifelse [OTP-doc?] of my-provider = true ;
[
ifelse [provider-type] of my-provider = "MTH-doc"
[try-to-start-mth-tx]
[try-to-start-bup-or-mth-tx]
]
[start-bup-tx]
end
to try-to-start-mth-tx
let temp-no-pay? [no-pay?] of my-provider
let cantAffordMTH? FALSE
let have-MTH-spots [MTH-spots] of my-provider
let number-MTH-pts [count MTH-patients] of my-provider
ifelse [accepted-insurance-list] of my-provider = ["none"]
[set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment mth-cost ]
[set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment mth-cost * (100 - coinsurance) /
100]
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if monthly-out-of-pocket-payment > income * pct-of-income [set
cantAffordMTH? TRUE]
ifelse ((cantAffordMTH? = FALSE or (cantAffordMTH? and temp-no-pay?))
and ((have-MTH-spots - number-MTH-pts) > 0))
[
ifelse [otp-doc?] of my-provider = false
[error "methadone error here" start-mth-tx]
[start-mth-tx]
]
[
set getting-bup-weeks -1
set waitlisted? TRUE
set cantAfford? TRUE
set provider-group
(turtle-set my-provider
([colleagues] of my-provider) with [member? [insurance] of
myself accepted-insurance-list = TRUE]
providers with [do-telemedicine? and member? [insurance] of
myself accepted-insurance-list = TRUE]
)
set indexprovider indexprovider + 1
get-provider
]
end

to start-mth-tx
set recipient-flag? false
set getting-BUP-weeks -200
set got-any-tx-flag? TRUE
set seeking-BUP? false
set relapse? false
set stable-abstinence? false
set cantAfford? false
set waitlisted? FALSE
set color green - 2
set too-far? FALSE
set weeks-waiting 0
end
to try-to-start-bup-or-mth-tx
let number-bup-pts (count ([BUP-patients ] of my-provider) + count
([tele-patients] of my-provider))
ifelse [accepted-insurance-list] of my-provider = ["none"]
[set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment [visit-cost] of my-provider +
monthly-medication-cost * (100 - coinsurance) / 100]
[set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment [visit-cost] of my-provider *
(100 - coinsurance) / 100 + monthly-medication-cost * (100 coinsurance)/ 100]
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if monthly-out-of-pocket-payment > income * pct-of-income [set
cantAfford? TRUE]
ifelse number-bup-pts < [capped-patients-per-provider] of my-provider
and cantAfford? = FALSE and random 100 < pct-try-bup-first
[start-bup-tx]
[if [otp-doc?] of my-provider = TRUE[try-to-start-mth-tx]]
end
to start-bup-tx
set recipient-flag? TRUE
set getting-BUP-weeks getting-BUP-weeks + 1
set got-any-tx-flag? TRUE
set seeking-BUP? false
set relapse? false
set stable-abstinence? false
st
set color green
set size 1
set waitlisted? FALSE
set weeks-waiting 0
ifelse [accepted-insurance-list] of my-provider = ["none"]
[set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment [visit-cost] of my-provider
monthly-medication-cost * (100 - coinsurance) / 100]
[set monthly-out-of-pocket-payment [visit-cost] of my-provider
(100 - coinsurance) / 100 + monthly-medication-cost * (100 coinsurance)/ 100]
set total-tx-cost total-tx-cost + [visit-cost] of my-provider +
monthly-medication-cost
if monthly-out-of-pocket-payment > income * pct-of-income [set
cantAfford? TRUE]
end

+
*

to start-seeking-tx
ask n-of (round (count deps * seeking-incidence / 52)) deps [
init-patient
set sought? true
]
end
to add-to-BUP-list
ask my-provider[set BUP-patients (turtle-set BUP-patients myself)]
end
to add-to-MTH-list
ask my-provider[set MTH-patients (turtle-set MTH-patients myself)]
end
to add-to-tele-list
ask my-provider[set tele-patients (turtle-set tele-patients myself)]
end
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Reporters.nls
to-report random-lognormal[densd denmean]
let sigmaden sqrt (ln (((densd * densd) / (denmean * denmean)) + 1))
let mu ln (denmean) - (sigmaden / 2)
report (exp (random-normal mu sigmaden) )
; show mu
; show sigmaden
end
to-report patients
report deps with [pt?]
end
to-report nonpats
report deps with [pt? = false]
end
to-report not-dummies
report providers with [provider-type != "dummy"]
end
to-report insurance-not-dummies
report providers with [provider-type != "dummy" and member?
[insurance] of myself accepted-insurance-list = TRUE]
end
to-report real-providers
report providers with [provider-type != "dummy"]
end
to-report total-pop
report sum [pop-den] of patches
end

